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INTRODUCTION
For more than thirty years, as a serving officer of the British Transport Police, I have 
attempted to answer questions put to me by family, friends, acquaintances and complete 
strangers about my job in particular and the Force in general. In 1987,1 was asked by the 
then Deputy Chief Constable Ted Coles, to take on a research programme, ostensibly to 
assist a team of Management Consultants to conduct a strategic review of the Force. Many 
of the question^ to which they sought answers were those which I had been asked before. 
In consequence, using some of the material I prepared for them, together with further 
research conducted before and since, I have in this study attempted, as comprehensively as 
possible to cover a whole range of activities and draw conclusions as to the case for the 
continuing existence of the Force either in its' present form or as a more integral part of the 
Police service in Great Britain.
It will become apparent that my primary objective throughout the study is to examine the 
evidence relating to the question of whether the British Transport Police officer is equal in 
status to any 'public' police officer of any U.K. police force. The manner in which the B.T. 
Police Force has developed historically seems to be almost accidental, but government 
attitudes which have prevailed for almost a century and a half have resulted in this highly 
professional group, nevertheless remaining outside the umbrella of policing in many 
respects, despite contributing on a national scale to the safety and security of the entire 
community of England, Wales and Scotland. Having examined all available relevant 
evidence, the case will be made that the B.T. Police officer is indeed equal.
Research has been difficult - records have not been retained over the years and much of 
the history of the early railway, dock, port and canal police forces has been lost. Reliance 
on William Owen Gays paper, produced in 1973, has been necessary to examine the early 
years. Annual Reports by Chief Constables from 1960 (when they commenced) have been 
invaluable as sources of data, as have the Force Journal, the Force news sheet and the 
Police and Police Review magazines.
(i)
As a starting point, I have produced in Chapter One a brief snapshot of the modem force, 
and then examined its' origins, the history of Home Department Police Forces in England 
and Wales, the policing of the railways, associated ports, docks and waterways in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and provided a resume of developmental milestones 
in the last thirty years. This Chapter sets the scene for a more detailed examination of the 
modem Force and attempts to answer the question 'Who are the B.T. Police and how did 
they come to exist?'
The vast amount of data collected in 1988 to examine in Chapter Two the relationship of 
police and civilian person power in Home Department Forces, in order to draw 
comparisons with B.T. Police, provided me with the opportunity to delve into the manner 
in which police establishments were generally calculated, and again draw comparisons 
with B.T. Police. Until the arrival of the Amendment Order for the B.T. Police Scheme in 
1992 (S.I.364/1992), only an 'efficient' force, as opposed to an 'adequate and efficient 
Force' was legally required.
Of necessity, Chapter Three occupies the lions share of the study. In two parts I have 
examined the legal and practical considerations to answer a question which has caused 
B.T. Police officers considerable discomfort, probably since railway policing originated - 
'Are you a REAL police officer?' It will be seen that legislation and case law has 
produced a firm answer to this question, and the examination of the duties of B.T. Police, 
including the public order and crime fighting roles hopefully provides the evidence to 
support the firm belief in the reality of the role.
Accountability and control of police agencies are vital in any democratic society. Chapter 
Four outlines the measures applicable in relation to B.T. Police, with reference to 
academic views on the subject. Funding is an extremely delicate issue, and in Chapter 
Five, whilst I have adduced such evidence as is available, I cannot provide information 
which will produce an answer 'beyond reasonable doubt' as to exactly who pays for the 
Force. The most important conditions of service are explained in Chapter Six, important 
to society in that B.T. Police receive exactly the same training as Home Department Police 
and recruits are required to pass through the same assessment procedures as those for any 
other Force. This not only gives credibility to the status argument, but also re-assures the 
general public that those officers who police the railways are of the same calibre as those 
who police the streets. British Transport Police pay is now comparable to Home 
Department Police pay, but it will be seen that this has not always been the case, and the 
discussion on promotion prospects highlights a very serious defect in the system; whereas 
Home Department Officers may apply for Senior vacancies in the B.T. Police, (and are 
accepted) this is not reciprocated.
(ii)
Relations between B.T. Police and Home Department Forces are the subject of Chapter 
Seven. Again, an area of increasing development and decreasing prejudice. Once more, 
improvements in funding arrangements over the years has led to better quality equipment, 
buildings, communication systems and mobility, all of which produce a more professional 
image. There is still, however, some way to go to lay the ghosts of the last century. 
Chapter Eight examines the alternatives available to provide safety and security on the 
railways, and provides evidence of the benefits which may accrue to Society if the Force 
continues.
Finally the conclusion provides discussion on the entire study and some recommendations 
for further research. Overall the study has probably raised more questions than it has 
answered. It provides no more than a basis for further discussion and research, but I hope 
that it has advanced the work completed by the late Bill Gay in 197$, a little further, and 
will give those who may wish to pursue studies on the Force in future either general or 
particular, a base from which to start. Its' completion would not have been possible 
without the help of many people - some of whom I have been able to acknowledge. Many 
more, have through discussion and exchanges of views, over the years helped to crystallise 
several of the concepts which I have advanced. The most tolerant and understanding of all 
who have helped have been my wife and family who have shared the joys and sorrows of 
my career in the Force.
(c) Colin Thomas 1993
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CHAPTER ONE
WHO ARE THE BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE AND HOW DIP THEY COME
TO EXIST?
In this Chapter, after providing a brief snapshot of the modem Force, I will provide 
information on its' origins, a comparable precis of its' early development with Home Dept. 
Forces, following through to the present day.
1.1 T h g_M flA€m-Fo rce
'The British Transport Police is the national police service for the railways, enforcing the 
law to preserve the Queens Peace and reduce the fear of crime'. The role of the Force is 
thus succinctly explained in the Force Statement (Appendix One). In April 1992 the Force 
re-organised into eight territorial areas (Appendices Four and Five) throwing off historical 
constraints o f a many layered hierarchy, dispensing with the lengthy chain of command, 
with a view to improving communication and efficiency. The object of the new Force 
Structure was to devolve from Headquarters, located in central London, the maximum 
amount of decision making and relocate the maximum amount of resources to individual 
police stations. Cost effectiveness and increased accountability at ground level should 
thus improve and it is intended that those remaining at Force Headquarters will 
concentrate on setting values, maintaining standards, creating policy, auditing operations 
and providing essential expertise, working towards a higher quality of service. This is 
reflected in the aims and values of the Force published in the Force Statement (Appendix 
One), namely 'making our railways the safest' and 'enhancing the quality of life for 
customers and staff whilst safeguarding the whole community' The Force values are 
' Giving a best quality policing service which is caring, efficient, courteous and 
approachable in a way that is consultative, flexible and cost effective'. Whilst these words 
may initially seem somewhat pious to the reader, there is considerable evidence of 
organisational developments which support the direction the Force has taken. Numerous 
schemes in conjunction with British Rail and London Underground have been adopted, 
including managing out crime, working with the community as a whole through the 
Schools Liaison Scheme, a Victim Support Scheme and, in the words of a consultation 
document issued by the Department of Transport discussing the privatisation of British 
Rail giving a 'robust answer to the terrorist threat'. (The Future Status of The British 
Transport Police - Dept, of Transport 1992). This will be examined in more detail in 
context later.
1.2 Cwrrent Organisation And Strength
The structure of the Force is based on geographical regions or Areas. On 5th April 1992,
LN
the newly created eight Area organisation was as follows:-
Sc NE NW MID SW LS
Police Stations 12 12 12 9 10 13
Command level A.C.C Supt. C/Supt. Supt. Supt. C/Supt.
Command loc. G1 Leeds Mch B/ham Bristol Victoria
13
C/Supt. 
Kings X
Key:- Sc : Scotland N E : North Eastern, NW : North Western
MID: Midland SW : South Western LS : London South
LN : London North LU : London Underground
ACC : Assistant Chief Constable, C /Supt: Chief Superintendent
S up t: Superintendent (See Appendices three, four and five)
G1 : Glasgow Ld
Bhm: Birmingham Btl
VIC : Victoria B/w
Leeds Mch : Manchester
Bristol Kings X : Kings Cross
Broadway.
Source : British Transport Police Annual Report 1991/92 - page 7. Figure 1(a) See also 
figures 1(b) and 1(c) regarding the simplification of the chain of command.
The overall actual strength of the Force on 31st March 1992 was 2,041 police officers 
(against an underwritten strength of 2,072) and 354 civilian support staff (against an 
underwritten strength of 378) (British Transport Police Annual Report 1991/92 - 
Appendix A).
The term 'underwritten strength' is analogous to the 'establishment' which is used in 
Annual Reports of Chief Officers of Home Department Police Forces. Police strength in 
the British Transport Police is however negotiated with Transport Industry Managers who 
'underwrite' specific numbers of police personnel. This system will be discussed later. By 
comparison, The Devon and Cornwall Constabulary (a typical Home Department County 
Force) had an authorised establishment of 2880 police personnel in 1991 and an actual 
strength of 2876 (Annual Report, Chief Constable, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 
1991).
1.3 Civilian Support Staff
In June 1988, in response to a research requirement in connection with a Strategic 
Management Review of the Force undertaken by management consultants (Ernst and 
Whinney), I undertook a survey of Home Department Police Forces in relation to Police 
and Civilian personpower to show comparison with B.T. Police. Of the 55 Police Forces
BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE REPORTING SYSTEMS
Before 5th April 1992
Chief Constable
Deputy Chief Constable
Assistant Chief Constable 
(Operations)
DIVISIONS
Assistant Chief Constable 
(Support Services)
A.C.C. (Scotland) Chief Supt. 
SUB DIVISIONS 
DISTRICTS 
POLICE STATIONS
After 5th April 1992
Chief Supt. 
Supt. 
C/Insp. 
Insp.
Sgt.
Constable
Chief Supt. A.C.C. (L.U.)
Chief Constable
Deputy Chief Constable
Figure 1(b)
Assistant Chief Constable 
(Operations)
Assistant Chief Constable 
(Support Services)
Area Commander
Operations Support Services
Officer in Charge of Police Station 
(who in some cases is a Constable)
Figure 1(c)
asked to contribute, 43 replied by the time that the survey results were required. Each was 
asked to provide inter alia the following information:
(a) The number of police officers in each Force at December 1980, 1985 and 1987.
(b) The number of accountable civilians in the same years.
The dates were selected to portray the effects of Home Office Circular 114/83 (See Ch.
2.2) An analysis of the raw data showed that of the 43 forces surveyed, 37 had increased 
in police strength since 1980, 3 had remained static whilst 3 had decreased in police 
strength. Of those, however only one had suffered an appreciable decrease - The City of 
London Police - although that Force had been operating with a deficiency in police 
strength for some considerable time, and in consequence the decrease effectively 
eradicated 'vacancies'.
In relation to civilian strength 39 had increased since 1980, 3 had remained static, and one 
Force was unable to provide a civilian figure for 1980. Corresponding figures for B.T. 
Police showed an irregular pattern in relation to police strength, but a regular percentage 
of police to civilian personnel
1980 1985 1987
Police Civilian %£. Poliee Civilian %Q Police Civilian %Q
1948 186 10 1817 184 10 1846 183 10
Figure 1(d) Source : British Transport Police Annual Reports
The survey further revealed that the average number of civilians to police personnel on 
Home Department Forces in 1987 was 27 civilians to 100 police, whilst in B.T. Police the 
figure was 10 civilians to 100 police. Ernst and Whinney conducted a cost comparison 
between police officers and civilians, and subsequently recommended that the Force might 
be able to make more efficient use of human resources by 'civilianising' certain 
administration and operational support functions currently carried out by police officers'. 
(Ernst and Whinney 1988, p.73). This recommendation has been pursued, and the 1989 
authorised strength comparison showed that the percentage of civilians to police 
had increased from 10 to approximately 17%. this trend has continued in relation to 
civilian support staff in accordance with one of the main objectives agreed by the Chief 
Constable with the Police Committee to 'progressively civilianise that element of police 
manpower which is engaged on non operational police duties'. (British Transport Police 
Annual Report 1990/91). Between 198Sand 1991, some one hundred and sixty 'police 
tasks' had been passed to civilians in such areas as security of police buildings, 
communication centres, prosecution sections etc..
STRENGTH
YEAR POLICE CIVILIAN % - CIVILIAN
1988 1829 194 10.6
1989 1857 247 13.3
1990 2017 326 16.2
1991 2041 354 17.3
1992 2114 373 17.6
Source : British Transport Police Annual Report.
Figure 1(e).
By comparison, the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary (an 'average' County Force) had an 
overall establishment of civilian support staff of 1048.5 (excluding Traffic Wardens) for 
1991 (Annual Report Chief Constable Devon and Cornwall Constabulary 1991).
The initiative continues, and national recommendations are closely followed with an eye 
on the future, for example the recent ACPO document on police training (Towards a 
Future Training Strategy April 1992) which suggests the use of some civilian trainers (at 
p.6) to replace police. The Force recruited a civilian Physical Training/Self Defence 
Instructor in 1992, thus replacing a tradition of employing an operational police sergeant 
with specialist skills in this function on a secondment to the Force Training Centre for a 
two year period.
1.4 The Origins Of The Modern Force
It is important to trace the early history of policing railways in order to examine the 
development of the national Force as it exists today. Following a brief discussion of the 
railway police, its development will be placed in the context of the emergence of the 
police generally as a modem social institution. Police and railways seemed to have 
developed together. Transport Police, though not funded in the same way as County and 
Metropolitan Police Forces have, since their inception, followed a similar pattern of 
emergence. The Force has progressed into the twentieth century it would seem as a result 
of major historical accident. As is evidenced in Luke, Chapter 10, verses 25-37 of thep
New testament (the parable of the good Samaritan), travellers have been at risk from 
criminals since time immemorial. The first available reference to the existence of the 
Railway Police is found in the Board Minutes of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 
November 1830, which indicates a 'list of whole police establishment', and a Minute 
records also an increase in police pay on the grounds that the duty was one of great 
responsibility (Gay 1973, p.2.).
The historical accident which created the current situation whereby a specialist, highly 
professional police Force, apparently outside the organisational framework of the majority 
of the nations police may well have been started by the decision of the Royal Commission 
on Rural Police 1836-1839, which recommended that there should be a centrally directed
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police force but did NOT favour the growth of separate Forces such as Railway Police. 
(Gay 1973, p.6.).
Early Railway, Dock and Canal Companies were thus obliged to finance the appointment 
of their own constables to maintain an internal police organisation. Parliament for its part 
was prepared to grant authority, and typical of the legislation authorising this was the 
Great Eastern Railway (General Powers) Act 1900, Section 50. 'Fit persons' 
recommended by the Company could be appointed as special constables by two justices. 
The constables could act as such upon and within the whole of the railways stations and 
works belonging or leased to, or worked by the Company either solely or jointly with any 
other company or companies or any committee or committees. (It was the practice for 
railway companies to work together in 'Joint Line Committees').
The appointee was obliged to make an oath or declaration 'in due form of law', and having 
done so, was granted, for the continuance of his appointment all the 'powers protections 
and privileges of a constable in the exercise of his duties'. Within his limited geographical 
jurisdiction, he thus enjoyed the same status as any other constable. He was also 
empowered 'to follow and arrest any person who had departed from any of the said 
railway stations or works after committing therein or thereon any offence for which he 
might have been arrested while within or upon the said railway stations or works.' In 
order to use these powers, he was required to be in a uniform or be in possession of 'an 
authority' to act as a constable, which the justices would grant him, and which if he were 
not in uniform he was required to show whenever called upon to do so.
1.5 Police ^-General History - Nineteenth Century
Whilst the history of police in England and Wales is extremely well documented, very 
little research has been undertaken into the origins of specialist forces such as railway 
police. It is relevant to examine early general police history in order to put into context the 
recommended requirement to provide in modem times the same quality of policing for the 
community as a whole. The concept of police seems to emerge from origins in Anglo 
Saxon times, when the Headborough or tithing man had a responsibility with the local 
community to prevent and detect crime. The Watch and Ward system, the Hue and Cry 
and Justices of the Peace Act 1361 which provided for a constable to assist the Justice of 
the Peace, (the Parish Constable) provided a useful beginning to the Police Systems of 
today (Critchley 1977, p. 15/16) Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth Centuries, 
some general progress was made towards the creation of a general system of policing, (the 
formation of the London Nightly Watch in 1663 for example). It is perhaps to the Fielding 
Brothers that credit is owed to the true beginnings of a regular system of policing. The 
appointment of Sir Henry Fielding as a Bow Street Magistrate in 1748, and subsequently 
on his death in Lisbon in 1754, the appointment of John Fielding in the same capacity 
appears to mark significantly efforts to police the capital at least. Whilst John Fieldings 
attempt to introduce a neighbourhood watch system in 1755 failed, the Bow Street 
Runners emerged and became famous, eventually being absorbed into Peels Police 
(Reithl938,p.34). By the end of the end of the eighteenth century however, no organised 
police system had appeared. Parish Constables, who received no salary but were entitled 
to certain fees and sometimes were allotted small pieces of land attached to their offices 
continued to do what was possible to bring criminals to book, but invariably they were
'elderly men appointed to the office to keep them off the poor rate' (Radcliffe and Cross 
1971, p.333).
The Gordon Riots of 1780 which resulted in mob rule in London for several days, the 
burning of Lord Mansfields house and the breaking open of Newgate Gaol provided an 
added impetus for an organised police force. In the same year James Hanway published a 
book ’The Citizens Monitor' showing the necessity of a salutary Police and Lord 
Bathurst attempted to create an armed 'police' unit in the City of London, but all to little 
avail. 1785 saw Pitt's Bill to create Commissioners for the Metropolis, whilst a year later 
the Dublin Police Act was passed. In 1792 however, Patrick Colquhoun was appointed a 
Bow Street Magistrate. His treatise, on 'The Police of the Metropolis', was published in 
1796, and in 1799 a further treatise 'Commerce and Police of the River Thames' produced 
some success, for in 1800 the River Thames Police was formed. (Reith 1938, p. 117-122).
Modem T 4 ^  S i ow Wn t a i , jn examining the need for police suggest that it was 
capitalist inspired, industrialisation and urbanisation occurring within a capitalist 
framework. Rapid growth of cities led to a greater class distinctions. Reiner examines 
evidence to suggest that the upper class perceptions of the 'dangerous classes' - the urban 
poor, led to a fear of social disorder, and that early nineteenth century riots were accepted 
and understood as a means for the poor to communicate their grievances to the wealthy 
ruling classes. This industrial capitalism rioting became a fundamental threat to social and 
political order.
Late eighteenth and early nineteenth century capitalism thus led to a 'tighter discipline in 
both work and leisure time to fit rhythms and regimentation of capitalist organisation, thus 
causing criminalisation of traditional street pastimes which were solely recreational. The 
police officer thus became the moral entrepreneur of public propriety charged with 
converting the folkways and mores of savage street dwellers to respectability and 
decency.' (Reiner 1985, p.21. and 22.)
The early nineteenth century society was very divided by power, money and status. The 
threat of the gallows was very much in evidence, and a speech by Sir Samuel Romilly 
(who had become Solicitor General in 1806) to the House of Commons in 1808, in which 
he stated his intention to reform the penal code, and sought leave to introduce a Bill to 
abolish the death penalty for picking of pockets of goods to the value of twelve pence is 
evidence of this, particularly since most of the offenders were children. Romilly 
continued to crusade, when two years later he sought leave to introduce a Bill to abolish 
the death penalty for the crime of stealing goods to the value of five shillings from a shop 
or warehouse, and after his death in 1818, MacKintosh (who was a disciple of Bentham 
and had a distinguished career as a writer, a member of the Judiciary in Bombay and 
eventually a Whig member of Parliament - (Reith 1938 p.225/226)) continued to persevere 
with reforms.
In 1820, he sought to abolish the death penalty for the following crimes:-
(a) Stealing five shillings from the person.
(b) Stealing forty shillings on a navigable river or from a dwelling house.
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(c) Being a gypsy and residing twelve months in England.
(d) Being a notorious thief and residing in the Counties of Northumberland or 
Cumberland.
(e) Being found disguised in tthe Royal Mint.
(f) Damaging Westminster Bridge.
(g) Taking away a maid or widow for the sake of her fortune.
(h) Receiving stolen goods.
(i) Wounding cattle, damaging trees, breaking the banks of rivers, sending threatening 
letters, being found in possession of forged bank notes e tc .......
(Reith 1938 p.231)
Romilly and subsequent reformers were conscious that convictions in the courts were 
uncertain and that proper investigation, certain detection and moderate punishments would 
be a more effective deterrent than 'occasional terror of the gallows'. (Hay - 1981 p.22)
No more than three percent of the population of the day, the monarchy, aristocracy, gentry 
and wealthy merchants, i.e. those who held power and wealth, controlled the criminal law, 
thus maintaining their rule and moulding social consciousness. 'Eighteenth century 
England was not a free market of patronage relations. It was a society with a bloody penal 
code, an advantage and people schooled in the lessons of Justice, Terror and Mercy. The 
benevolence of rich men to poor, and all the ramifications of patronage were upheld by the 
sanction of the gallows and the rhetoric of the death sentence. (Hay - 1981 p.25)
But there was a growing acceptance that employment could be a more effective barrier 
against disorder than draconian legal penalties. In 1784, Jonas Hanway described crime as 
a 'disease which spreads destruction like a pestilence and immorality as an epidemical 
disorder which diffuses its' morbid qualities' - i.e. he saw poverty which produced squalid 
and undisciplined systems of life as a catalyst for crime. In 1815 Jedediah Strutt, who had 
created cotton factories in Derbyshire, declared that before they had established their 
works in Cromford and Belper 'the inhabitants were notorious for vice and immorality ... 
but that regular work and wages, together with the stabilising influence of a closely
supervised village community had transformed their behaviour and their industry,
decorous behaviour, attendance on public worship and general good conduct were very 
conspicuous.' (Ignatieff - 1981 p.40 and 41).
In 1822 Mackintosh introduced a speech on Law Reform and measures for strengthening 
police, and both in 1822 and 1823 Peel’s speeches on Law Reform were followed by 
considerable strides in this direction. In 1828 Peel opened his police campaign and in 
1829, supported by Wellington, succeeded in establishing the London Metropolitan Police 
by the Act of that year. (Reith 1938, p.232/253).
Considerable public hostility was directed towards the 'new police' and there was a 
deliberate campaign staged by parishes, disinclined to finance the Force through rates. 
Tactics however, to dispel riots, including the invention of the baton charge caused the 
realisation that this could be achieved by police without the aid of the military (Reith 1956 
p.l 57). By 1835 the decrease in crime and disorder in the Metropolis became so apparent 
as to cause local authorities in other parts of the country to create their own police forces 
and the Municipal Corporations Act of that year assisted this desire (Reith 1956 p. 195).
By 1839 however the administration of new borough police forces was found to be corrupt
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and inefficient and numerous other law enforcement agencies were becoming involved in 
crime control and creating confusion. Major crime on roads, railways and canals was such 
that senders of goods accepted no responsibility for delivery and owners were obliged to 
make their own arrangements to protect vulnerable traffic (Reith 1956 p.203/4). It was not 
until 1856 that an obligatory Rural Police Act compelled County authorities to establish 
police forces. (Reith 1956 p.262). The Police Act 1890 provided for police pensions and 
mutual aid to other forces i.e. those maintained by Counties, Boroughs and Metropolitan 
and City of London authorities, but as late as 1923, the City of London Police Force was 
not subject to the County or Borough Police Acts, being constituted under local Acts of 
Parliament and governed by the corporation (Savill, 1923, p. 10 and 11).
Some suggest that the police were created for the benefit of the middle classes - 'Each 
speech in Parliament that introduced a police bill was a body of suggestions for the 
improvement of property protection' (Steedman, 1984, p.60, with reference to the period 
1839-1842). Further Steedman comments regarding mid nineteenth century perceptions 
that people who were not ratepayers, working people, vagrant or settled poor were seen by
their betters as belonging to a different community from themselves they were
increasingly seen through the operation of local police forces and attitudes created by 
legislation to belong to a national community of disorder, impropriety and legal aberration 
(Steedman, 1984, p.61). Lustgarten provides the following observation 'Anyone who was 
transient - the common condition of the intermittently unemployed, casual and seasonal 
workers, was also voteless. The 'political nation' was thus comprised of the propertied 
and the respectable working class and their consensus about public order and public 
decorum could not be disturbed by dissonant notes from the politically voiceless.' 
(Lustgarten, 1986, p.39). This view seems to have continued into the twentieth century. 
Between 1880 and 1920, local press reports indicate 146 incidents involving police and 
the costermongers of the Caledonian Road area of London whilst 'the middle class 
retreated northwest behind the barriers of property and income.' (Cohen, 1981, p. 117).
16 Policing The Railway - The Nineteenth Century
Against this backcloth of public disorder, class relations and efforts to produce an 
effective, disciplined, organised Force to combat crime and disorder, the age of the steam 
railway arrived. Whilst railways or wagon ways had existed in mines and quarries, pulled 
by men or horses since before the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, steam locomotion was 
introduced between 1829 and 1830. The opening of the Liverpool to Manchester Railway 
in 1830 by the Duke of Wellington produced great public interest, almost one million had 
assembled along the track, but the military were also out in Force to control a 
demonstration against the Iron Duke - 'the garrison was under arms and at various points 
within sight of the railway piquets of cavalry were placed. Without this display of
Military Force there would certainly have been a breach of the peace....... ' (Gay, 1973
p.2). The construction of the nations railways was to produce considerable problems of 
public order for years to come. The labour force used to provide this service were termed 
'navvies'. Originally many had constructed the nations waterways and had thus been 
known as 'navigators' - 'naw ie ' being an abbreviation. They came from all parts of the 
country, seeking work as a result of agricultural depression, Napoleonic Wars, and of 
course many transferred their canal building skills to railway construction. They 
reorganised themselves into 'butty gangs' - groups of twelve, all equal in status, but one
nominee elected to collect their wages and distribute the cash evenly. They developed 
their own code of conduct, had little regard for the law, but were industrious workers with 
enormous appetites for both food, and drink (particularly whiskey). (Whitbread 1961, 
p.21 to 28).
The disregard for the law by the railway construction gangs caused considerable public 
order problems in the mid nineteenth century. In Penrith in 1846 more than 2,000 English 
navvies laid siege to battle with rival Irish construction gangs. The Irish fled, and the 
English ransacked the town, discovered twelve or fifteen Irishmen who had not left and 
beat them with bludgeons, 'It was a regular butchery and could be compared with nothing 
else than turning rats in a box and as many laying on with sticks as could get near them' 
(Coleman 1965, p.86). The Westmoreland Yoemanry were summoned to restore order but 
not before one policeman had been killed and another severely injured. Riots however 
occurred at Kendal, and later in Scotland on the Edinburgh to Hawick line being 
constructed by the North British Railway Company. More than a thousand Scots navvies 
(led by a piper and bugler) marched towards Edinburgh to attack two hundred Irish 
navvies. Such incidents brought demands that railway companies who brought large 
bodies of workmen into localities should be obliged to bring with them some means of 
preserving order, morality and religion among the workforce (Coleman, 1965, p.87). In 
some instances the employers caused problems. In 1845, at Woodhead in Cheshire for 
example, a list of'casualties' suffered by labourers working to construct lines of railway 
for the Sheffield, Ashton Under Lyne and Manchester Railway Company was thirty-two 
killed, several maimed, twenty three cases of compound fracture including two fractured 
skulls, seventy four simple fractures and one hundred and forty serious injuries such as 
bums from blasts, severe contusions, lacerations and dislocations. Additionally, many had 
chronic coughs caused, they claimed by perpetually damp working conditions and inhaling 
fumes from gunpowder blasts which were continuously carried out in the tunnels. 
(Coleman 1965, p. 109) Even Brunei himself had become involved in the 'Battle of^
Mickleton' in 1851, when the Riot Act was read twice. Two navvies were subsequently 
hanged beside the track of the North British Railway on a gallows protected by the 
military, for the murder of a ganger (Gay, 1973. p.6.). It was thus hardly surprising that 
disorder among railway construction workers should create public disquiet. The fights it 
seems took place in the absence of any real preventative measures (i.e. the lack of a 
substantial and properly organised police force). Lieutenant Peter Lecount, an engineer of 
the London and Birmingham railway said 'their ferocious behaviour can only be equalled 
by the vulgarity of their language, but in general they act in concert and put at defiance any 
local constabulary force, consequently crimes of the most atrocious character were 
common and robbery was an everyday occurrence'. Racialism might also have been a 
contributory factor, 'When pitched battles took place between warring factions, and 
especially between Irish Labourers and the English and Scots, it was sometimes necessary 
to call out detachments of yeomanry, infantry and cavalry to restore order (Gay 1973.p.5.).
In 1838, the Special Constables Act requiring Constables to be employed at railways and 
other public works was passed to prevent 'outrageous and unlawful behaviour of labourers 
and others employed on railways and other public works.' (Gay 1973, p.5) The Special 
Constable of that day was a somewhat different character to the modem day voluntary 
Special Constable. By virtue of the Special Constables Act 1831, any two or more
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Justices of the Peace were empowered to appoint, in certain circumstances 'householders 
or other persons not legally exempt, willing to act as Special Constables, be they residents 
in such parish, township etc. to act as Special Constables for such time and in such manner
a s  shall seem fit and necessary for the preservation of the public peace and for the
protection of the inhabitants and the security of the property in such parish, townships or 
place ....' etc. The Act provided that where three or more credible witnesses applied on 
oath to any two or more Justices of the Peace that the appointment of Special Constables 
was necessary due to the behaviour of persons employed upon any railway, canal or other 
public work made or carried on under the authority of Parliament within the district or 
division in England or Wales for which the Justices usually act, the Justices could appoint 
sufficient Special Constables and require the appropriate company to pay for the police 
services. (Special Constables Act 1831).
When in the early 1860's, local authorities sought Home Office assistance to deal with 
rising public disorder, they were advised to recruit Special Constables, call in the county 
constabulary, the yeomanry (who should also be sworn in as Special Constables), and in 
the last resort, seek military support (Fielding 1991, p.57). In 25 mainly urban riots 
created by William Murphy, an anti Catholic agitator, between 1866 and 1871, troops 
were deployed on ten occasions, police from outside were drafted in on 11 occasions, 
militia and yeomanry once each, and Special Constables sworn in eleven times. Riots 
were averted in the other fourteen instances (Fielding 1991, p.58).
It would seem that such appointees could be paid or unpaid, depending upon the 
requirements placed upon them (Savill, 1923, pages 5-9). In 1846, a Select Committee to 
examine the conditions of labourers employed in the construction of public works was 
sought by the Hon.E.P. Bouverie. The then Home Secretary, Sir James Graham did not 
oppose such an enquiry but also said that he considered that 'companies do not sufficiently 
avail themselves of the powers with which they were vested in keeping an efficient police 
force along their respective lines. I think that they should be compelled to do so '. (Gay, 
1973, p .8 also Hansard, 1846 Vol.85, col. 1324). In making this statement, Graham was 
creating two very important criteria which were to have a continuing effect on policing in 
general and transport policing in particular (in 1843 he had strongly resisted sending
detachments of Metropolitan Police to deal with the Rebecca R iots 'Sir James
Graham is not prepared to supply a civil force at public expense to put down these local 
disturbances'). (Radzinowicz 1981, p.62) The first principle was that Counties and other 
Local Authorities should pay for their policing requirements. The second criteria was 
applied without question when on 21st December 1988 Lord Harris of Greenwich raised 
the question in the House of Lords as to which authority will pay for the increased number 
of British Transport Police Officers to be recruited for service on the London Underground 
and for any police officers loaned for such service by the Commissioner of the Metropolis 
and the Commissioner of the City of London Police. The reply by the Government 
spokesman Lord Brabazon of Tara was true to Sir James Grahams view of over a century 
and a half ago - 'The policing of the London Underground system is financed by London 
Underground Limited'. (D.O.T. Circular 16 16 Jan. 1989)
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1.7 The Early Railway Constable
The early railway constables uniform was a top hat with a leather crown, tight unstrapped 
trousers and brightly polished boots. Most constables carried elaborately painted wooden 
truncheons bearing the crest of the appropriate railway company, and a crown as a symbol 
of their office as Constables (Today, the crown is worn as part of the helmet plate or cap 
badge). Uniforms were of various colours. On the London and Birmingham line and the 
Brighton and South Coast Railway they were rifle green, whilst on the London and South 
Western Railway, they were chocolate brown. Today British Transport Police uniforms 
are indistinguishable from those worn by all British Police.
According to a rule book of 1883, the Railway Constable had to preserve order at stations 
and on the track, keep the line free from obstructions, assist in cases of accident, warn 
strangers of dangers on the line and remove obstinate intruders. Among many other 
miscellaneous duties, the early railway constable was the first railway signalman. He 
worked twelve hours a day for wages varying between fifteen and twenty-three shillings a 
week, and generally there was one Constable to every mile and a half of track. (Gay,
1973, p.2 to 4.)
The raw recruit to the police at the start of professional policing was assumed to be stupid 
but trainable (Critchley, 1977, p.23). One of Peels principles in 1829 by offering the low 
wage of a guinea a week was to recruit 'only men who had not the rank habits or station of 
gentlemen, and all the promotions were to be made from the ranks (Critchley, 1977, p.51). 
Clearly, from the outset it was believed that police officers needed neither education or 
specific interpersonal skills. In an examination of police recruits to Buckinghamshire in 
1857, Steedman found that of 153 recruits, 41 were labourers, 15 farmers, 9 shoemakers, 7 
servants, 6 were gardeners, the same number were grocers, tailors and grooms, 5 were 
lawyers, there were 4 bakers and clerks and 3 carpenters, porters and wheelwrights. Two 
each of bricklayers, drapers, gamekeepers, potters, railway workers and police officers 
were recruited, whilst one each of a range of former occupations including a soldier, a 
marble mason, a plumber, ropemaker, stoker and watchmaker. (Steedman 1984, p.73). In 
Staffordshire in 1856, again the lions share of 112 police officers recruited (some 35) were 
labourers (Ibid p.76), in 1866, 36 of the 79 recruited were labourers (Ibid p.87) and in 
Buckinghamshire in 1866 14 of the 32 recruited were also labourers. That intake however 
attracted also a clerk and a veterinary surgeon (Ibid p.87). Overall however, it seems that 
Peel's principle continued for some considerable time. No specific records of early 
recruits to railway police forces are available, but Gay tells us that police were required to 
be not older than 35, not less than 5'7' in height and that some had been soldiers. Each 
railway company had its' own rules. One required Constables to attend Church every 
Sunday, another that they should be clean shaven. Duties included preserving the peace, 
protecting against felons, prosecuting felons and other offences, as well as performing 
duties as signalman. On some lines they were issued with red flags (for 'stop') and white 
(for 'all clear') for daytime signalling and a lamp with red, white and green (for 'caution') 
aspects at night (Gay, 1973, p.4). (For modem day recruiting procedures within B.T.P. see 
Chapter 6).
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, police pay generally was an issue. In 1866 
the editor of the 'Police Service Advertiser' saw poor pay as 'the evil that like a canker 
worm lies at the root of our police administration' (Steedman, 1984, p. 131), and the 
Manchester Guardian in 1853 reported that since every police force was largely supplied 
with men from agricultural districts who found police wages a considerable improvement 
on farm wages, little difficulty would be found in filling vacancies in police forces 
(Steedman p. 132). By comparison with the wages of a railway constable, in 1880, 
constables in Borough Police Forces were paid between twenty-six and twenty-seven 
shillings a week, whilst in County Forces the rate was between twenty four and twenty six 
shillings a week. (Steedman 1984 p.l 10).
Railway Police were paid in accordance with systems adopted for the railway service, and 
it was not until 1919 that the question of whether conditions of service (including pay) 
should be based on those of the Metropolitan and County Forces or the Railway Service 
began to be seriously considered (Minutes of a meeting of Railway Company 
Representatives - June 5 1919 - Min.l) (See Chapter Six).
In 1825 there were thirty miles of track, by 1840 over two thousand, and by 1870 more 
than fifteen thousand. The railway policeman ceased to be a signalman by about 1843 by 
which time fixed mechanical signals had replaced hand signals and the electric telegraph 
was in operation. (Gay 1973, p.9)
18 Railway Police Establishments
Railway Police establishments depended initially it seems on the ownership by a railway 
company of miles of track. In 1839, for example, the Great Western Railway appointed an 
inspector, four sub inspectors and thirty three constables to cover in twelve hour shifts, 
seven days a week, the twenty four and a half miles of track between Paddington and 
Maidenhead. In 1840, the Superintendent of Police of the London and Birmingham 
Railway had a command of ten inspectors and 90 constables. In 1850, the London and 
North Western Railway maintained seven hundred and one constables. (Gay 1973, p.9)
By comparison, the London Metropolitan Police Force had grown from 1,000 officers to 
nearly 5,625 by this time. (Ascoli 1979, p. 122) Gradually, railway police were 
withdrawn from track patrols to main line termini and principal stations. Some 'Railway 
Towns' like Swindon for example, were policed entirely by the appropriate Railway Police 
Force in the early days of railways.
Passenger railway travel was initially a very uncomfortable experience since carriages for 
the cheapest class of passengers were little more than open trucks. Although gradual 
improvements ensued, no luggage vans were at first provided and luggage was carried on 
the carriage roof, covered by tarpaulins. Thieves were extremely active. A picture, 
painted from an original engraving by Frith, shows Paddington Station in 1862, with some 
seventy different characters, including two plain clothes police officers arresting an 
offender. The Great Western Railway Police had formed its' own detective branch by 
1865, though no figures are available as to its' size. By comparison the London 
Metropolitan Police created a Criminal Investigation Department in 1842 when two 
Inspectors and six Sergeants were selected to give 'full time and exclusive service to the
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detection of crime', although prior to this police officers in plain clothes had been 
deployed to detect pickpockets and attend various political meetings. (Reith 1956 p.221)
Police uniforms developed gradually, the helmet replacing the top hat by about 1890. In 
1908 the North Eastern Railway Police were using dogs - mainly Airedales and may well 
have been the first of all UK police forces to move in this direction. Railway forces also 
pioneered the recruitment of women police officers during the first world war. (Gay 1973,
p. 10)
The Police and Constabulary Almanac, first published in 1865 provides some useful 
information concerning the organisation of early railway police forces. In 1870 the total 
number of police within the Great Eastern Railway Police Force is shown as ninety six, 
made up of one Superintendent, seven Inspectors, seven Sergeants and eighty one 
Constables. The Great Northern had seventy-four commanded by an 'Inspector of the 
Line'. The Great Western could muster sixty, commanded by a Superintendent with six 
Inspectors at strategic locations. Lancashire and Yorkshire boasted only one 
Superintendent, one Inspector, three Detectives and three 'Police Officers' (presumably 
constables), a total of eight. Twenty six police in total served the London and North 
Western Railway, (a considerably lower number than Gays figure ofc«v**hundred and one 
in 1850), though a note at the top of the list of Railway Police Forces indicates that the 
'Publisher of the Police Almanac will be pleased to receive any additions or emendations 
for this branch of information' and indicates that the Somerset and Dorset Railway Police, 
whose Superintendent is shown as Fred U. Wood', had not forwarded a revised list.
(Police and Constabulary Almanac, 1870, p.72). This must raise doubts as to the accuracy 
of the published figures, perhaps indicating a lack of administrative machinery within 
some of the early Forces. The information on the London and South Western Railway 
Police is more detailed than other Forces, a total of 101 police with a Superintendent, a 
Detective, two Sergeants and twenty three Constables at Waterloo, one Inspector, four 
Sergeants and forty four constables at Nine Elms, with twenty five Constables at country 
stations. Thirty officers served on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, 
fifty on the North Eastern, only one (according to the record) on North Staffordshire and 
one hundred and sixteen on the South Devon and Cornwall. In Scotland, the Caledonian 
Railway maintained seven (five of whom appeared to be Inspectors), Glasgow and South 
Western three, North British had a Superintendent, a Chief Inspector (the 'first' mention of 
that rank in the whole list), four Inspectors and three Detectives - no total is shown and 
hence it is not known if this was the entire force strength. The Scottish North Eastern 
Railway lists only one 'Passenger Superintendent' at Aberdeen. The overall total of 
railway police (582) may well be an incorrect figure. There is some evidence to suggest 
that railway police may have been maintained on the Metropolitan Underground Railway 
which opened in 1863, but no records are available (B.T. Police Journal, No.l 11, 1976, 
P-20).
1.9 IiitQ_Xtig_Twentieth Century
By 1916, the Almanac was able to list thirteen railway police forces, three of the original 
having disappeared (presumably amalgamated into larger company police forces), namely 
the Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire, Somerset and Dorset, and the South Devon 
and Cornwall. In addition to the remaining eight were Cheshire Lines, Great Central,
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Midland, London, Brighton and South Coast and the Taff Vale Railway. Unfortunately 
many figures indicating strengths of the individual forces were omitted, but in Scotland, 
three of the original four forces remained (the Scottish North Eastern was not listed in 
1916), the Glasgow and South Western having increased its police strength from 3 in 1870 
to 27 in 1916 (Police and Constabulary Almanac, 1916, p. 166-169).
London's first underground railways, the Metropolitan and District maintained their own 
police forces, but by 1921 more than one hundred and twenty railway companies existed 
throughout the United Kingdom, many of which maintained either a separate police force, 
or jointly contributed to the upkeep of police. In consequence of the Railways Act 1921, 
four major rail companies were created and commenced operating on 1st January 1923. 
They were:
The Great Western Railway.
The London Midland and Scottish Railway.
The Southern Railway.
The London and North Eastern Railway.
As a result, the main line railway company police were also amalgamated. In 1933 the 
London Passenger Transport Board absorbed London’s Underground Railways, and 
'London Transport Police' were bom (Gay, 1973, p. 12).
The Police and Constabulary Almanac for 1942 (at pages 207 to 209) lists all of these 
railway police forces, including the London Passenger Transport Board Police, the only 
Area of the Force today to maintain its original Headquarters located at 55, Broadway, 
London, SW1. Many of the original railway companies owned and operated Dock, Port 
and Harbour premises. The Great Western Railway Company provided policing at Cardiff 
Docks, Newport Docks, Fishguard and Swansea. The London and North Eastern Railway 
Company at Parkeston Quay, Hull and Grimsby Docks, and the Southern Railway 
Company at Southampton Docks for example. Canal companies also operated separate 
police forces, but in 1947, the nationalisation of public transport within the framework of 
the British Transport Commission resulted in the amalgamation of a number of police 
forces which had hitherto provided a service to independent rail, dock, harbour, port and 
canal companies. The British Transport Commission Act 1949 provided for the 
jurisdiction of the corporate national British Transport Commission Police. In 1962, the 
Commission was dissolved by the Transport Act and the British Transport Police Force 
Scheme 1964 was prepared by the British Railways Board after consulting with other 
newly created Boards, (e.g. British Transport Docks Board, British Waterways Board etc.) 
and was submitted to the Minister of Transport for his approval. The scheme was 
amended in 1992 and will be discussed later.
1.10 The Development Of The Present Establishment
It was some years after the creation of the British Transport Commission Police that a 
review was undertaken of the establishment (Maxwell, 1957 - Force Archives ) positive 
and far reaching recommendations were made.
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Pointing out immediately that (at that time) the Commission had no statutory duty to 
maintain an efficient police force, the Maxwell Committee had no hesitation in 
recommending, after consideration of the organisation and efficiency, that the Force 
should continue, organised on the lines of a large County Force and so trained as to 
provide for all parts of the Commission's undertaking a police service justifying parity of 
pay with Civil Police Forces.
Among other recommendations were the establishment of a Police Committee, the 
redesignation of the post of Chief Officer of Police, to Chief Constable, that police areas 
should be closely related to railway organisations, that the London Transport Police should 
merge with the main body of the Force (at the time London Transport still maintained its 
own Force), that training arrangements should be expanded, a head of C.I.D. appointed, a 
Discipline Code introduced, retirement ages examined and a comprehensive review of the 
establishment be undertaken.
In recommending the latter, the review committee pointed out that they had noted in some 
places there were insufficient staff, that duties were being performed which might be out 
of such character as to justify police attention, that appropriate proportions of C.I.D. and 
uniform staff as well as supervisors should be suitably reflected in the authorised 
establishment, that there were a number of one man posts, the recruitment of policewomen 
should be encouraged and that the work of police dogs should be extended. The 
Committee however, declined to suggest what the establishment should be. That 
responsibility was passed to the Chief Constable who reported his findings in 1959. Three 
years later another review under the Chairmanship of Sir Frank Newsam (a former under 
Secretary of State at the Home Office) took place (Newsam 1962 - Force Archives). The 
terms of reference included a comprehensive examination of the establishment of the 
Force, with particular regard to certain paragraphs of the Maxwell Report, and to 
recommend to the Police Committee what the establishment should be.
The review was extremely comprehensive and among its recommendations were that (at 
that time) a Sub Division should comprise not less that twenty officers under the charge of 
an Inspector, regular overtime should be reduced, closer links should be established with 
transport board management, one man posts be abolished, more plain clothes officers 
appointed to prevent and deter crime, special police services should be analysed for special 
occasions and there should be the formation of mobile squads as opposed to fixed beat 
patrol systems.
The Newham Committee examined the existing establishment and adopted criteria for 
determining the assessment of the strength of the police force. These were the total 
number of railway employees, the volume of merchandise and parcel traffic and lastly, the 
volume of crime in a particular area. Consideration for the safety and security of 
passengers was not discussed.
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They noted that in 1947, the actual establishment of the Force had been 3,902, by 1957 it 
had been reduced to 3,452 and at the time of their review it was a mere 2,953. Overall, 
they further reduced the size of the Force by nearly twenty per cent, many of the reasons 
given seeming to be in the interest of economy rather than effectiveness.
The implementation attracted little or no national media comment and the British 
Transport Police Journal of the day offers no assistance. Inadvertently, the Newsam 
Committee had sown the seed for the destruction of the concept of community policing by 
abolishing one man posts and introducing 'fire brigade' or reactive policing by mobile 
patrols. Shortly after the recommendations had been implemented, however, a major 
event in the history of British crime took place. On 8th August 1963 at 3am the Glasgow 
to Euston Royal Mail Train was stopped at Sears Crossing near Linsdale in 
Buckinghamshire by means of creating a false signal to the driver, the late Jack Mills 
(Force Records). Mr Mills was attacked when he offered resistance and some two and a 
half million pounds worth of mail was stolen from the 'Travelling Post Office'. Heralded 
at the time as the 'Crime of the Century' by some sections of the press, it seems it is still so 
regarded a quarter of a century later. The criminals who were subsequently identified and 
convicted have certainly achieved notoriety. Even a film was made about the robbery 
which attracted press comment (e.g. Daily Telegraph, 6 September 1988, and Mail on 
Sunday 4 September 1988 - "Villian becomes a middle class hero'). Shortly after the 
crime public opinion and government pressure demanded special attention be given by 
police to the Royal Mail 'Travelling Post Office' trains. At that time, the only police force 
with sufficient jurisdiction to do this was the British Transport Police.
Since the late 1950's and early 1960's to work of the Force has changed dramatically in 
keeping with trends of society. As a result, as will be seen, much of the police work 
undertaken today is for the benefit of society as a whole, in the national interest, as 
opposed to the exclusive protection of the commercial interests of the transport authorities. 
One question is, whether or not the present establishment of the Force is sufficient. 
Officers asked at random, are unanimous in the belief that it is totally unrealistic. No 
comprehensive review has been undertaken since the Newsam Report and surprisingly, the 
Emsy and Whinney Review did not directly address the problem.
1.11 The Last Thirty Years
In relation to the organisation of the Force, the Maxwell recommendations that it should 
be organised on the line of a large County Force have, until 1992, stood the test of time. 
The B.T. Police Scheme required (at paragraph 3a) that the Force should be organised in 
Divisions (SI. 1964. 1456). There have been continuous 'administrative' organisations.
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The table below illustrates the situation in various years taken as random, with particular 
emphasis on years since the Emst & Whinney Review: -
1962 1972 1982 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992
No. of Police Areas 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 8
Establishment (Police) 2503 2262 2513 2208 1953 2074 2072 2151
Strength (Police) 2673 2000 2128 1846 1857 2017 2041 2114
Establishment 121 148 196 183 345 367 378 400
(Civilian)
Strength (Civilian) 121 125 196 N/Rc 247 326 354 373
Source B.T. Police Annual Reports 
Figure 1(f)
By 1982 Police 'Areas' had been abolished, eleven Divisions were in evidence. A strata 
of management had been reoved.
By 1987, there were nine Divisions and by 1989, as a result of the Emst & Whinney 
review recommendations (Emst & Whinney, 1988, p.4) there were five Divisions. If 
examined critically, it may seem that 'Areas' and 'Divisions' in 1979 and 1989 are 
synonymous. In fact, hierarcichal structures required that there was an administrative 
centre at Force H.Q., a similar system at Area H.Q., at Divisional H.Q. and Sub Divisional 
H.Q.. The new structure from April 1992 has dispensed with references to Divisions, 
Sub-Divisions, Districts, Sections etc, and created a simple command chain from police 
station to Area to Force H.Q.
Three very important factors have however created problems for the Force during the latter 
half of this century, shortly after the creation of the B.T. Police by the 1964 Scheme. The 
British Waterways Board did not in fact join the scheme (Gay 1974, p. 14). In 1983, 
Associated British Ports (formerly British Transport Docks Board) began to withdraw 
support and in 1984 Sealink UK Ltd, formerly a wholly owned subsidiary of British Rail 
which had been sold off, made a similar decision which resulted in the cessation of 
professional policing at Sealink ports, (see Chapter 8 for a full discussion). In 1992, it 
was thus clearly true to say that the Force was 'the national police for the railways', though 
jurisdiction still remains for officers to legally act as Constables in other fields of transport 
should the need arise.
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CHAPTER TWO
IS THERE A CASE FOR MORE HUMAN RESOURCES FOR THE B.T. POLICE?
2.1 Negotiating A  Realistic Establishment - The Current Process
The Ernst and Whinney Review recognised that the sytem existing in 1988 was 
centralised, the Chief Constable being responsible for the financial management of the 
Force. Budgets were drawn up by the Force Finance Officer after discussions with 
British Rail and London Underground management iq respect of police requirements and 
financial ceilings set by the industries. The consultants recommended a system of 
devolved budgeting using objectives and performance indicators to establish needs (Ernst 
& Whinney Report 1988, p. 90-96). By 1990, a system had been introduced whereby 
Superintendents at Sub Divisional level were negotiating with railway area and business 
managers to have their costs underwritten. Due to difficulties (mainly misunderstandings 
between commercially minded rail managers and police orientated police managers), the 
system was further refined and a Police Budget Group created, to include the Chief 
Constable, the Managing Director of L.U.L. and B.R. Sector Directors. A physical facts 
package was created and performance indicators linked to six main objectives were 
agreed. These were to increase the number of police officers on operational duties, 
devolve substantial parts of the decision making process to Sub Divisions, civilianise 
police manpower engaged on non (police) operational duties, improve professional skills 
of police supervisors, especially in financial management, improve the travelling public's 
feeling of security and develop closer contacts with user groups and to reduce crime and 
improve detection rates. (Annual Report of Chief Constable 1989 p.5). This system is 
the current method of determining manpower levels. It started, however, at the original 
base line - the strength of the Force in 1988.
2.2 Police Establishments - General Issues
The British Transport Police Force Scheme of 1964 required the British Railways Board to 
maintain an efficient police force, unlike the Police Act of 1964, the Scheme did not 
mention the word 'adequate'. This was added when the Scheme, in accordance with the 
Ernst and Whinney recommendation (Ernst & Whinney Report 1988 p. 29/30) was 
amended in 1992. (B.T. Police Force Scheme Amendment Order 1992/364 - H.M.S.O.)
On 30th November 1983, the Home Office issued the Circular No. 114/1983 entitled 
'Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service'. The purpose of the 
Circular was stated to be 'to inform Police Authorities and Chief Police Officers of the 
considerations which the Home Secretary will take into account in carrying out his 
statutory responsibility for improving police establishments, to invite Chief Officers and 
Police Authorities to keep their objectives, resources and priorities under review and to
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inform Police Authorities and Chief Officers of relevant matters on which the Home 
Secretary has asked H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary to concentrate their attention'. The 
Circular laid down specific guidelines in relation to further requests for increases in 
establishment, pointing out that since 1971 police strength had increased considerably. 
Chief Officers were advised that increases could only be approved if they could show that 
existing resources were being used to the best possible advantage, that civilianisation of 
police posts, thus releasing officers for operational police work must be examined, long 
term planning was necessary as there were clear objectives and policies. Changes were to 
be examined to allow for redeployment of resources to meet new priorities. The need for 
communication within police forces so that junior officers and civilian staff understood 
objectives, together with co-operation with public bodies, (public services, schools, 
voluntary organisations etc.) was stressed and a package of useful suggestions as to how 
this might be achieved was offered. Police Authorities, it was pointed out, have an 
important role. In providing an adequate and efficient force they were obliged to consider 
resources and the needs and wishes of the community. Whilst direction and operational 
control was a Chief Constable's responsibility, co-operation was necessary between Police 
Authorities and Chief Officers.
The Circular formed the basis for a quiet revolution in policing and since 1983, policing 
by objectives and initiatives has become the key issue of police management and issues 
involving quality of service now dominate police management methodology. The 
statement of Common Purpose, issued by A.C.P.O. in 1991 evidences this. (Appendix 
Two) The British Transport Police Force has never enjoyed, until recently, any overall 
increase in establishment either in police or civilians. In fact, the trend was exactly the 
opposite. (See Chapter 1)
Whilst the media, Government and Chief Officers of Police have traditionally measured 
crime control quantitively by performance indicators of statistics and clear up rates, 
modem researchers suggest that police efficiency gains can no longer be made simply by 
increasing establishment. (Lustgarten 1986, p. 85/86) It appears to be accepted, 
however, that crime can be reduced by preventative policing in the form of patrols, albeit 
that in some instances, saturation policing in one locality simply creates a problem of 
displacement elsewhere.
Clearly there are numerous measures which can be taken to reduce crime. Technology 
has produced close circuit television, audible warning systems, quality electric lighting in 
dark and lonely public areas, e.g. public car parks and visual warnings such as crime 
prevention posters. Deployment of civilian staff including security officers are some of 
the measures suggested for crime reduction on the London Underground and in 
consequence, London Underground launched a scheme which provided better radio 
communications, improved lighting, additional closed circuit television, more gates, 
numerous mirrors in long, winding public passageways and specially constructed waiting 
areas for passengers supervised by staff. (Daily Telegraph April 22nd 1988) Fare 
evasion has been considered and new automatic ticket barriers installed to reduce the 
problem but these have been criticised as 'very high obstacles' should a tragedy on the 
scale of the King's Cross fire occur.
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London Underground's reply to such criticism, through independent consultants was that 
the new barriers would provide more capacity for people to leave than the original barriers 
and they could all be centrally opened from a control room. (Financial Times July 18th 
1989) The Tyne & Wear Metro managers, however, have recently returned to old 
fashioned, perhaps more efficient methods to prevent fare evasion - human ticket 
inspectors - abandoning the use of electrically operated barriers, (Financial Times 14th 
September 1988) which on 15th September 1988 created a very serious problem to rush 
hour travellers at twelve London stations including Oxford Circus, Charing Cross, 
Farringdon and Baker Street when a power failure caused their closure. (Evening 
Standard 15th September 1988).
A police presence seems important in public places, particularly since the public regard the 
police as an available resource to call upon in any crisis situation. The difficulties 
experienced in providing an adequate level of police presence on Transport premises has 
largely been due, in the past, to the inadequate strength of the British Transport Police.
The establishment simply does not allow an adequate presence.
Numerous suggestions have been put forward to increase police presence on Transport 
premises, particularly in London on the Underground system. In 1975, the management 
of London Transport agreed to allow Metropolitan Police officers free travel at all times 
on both tubes and buses on production of a warrant card, provided that they would act in 
their capacity as police officers to deal with any situations which arose during their 
journey. Following protests by the B.T. Police Force Federation, the same facility was 
extended to officers of the Transport Police in December 1975. The General Order 
(29/75) granting the travel states 'When an officer accepts the free facility he/she must 
respond if called upon by staff of London Transport to assist'. No separate records of 
officers dealing with incidents whilst off duty are kept, however, commendations by the 
Chief Constable prior to the facility included two, both in respect of women police officers 
- commended for courage and determination whilst alone and off duty in effecting the 
arrest of three men on a train for possessing cannabis (GO 33/78) and a Magistrates' 
commendation for the arrest of two men whilst off duty and in plain clothes for offences 
against Section 3 of the Theft Act 1978 (Making Off Without Payment) (GO 57/79).
Additionally, there have been calls for a Special Constabulary for the British Transport 
Police (see Chapter 8) as well as suggestions that London Underground particularly might 
benefit from the formation of a Special Constabulary (Paterson & Axworthy 1983). A 
recommendation that British Transport Police should share London Metropolitan Police 
Specials (Crime on the London Underground 1986, D of T p. 61), was discussed at high 
level between representatives of each Force .
The outcome was th a t;
❖ within the past thirty years or so, the strength of the Metropolitan Police Special 
Constabulary had decreased by almost fifty percent and at that time stood at about 
1,600. In consequence, the Specials are somewhat stretched to cover Metropolitan 
Police commitments and generally would be required at the same time as British 
Transport Police might wish to 'borrow' them.
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❖ the legal situation in relation to jurisdiction, operational control, payment of 
expenses, responsibility for vicarious liability and insurance cover, was extremely 
tenuous;
❖ in view of the specialist nature of British Transport Police work, extra training 
would be necessary.
The overall conclusion was thus, that the recommendation at that time was impractical in 
light of all the circumstances.
Finally, why not disband the Force and hand over the responsibility for policing to local 
Home Department Forces? It will become apparent that policing transport is by no 
means a peripheral part of general police duty. The work undertaken by British 
Transport Police is now an integral part of the police service as a whole and the duties 
performed are parallel to those outside transport. Crime and non-indictable offences are 
committed, investigated and detected to the same level as crime elsewhere. The overall 
picture of police duty in society as a whole is mirrored by that on Transport Property.
(See Chapter 3 and also Chapter 8 for a full discussion on alternatives.)
Additionally, it is most likely that police resources would be overstretched to cope with 
transport policing and doubtless Chief Officers would be calling for an increase in 
manpower. In 1971, the police strength at Heathrow Airport was 175 officers (Annual 
Report B.A.A. Police 1971). Responsibility for policing passed from the British Airports 
Authority Constabulary to the Metropolitan Police three years later. Today, many more 
officers are regularly based there with, of course, considerable available resources if and 
when required. At Gatwick, in 1971, there were 41 B.A.A. police officers (Annual 
Report B.A.A. Police 1971), today (albeit the airport has extended somewhat), Sussex 
Police maintain a very large Division there. (No figures are shown in Metropolitan or 
Sussex Police Annual Reports.)
On 31st December 1987, the strength of the British Transport Police was 1,846 police 
officers and 183 civilian support staff. (Annual Report B.T. Police 1987) This 
represented on a pro rata basis, one civilian to every ten police officers and compared most 
unfavourably with Home Department Police Forces. The term 'establishment' is used 
within the police service to define the agreed and determined number of personnel to be 
maintained by a police force and quite often the figure compared with actual strength of a 
force is found wanting. For example, in 1987, eleven of the forty three Home Department 
Police Forces had recruited to full establishment but there were deficiencies in other 
forces, notably the London Metropolitan Police (127), West Midlands (45), Merseyside 
(32) and Sussex (29). (Police Review 1st July 1988 p. 1365)
Attempting to discover exactly how the present establishment of the British Transport 
Police was calculated was complicated further by the fact that there were between 1983 
and 1988 three alternative figures; firstly the 'authorised establishment', i.e. the number 
of officers who should be maintained; secondly the 'actual establishment', i.e. the current 
strength of the Force and finally, the 'budget establishment', the number of officers which 
the Force could afford to maintain in order to remain within the budgetary constraints.
2.3 Calculating a Realistic Establishment - A Suggested Formula
In 1988,1 attempted, on behalf of my colleagues in B.T.P., to create a formula by which a 
realistic establishment might be calculated. Originally, it was an exercise of the mind, 
using the statistics I had generated in respect of the civilian survey discussed at para. 1.3 
supra. My interest, however, snowballed and the logical sequence of information is 
recorded here. The research has to some extent been superseded by the system whereby 
Area Commanders now negotiate resources but the base line for such negotiations was the 
establishment of the Force which existed when the system began. The means by which 
that base line was reached remains questionable.
In formulating the numerical strength of any police force, it would seem that one of the 
major factors which determines the level of police strength in a given area is population 
density as opposed to the size of a police area in acres or hectares. In 1987, the Norfolk 
Police area was 1,323,317 acres in size, whilst Merseyside Police was 64,650 hectares 
(159,750 acres) (Police & Constabulary Almanac) Thus the Norfolk Police area was 
eight times greater in size than Merseyside but its police strength was considerably less.
At the end of 1987, the police service establishment (Home Department) in England and 
Wales was at its highest ever at 124,102- an average overall of 435 members of the public 
to one police officer, although in the Metropolitan Police District, the average was 261 to 
one. (Calculations based on figures from Annual Reports) Clearly, whilst every Home 
Department Force had its own inner city areas, some have more than others. It would 
seem that these 'twilight zones' which are invariably more heavily populated by poorer 
members of society attract more police attention. (See generally Shaw and McKay 1942) 
Although A.C.P.O. identified serious incidents of public disorder in rural areas (Press 
release by A.C.P.O. 9th June 1988) (see also Chapter 3.4), inner cities seem to suffer such 
incidents more regularly. Only one Home Department Force has addressed itself to the 
fact that, throughout the average working day, the population of large cities swells with 
people going into work in the early morning and diminishes again in the evening when 
they leave for home. The City of London Police have thus calculated a separate DAY and 
NIGHT population. (Police & Constabulary Almanac 1987) There is, of course, very 
little residential accommodation occupied within the City 'square mile', most of the 
buildings being banks, finance houses and other commercial enterprises.
In attempting to assess a realistic establishment (based on Home Department criteria) for 
the British Transport Police, efforts were made to calculate a 'population' like the City of 
London Police (where the ratio was 160 police officers per 1,000 residents (Police Review 
1st July 1988 p. 1365), the force has few, if any, 'residents' within its jurisdiction. It 
does, however, serve two main groups of people, operates countrywide (including inner 
city areas) and again, like the City of London Police, has a very irregular and fluctuating 
community to serve. Information was gathered as far as possible and an 'educated 
guestimate' was necessary as to the average number of people to be found in the rail 
transport system daily.
The two community groups might be described as :
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(i) The Fixed Group : Persons employed by the Transport Authorities and tenants, 
together with their employees and contractors who work within land and premises 
under the control of the Authorities.
(ii) The Transient Group : Members of the public who use the many stations offered 
by the Transport Authorities.
There is also a third group, those who have no lawful business to conduct on land and 
premises of the Authorities, vagrants, trespassers and of course, criminals, but except for 
crime and summary offence statistics which do not separate offenders into specific groups, 
the number is incalculable. At the time of the study, British Rail employed about 160,000 
staff (B.R.B. Annual Report and Accounts 1987/88), whilst London Underground's staff 
level was about 20,600 (Information supplied by L.U. Ltd.). British Rail leased out over
8,000 arches, some of which were used for storage but from many businesses were 
operated and the lessees actually employed people to run them. (Information supplied by 
B.R. Property Board). Station Trading provided retail outlets for a variety of businesses 
including bookshops, clothing shops, chemists, heel bars, foodshops, sundries and vending 
machines. In some central mainline termini, e.g. Victoria - London, there are large
shopping developments. Whilst there were no available figures for station trading outlets, 
British Rail operated 2,451 stations. (B.R.B. Annual Report 1987/88) There were no 
figures for station trading in relation to London Underground but within the 248 stations 
managed by them, numerous kiosks were to be found, whilst several stations, e.g. 
Knightsbridge, Baker Street, Edgware Road, Victoria etc., have many retail outlets. 
(Information supplied by L.U. Ltd.) Both British Rail and London Underground Stations 
which have forecourts from which licensed taxis and minicab firms operate, the latter 
often leasing offices from transport authorities. Buses also make use of many station 
forecourts. Additionally, there are many visitors to Transport premises, contractors, 
delivery staff etc., who are so regularly on the premises as to merit membership of the 
Fixed Group, though their numbers are incalculable. In assessing the numerical size of 
the group, excluding visitors and making reasonable and conservative assumptions in 
relation to tenants by suggesting that each B.R. and L.U.L. station had at least two persons 
who are tenants or their employees of station trading outlets, the following figures 
emerged :
In attempting to assess the Transient Group, reliance was placed upon statistics in relation 
to 'passenger journeys' which may be defined as one person travelling on one ticket on 
one occasion, hence each passenger journey indicates that one person is on the rail system 
somewhere. London Underground stated categorically that more than one million people
Staff British Rail 
London Underground
160,000
20,000
Tenants and their employees B.R. (Arches)
B.R. (Stations) 
L.U.L. (Stations)
8,000
5,000
 m
194.000
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are carried into Central London daily and that throughout the whole system, seven hundred 
and sixty nine million passengers were carried from April 1986 to April 1987, creating a 
Monday to Friday average of two and a half million passengers a day. (Information 
supplied by L.U. Ltd.) Averaged over seven days a week (excluding Christmas Day when 
the system was closed) the figure was approximately 2.1 million.)
Within British Rail there were three separate organisations which operated trains - 
InterCity, Provincial and Network SouthEast. The overall number of passenger journeys 
recorded throughout the whole of British Rail in 1987/88 was 727.2 million. (B.R.
Annual Report 1987/88) A simple division by 363 (services do not operate on Christmas 
and Boxing Day) suggests that on average, some two million passenger journeys were 
undertaken daily. Additionally, an incalculable number of people use British Rail and 
London Underground facilities daily but because they do not travel, are not counted in the 
passenger journey calculations. The facilities include refreshment rooms, bars, shops, 
parcel points, information offices etc., as well as those meeting passengers or simply 
wishing departing relatives and friends 'Bon Voyage'.
If the duties undertaken by the British Transport Police are considered to be 'in the 
national interest' then it seems right that the Force should have adequate person power 
resources to maintain efficiency. Whilst there is much evidence to show the effectiveness 
of policing transport (s^Chapter 3), this is only so in areas in which the existing 
establishment allows officers to operate. Using the average ratio of one police officer to 
454 heads of population produced by the Home Department Forces, (see Figure 2(a)) and 
dividing it into the numerical size of the estimated daily community to be found on the rail 
network, should produce a realistic figure. It might be considered that a very conservative 
estimate of this community is 4,294,100 based on the following figures :
Fixed Group (see above) 194,000
Transient Group (B.R.) 2,000,000
(L.U.L.) 2 J M J M
The estimate is conservative because of the difficulty in calculating an accurate figure for 
'visitors' who use transport services and tenants of arches, shops and kiosks.
Additionally, it might be argued that not all travellers are on the system all day and night, 
by the same token, not all of the community policed by City of London Police are in the 
City of London all day and night.
A realistic establishment for the Force is thus :
4,294,100 t 454 
9,458 police officers
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Figure 2(a)
STATISTICS
Acreage Population Ratio
or Community 1 police ofl
Hectares Served Head/Pop.
1. Thames Valley 574,850H 1,819,100 525
2. Warwickshire 198.058H 477,700 487
3. Staffordshire 671.175A 1,018,000 473
4. Sussex 935,721A 1,313,397 456
5. Cambridgshire 841,000A 606,000 520
6. Norfolk 1,323,317A 724,000 549
7. Tayside 1,855,343A 396,174 395
8. North Wales 1,554,858A 629,000 474
9. West Midlands 222,200A 2,648,939 398
10. Northumbria 1,377,151A 1,518,381 440
11. Fife 322,979A 340,200 459
12. Glos. 264,266H 511,000 439
13. Guernsey C.I. 19,411 A 56,957 396
14. Notts. 220,884H 974,100 431
15. Durham 249,269H 609.163 455
16. Grampian 2,101,120A 500,000 496
17. Lancashire 305,524H 1,362,281 453
18. Devon & Cornwall 1,024,086H 1,413,700 506
19. N. Yorkshire 2,054,011A 691,100 500
20. Cumbria 1,682.780A 487,038 423
21. Leicestershire 630,820A 871,100 494
22. Gtr. Manchester 319,965A 2,600,000 371
23. Humberside 867,723A 849,600 434
24. Essex 359,415H 1,440,500 529
25. Dyfed-Powys 2,679,763A 445,900 477
26. Gwent 340,000A 439,700 450
27. Jersey C.I. 28,716A 80,000 376
28. South Wales 556.324A 1,290,400 415
29. Wiltshire 860,099A 514,810 479
30. Dorset 655,745A 627,700 504
31. Hertfordshire 367,536A 832,300 510
32. Bedforshire 123,465H 493,800 482
33. Cleveland 144,023A 573,580 389
34. Lothian & Borders 1,629.548A 846,526 358
35. West Mercia 1,832,690A 1,007,810 517
36. Dumfries & Galloway 1,575,070A 145,078 422
37. Merseyside 64,650H 1,481,100 310
38. City of London 677A 284,700D 355
5,800N
39. Avon & Somerset 1,186,972A 1,390,6000 459
40. Surrey 363,303A 744,555 439
41. Hampshire 377,700H 1,491,800 479
42. Suffolk 937,737A 607,382 512
43. Lincolnshire 1,461,560A 557,700 471
AVERAGE 454
British Transport 178,871A 4,294,100 2,326
Using the civilian establishment average figure ratio for Home Department Forces (28 
civilians per 100 officers) (Figure 2(b)), the number of civilians supporting the Force 
should be 2,648. Distribution of such resources presents another problem. Network 
SouthEast were helpful in providing the following information concerning passenger 
journeys within the London area.
Passenger j oumeys (overall) per annum 437 million
Within the London area 321 million
During morning peak : passengers into London 792,000
-II- out of -//- 57,000
-II- within -II- 3,500
London Underground's estimate of more than one million allows a further conservative 
estimate of people using rail facilities in the Metropolis daily :
London Underground 1,000,000
Network SouthEast 792,000
3.000
L m m >
Given that in the Metropolitan Police area the ratio was one police officer to 261 members 
of the community, (Police Review 1st July 1988 p. 1365) based on that figure, the number 
of British Transport Police who should operate within the Metropolitan Police District 
should be 1,795,000 ? 261 = 6,887. At that time 400 officers policed London 
Underground and approximately 160 were stationed at mainline London British Rail 
Termini, though these officers are often required to work outside the London area to 
augment the even more sparsely distributed remain der of the Force.
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Again, it might be argued that not all travellers are at risk at all times but then neither are 
all citizens. The fact that while the system is open (and in the cases of trespassers 
especially children, when is it not), all citizens have the capability to use the services and 
in consequence the expectation to be safe in all senses of the word is important. The 
transport system is an integral part of society's amenities and as such, society has the right 
to expect the same standard of protection as is available in the High Street or the 
residential road.
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Figure 2(b)
PERSONNEL : CIVILIAN & POLICE 
1980 1985 1987
1. Thames Valley
P
3103
C
1231
%
CIV
40
P
3317
C
1362
%
CIV
41
P
3467
C
1479
%
CIV
43
2. Warwickshire 916 142 15 939 257 27 981 264 27
3. Staffordshire 2071 425 21 2102 494 23 2151 520 24
4. Sussex 2823 676 24 2790 701 25 2883 808 28
5. Cambridgeshire 1086 255 23 1141 303 27 1165 356 31
6. Norfolk 1265 307 24 1278 394 31 1318 391 30
7. Tayside 963 271 28 982 299 30 1001 318 32
8. North Wales 1311 339 26 1272 356 28 1328 367 28
9. West Midlands 6539 1612 25 6555 1819 28 6659 2387 36
10. Northumbria 3355 963 29 3378 1061 31 3453 1128 33
11. Fife 651 123 19 670 138 21 741 173 23
12. Gloucestershire 1119 151 13 1151 183 16 1163 211 18
13. Guernsey C.I. 126 18 14 133 23 17 144 29 20
14. Nottinghamshire 2260 443 20 2259 496 22 2259 452 20
15. Durham 1345 310 23 1293 349 27 1339 335 25
16. Grampian 920 210 23 957 228 24 1008 292 29
17. Lancashire 3120 463 15 3044 499 17 3149 583 19
18. Devon & Cornwall 2734 871 32 2739 904 33 2794 963 34
19. N. Yorkshire 1352 237 18 1353 236 17 1383 254 18
20. Cumbria 1104 815 19 420 272 24 1151 296 26
21 Leicestershire 1720 438 25 1750 491 28 1762 575 33
22. Gtr. Manchester 6915 869 13 6786 1018 15 7013 1368 20
23. Humberside 1951 418 21 1936 465 24 1959 536 27
24. Essex 2633 603 23 2673 618 23 2722 737 27
25. Dyfed-Powys 934 170 18 934 170 18 934 191 20
26. Gwent 975 172 18 978 192 20 978 203 21
27. Jersey C.I. 185 40 22 212 44 21 213 50 23
28. South Wales 3069 842 27 3109 895 29 3109 1024 33
29. Wiltshire 1033 272 26 1045 284 27 1074 340 32
30. Dorset 1167 297 25 1202 433 36 1246 444 36
31. Hertfordshire 1533 322 21 1578 373 24 1631 431 26
32. Bedfordshire 978 242 25 996 253 25 1024 271 26
33. Cleveland 1458 270 19 1474 290 20 1474 322 22
34. Lothian & Borders 2362 867 37 2348 864 37 2362 906 38
35. West Mercia 1935 416 21 1924 602 31 1949 625 32
36. Dumfries & Gall. 305 80 26 333 95 29 344 102 30
37. Merseyside 4714 715 15 4674 890 19 4782 977 20
38. City of London 861 236 27 800 294 37 801 287 36
39. Avon & Somerset 3020 745 25 3020 833 28 3030 754 25
28
40. Surrey 1602 NF* - 1660 358 22 1697 392 23
41. Hampshire 3053 851 28 3068 927 30 3115 1062 34
42. Suffolk 1124 331 29 1136 384 33 1186 389 33
43. Lincolnshire 1182 182 15 1183 251 21 1183 282 
Average
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Re. 40 Surrey NF = no figure available
B.T. Police 1948 186 10 1817 184 10 1846 183 10
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2.4 Aii_Alt£gi3liyjp_F-Qrjmila
In addition to population density, police strength must also be connected to incidence of 
crime. Criminal statistics are published annually by Her Majesty's Stationary Office and 
are compiled from 'notifiable' offences recorded by Home Department Police Forces. 
These are offences which are concerned with criminal investigation and associated work.
The Chief Constable of the B.T. Police publishes comparable statistics reported within the 
jurisdiction of the Force in his Annual Report. Whilst these figures have not stood on 
their own in the past, in that they have been included in Home Department statistics within 
the police areas in which they occur, they are investigated by British Transport Police.
The only Home Office requirement is that offences of Murder on transport property 
remain the responsibility of the Chief Constable of the Home Department police area in 
which this occurs. For practical purposes, murder squads are invariably staffed on a 
50/50 basis by Home Department and B.T. Police.
In order to show the comparison in relation to crime rates and crimes per officer ratios, 
four Home Department Police Forces similar in strength to British Transport Police were 
selected and the appropriate statistics for 1981 are shown (Figure 2(c)). As further proof, 
two much larger police forces have also been included in the chart. 1981 was selected as 
a year when the Force policed many docks and ports. For comparison purposes, the same 
forces have been used in 1991. (Figure 2(d))
Adjustments have been necessary to B.T. Police figures since they must include 4,158 
offences specifically recorded as 'obstructions to the railway', these are potentially highly 
dangerous since they can cause permanent injury as well as untold damage if they are not 
discovered and are consequently a source of great concern. Were they not specifically 
recorded under a separate head, they would otherwise be shown as criminal damage or 
even, on rarer occasions, Robbery or Theft. The latter suggestions can be amply 
illustrated by an incident which occurred at Stockton on Tees in April 1988.
The Freightliner terminal at Stockton on Tees is accessible from the main railway line at 
Norton by a single track which passes through an open area of fields close to a housing 
estate. In order that a train can be hauled from the Depot, a locomotive must first enter 
along the track, then draw the freight train out. On Wednesday, 27th April 1988, during 
the evening, such an operation was underway when the train was forced to stop due to an 
obstruction which had been placed on the track. The train was then attacked by a gang of 
about thirty youths and a quantity of liquor was stolen. Police who moved in to prevent 
the theft were harassed by a larger group. (Force Records.)
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Perhaps the most notorious obstruction of this kind was that which formed the basis of the 
Great Train Robbery in 1963.
Additional adjustments to the B.T. Police statistics were also necessary to take into 
account the number of officers and reported crime in Scotland, since the Home 
Department statistics quoted are for England and Wales. It will be seen, however, that the 
crime to officer ratio for B.T. Police remains the same.
If the crime to officer ratio for ALL the Home Department Forces shown in Figure 2(c) is 
averaged out, a figure of twenty four is reached and if this is again divided into the total 
number of notifiable crimes recorded in Column A, a figure not far short of the actual 
strength (column B) is reached in Column C.
Whilst it is interesting to note that this formula works well for the larger Home 
Department Forces as well as those with strength similar to British Transport Police, the 
crime to officer ratio of the latter is considerably higher and if the formula is applied in the 
same way to B.T. Police, a strength of 3,566 officers is revealed.
Once more, the 1981 figures are somewhat conservative since in that year the Force 
strength was at it's highest since 1970, brought about by the increase in recruiting which 
had been authorised to gain more officers to set up Mobile Support Units. (See Chapter
3.3)
By 1987, the strength of the Force was 1,846 and reported notifiable crime was 85,439 
(Annual Report 1987 .B.T. Police) - a crime to officer ratio of 45. It is of interest to note 
that 19,136 crimes were reported to 'L ' Division (London Underground) and in 
consequence, the formula if applied using a ratio of 1:24, = 19,136 + 24 (= 798) officers 
amounting to almost double the existing strength.
It may be that the alternative method for calculating a realistic police establishment for the 
Force is more consistent and perhaps more acceptable in relation to cost effectiveness. 
There can be no doubt that by comparison with Home Department Forces, the B.T. Police 
Force has been grossly undermanned. By 1991, however, Home Department Forces were 
seeing a much higher crime per officer ratio than ten years previously, whilst B.T. Police 
ratio had risen only very slightly. Significant increases were apparent in Humberside, 
Cheshire, Staffordshire and West Mercia (Figure 2(d)). If this formula is valid, then 
clearly by 1991, Humberside in particular was due for a review of establishment. The 
decline in numbers of police, together with available statistical information on reported 
crime and
Summary offences within B.T. Police jurisdicion was best illustrated by reported and 
cleared offences :
Figure 2(e)
Year
Authorised
Establishment
Actual
Strength
Notifiable
Crimes
Reported £ k a m !
Summary
Offences
Reported Cleared
1960 
Ratio :
2,995 2,746 27,692
(10:1)
7,281
(3:1)
38,387
(14:1)
28,681
(10:1)
1967 
Ratio :
2,491 2,320 38,901
(17:1)
8,799
(4:1)
58,821
(23:1)
28,325
(12:1)
1970 
Ratio :
2,494 2,217 47,519
(21:1)
11,946
(5:1)
65,067
(29:1)
27,905
(13:1)
1977 
Ratio :
2,289 1,871 72,262
(39:1)
25,833
(14:1)
83,534
(45:1)
47,155
(25:1)
1980 
Ratio :
2,335 1,948 85,365
(44:1)
27,393
(14:1)
112,800
(58:1)
67,524
(35:1)
1986 
Ratio :
2,214 1,834 84,591
(46:1)
19,063
(10:1)
131,820
(72:1)
67,275
(37:1)
1992 
Ratio :
2,151 2,114 85,190
(40:1)
17,017
(10:1)
59,383
(32:1)
29,413
(16:1)
Compiled from Annual Reports of Chief Constables of British Transport Police.
The inconsistency in the ratio of clear-ups to reports between 1960 and 1992 is probably 
explained by improvements in efficiency aided by better technological support.
Increasing use of radio and more recently, Information Technology, has created a more 
effective use of police resources, particularly in the reactive role. The Force Vehicle Fleet 
which has improved considerably since 1960 and was barely mentioned in early Annual 
Reports, has created greater mobility for crime investigation.
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In his report for 1960, the Chief Constable, Arthur C West, showed that the civilian staff 
totalling 133 was made up as follows :
and indicated that a reduction in this figure has been proposed. By 1992, civilian staff 
had increased considerably, as had the scope of their duties. (See Chapter 1.3)
A simple comparative analysis of the police establishment, reported notifiable crime and 
reported non-indictable summary offence statistics for 1960 and 1987 shows that whilst 
the number of police had decreased by almost 36%, crime had risen three times and 
summary offences almost three and a half times.
It is right to draw attention to the British Crime Survey 1989, which showed that many 
victims do not report crime for a variety of reasons. Of all victims surveyed, just under 
half said that the incident involved no loss or damage or was too trivial, a further fifth felt 
that police would have been unable to do anything, one tenth did not feel that it was a 
matter for police or they dealt with it themselves. Only 2% cited inconvenience of 
reporting; 1 % dislike of police and 1 % fear of reprisals. The findings were generally 
consistent with previous British Crime Survey findings and with survey results from other 
countries. (Mayhew, Ellison, Dowds 1989, p. 24)
It is also right to point out that B.T. Police reported crime figures have, for many years, 
been calculated slightly differently to those for Home Department Police Forces where, for 
example, one offender committed two crimes in the same incident, these were recorded as 
two, whereas Home Office counting rules record them as one. Following a request from 
the Home Office, however, the Force has since 1989 used the national classifications for 
recording crime statistics. The Report of the Chief H.M. Inspector of Constabularies 
explains as follows :
'The most important non Home Office Forces, e.g. B.T. Police, have also provided crime 
figures since 1989 but these are not included in the main series except when the offence 
has been recorded by a local Home Office Force.' (Para. 2, App. 2 p. 189)
Although the British Railways Board may well have sold over one hundred thousand acres 
of land since 1964, the 'Railway Estate' on 31st March 1987 totalled 177,171 acres and 
London Underground Publicity Department representatives estimated that their permanent 
way acreage was approximately 1,700 acres. (Facts supplied by B.R. Property Board) 
Collectively, this is an area overall larger than at least one county police area (Cleveland). 
(Police & Constabulary Almanac 1987)
Clerks
Secretaries
Typists
Messengers
80
8
41
__4
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In terms of buildings and contents, British Rail maintained 2,530 stations, 536 of which 
deal with parcels and 123 with freight, together with numerous operational structures 
(power boxes), signal cabins, carriage sidings etc., as well as shops, kiosks, vending 
machines etc. within railway station complexes. London Underground maintained 248 
stations. (Annual Report of relevant industries 1987/88)
Additionally, British Rail maintained a vast amount of track and rolling stock, much of 
which is extremely valuable and vital to the needs of the industry, e.g. 2,040 diesel trains, 
230 electric locomotives, 197 High Speed Trains plus thousands of passenger and freight 
carrying vehicles. London Underground maintained 473 trains as well as 275 escalators. 
The list of valuable assets is far too long to quote here but at 31st march 1988, British 
Rails total net operating assets amounted to £3,924.2 million. The actual value of goods 
carried, stock maintained by shops etc. throughout the transport system is inestimable.
Throughout the country, rail transport maintains numerous car parks for passengers. 
London Underground alone has 66 providing some 1,500 car spaces. With train depots, 
goods depots, electrical generating systems, a vast and complex communications system 
etc., there is in terms of property, much to protect, in addition to the millions of people 
who daily use the services. Perhaps then, police establishment should be calculated on a 
national mean of 'reported crimes per officer'? The answer seems to be academic as is 
further discussed below.
The Way Forward
The present system of negotiating resources based on credible performance indicators has 
been refined even further and seems to provide a realistic solution to the problem. From 
1989, the Force has adopted three basic themes - 'Where are we now?' - 'Where are we 
going?' - 'How are we going to get there?' The authorised establishment in 1992 of 
2,072 officers and 378 civilians compared with 1,953 officers and 345 civilians the 
previous year is indicative of the commencement of growth and the value of this 
negotiation system. (Annual Reports B.T. Police 1989 and 1992) (See Chapter 2.1)
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CHAPTER THREE : ARE B.T, POLICE REAL' POLICE OFFICERS?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine two main areas - the legal 
status of a B.T. Police officer compared to the Home Department Police and the duties 
undertaken by B.T. Police, i.e. what they actually do.
3.1 THE.LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 (i) Case Law and Statute
The only constable know to law is one to whom the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 applies... 
in my opinion 'during the continuance of this appointment' means and can onlymean that 
whatever variations, dimensions or extensions of a constable's power are made, given or 
imposed during a constable's appointment, shall apply to him...'the power of detention' 
(under the 1980 Act) is conferred on a 'constable'. The transport police constable has 
conferred on him all the powers of a constable - there is no distinction between powers 
possessed by virtue of express statutory enactment or arising at common law' - per Lord 
Cameron (Smith -v- Dudgeon [1982] High Court of Justiciary - Scotland)
In that case, the Defendant was detained by British Transport Police officers at Edinburgh 
Railway Station on suspicion of theft under Section 2 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 
1980 and searched. No evidence of theft was found but he was in possession of 
controlled drugs and was subsequently charged with an offence under S.5(l) Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971. The Sheriff before whom he appeared dismissed the case on the grounds 
that the powers of police under the 1980 Act were conferred on Constables within the 
meaning of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and that British Transport Police officers were 
thus NOT covered by the 1980 Act, since British Transport Police officers were police 
within the limited meaning of a private statute (Section 53 British Transport Commission 
Act 1949 as amended by the British Railways Order Confirmation Act 1980, Section 3).
The Procurator Fiscal appealed by way of the case stated to the High Court. In the High 
Court, Lord Cameron also pointed out that -^Section 53 of the British Transport 
Commission Act 1949, as now amended provides, as I have noted that 'every constable 
shall during the continuance of his appointment have all the powers, protections and 
privileges of a constable'? Whilst this decision is a precedent set by a Scottish Court, 
there seems little doubt that it would be persuasive to an English Court, should a similar 
set of circumstances arise.
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The development of the professionalism of the Force during this century and the 
recognition of this fact can be measured by a somewhat older case, in which the Kings 
Bench held a very different view (Lambert -v- Great Eastern Railway Company 1909) 
(2KB 776)
The plaintiff, a youth of seventeen years, assisted his father, a Romford newsvendor with 
early morning newspapers, prior to going to school. Railway police had received 
information that copies of the Essex Times were regularly being stolen from bundles 
which arrived at Romford by early morning trains, addressed to Messrs Wilson & 
Whitworth.
On March 25th 1908, two railway constables saw the youth take fifteen copies of the paper 
from a bundle and arrested him. His explanations were not accepted by the officers but 
were believed by Romford Magistrates who, on April 9th, dismissed the charge against 
him. He then brought an action against the Railway Company for False Imprisonment.
The defence suggested that the constables were acting as servants of the King having all 
the powers and privileges of a constable, which was accepted at the lower Court. The 
plaintiff appealed to the Kings Bench Division and there, their Lordships refused to accept 
this after examining Section 50, Great Eastern Railway (General Powers) Act 1900,
(which dealt with the appointment of constables) together with other factors 'ticket
collectors, ticket clerks and all persons acting for the company go to the office of the 
Superintendent of the Line (Railway Manager) and refer to him as the Superior Authority' 
.... 'the County authorities who have to do with the ordinary police force ... they do not 
pay. It is the railway company who pay ... who dismiss and in these circumstances it 
seems to me that these men are bound to obey the orders of the railway company and ... in 
the acts which they did they acted as Servants of the Company.'
Clearly, comparison between the two contrasting statements needs further examination.
The term 'Office of Constable' is quite widely used, albeit at least one modem writer 
suggests that 'continued identification of the police with the status of constable produces 
confusion and mythology, obstructing clear thought about the nature of the public services 
they provide in late twentieth century Britain. (Lustgarten 1986, p.25)
Traditional legal definitions impute that the term is an office of trust. Blacks Law 
Dictionary explains that a constable is 'A public civil officer whose proper and general 
duty is to keep the peace within his district though he is frequently charged with other 
duties'. (Black 1951, p. 383)
Furthermore,
'The powers of a police constable are exercised by virtue of his office and cannot be 
exercised on the responsibility of any person but himself.' (Enever -v- The King 1906)
(3, CLR )
In Fisher -v- Oldham Corporation 1930 (2KB 364) it was held th a t:
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'neither the Crown nor the Police Authority were vicariously liable for torts that a 
constable may commit whilst allegedly acting in the execution of his duty.'
Lustgarten argues convincingly that the term 'office of constable' relies on the historical 
concept of a constable, originally an elected official who possessed few powers not 
enjoyed by the ordinary citizen and who had no special immunities until the Constables 
Protection Act 1750, which gave immunity from civil proceedings whilst executing a 
magistrates' warrant. Quoting Holdsworth, he points out that by the eighteenth century, 
the constables were unpaid, part-time, took orders from justices, had no systematic 
investigation systems, did not prosecute offenders and exercised common law powers 
only. By comparison, today, Lustgarten draws attention to the organisation, structure and 
operation of police in a professional manner and suggests that a police officer can no 
longer be seen as a self directed decision maker answerable only to the law. (Lustgarten 
1986, p.30) For the purposes of establishing the answer to the question 'Are British 
Transport Police officers real police officers?', it is right to point out both the legal 
statements and those outlined here. In relation to each viewpoint, British Transport Police 
would appear to fit into both frameworks.
The Crown Proceedings Act 1947, Section 2(6) provided 'The Crown is liable for the acts 
or omissions only of such of its officers as are :
(i) appointed directly or indirectly, by the Crown; and
(ii) paid wholly out of central Government funds.
(Crown Proceedings Act 1947 S.2(6))
The main practical effect of this subsection was to exempt the Crown from liability for 
acts of the police, assuming of course, that they were 'Officers of the Crown'.'
The Police Act 1964 Section 48(1) and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 Section 39(1) 
provide th a t:
'The chief officer of police for any police area (Scotland - the Chief Constable of a police 
force) shall be liable in respect of torts committed by a constable under his direction and 
control (Scotland - in reparation in respect of any wrongful act or omission on the part of 
any constable under his general direction) in the performance or purported performance of 
his/their function(s) in like manner as a master is liable in respect of torts (Scotland - a 
wrongful act or omission) committed by his servants in the course of their employment 
and the Police Act 1964, Section 48(2) and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, Section 39(2) 
provide th a t:
'There shall be paid out of the police fund (Scotland - The Police Authority shall pay)
(a) any damages or costs (Scotland - expenses) awarded against the chief officer of
police (Scotland - the Chief Constable of a police force), in any proceedings brought
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against him by virtue of this Section and any costs (Scotland - expenses) incurred by 
him in any such proceedings so far as not recovered by him in the proceedings; and
(b) any sum required in connection with the settlement of any claim made against the 
chief officer of police (Scotland - the Chief Constable of a police force) by virtue of 
this Section, if the settlement is approved by the Police Authority.'
Sub-sections (3) of the relevant Acts and Sections also provide th a t:
'Any proceedings in respect of a claim made by virtue of this Section shall be brought 
against the chief officer of police (Scotland - the Chief Constable of a police force)
It is thus so far clear throughout the United Kingdom that a constable is in a unique legal 
position in relation to the term 'employee' though sociologically there is room for thought. 
In Attorney General for New South Wales -v- Perpetual Trustee Company 1955 (AC 457), 
it was held that 'A constable holds a public office and is not a servant for whose loss of 
service a police authority can sue.' Constables maintained by Home Department Forces 
would thus seem to fall into the descriptions discussed thus far. What of British 
Transport Police Constables?
The Transport Act 1962, Section 69(1) imposed a duty upon the British Railways Board 
after consulting with the other Boards to prepare and submit to the Minister of Transport, a 
Scheme for the organisation of the British Transport Police.
On October 9th 1963, the Minister of Transport approved a Scheme, the details of which 
are set out in the Schedule to the British Transport Police Force Scheme 1963 (Approval) 
Order 1964, Statutory Instrument No. 1456 1964. This was laid before Parliament on 
September 17th 1964 and came into operation on January 1st 1965.
'There shall be a Committee (to be known as the British Transport Police Committee) to 
whom the Chief Constable (of the British Transport Police Force) shall be responsible for 
the administration of the Force (Para 4a)
Further 'It shall be the duty of the Committee to supervise the administration of the Force 
by the Chief Constable on such lines as may, from time to time be agreed between the 
represented Boards and to give him all such directions as may from time to time be 
necessary for that purpose' (Para. 4g)
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The original Scheme was silent on control of the Force, though by convention, the Chief 
Constable exercised this function in line with his Home Department Police Force 
counterparts. The Scheme does provide, however, for :
'At least one of the members (of its committee) to be appointed by the Railways Board 
shall be appointed after consultation with the other represented Boards from among 
persons who have had wide experience of, or who have shown capacity in, the control of 
administration of police.' (Para 4c)
As Lord Cameron observed in Smith -v- Dudgeon (ante) section 53 of the British 
Transport Commission Act 1949 gave all the powers, protections and privileges of a 
constable to British Transport Police Officers.
With the impending arrival of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, concern was 
expressed within the Force in relation to the status of British Transport Police officers.
The Force Federation, through its former Parliamentary Advisor, the Rt. Hon. Robert 
McCrindle M.P. sought clarification during the passage of the Bill through Parliament. In 
response to letters written to Leon Britton on 25th October and 28th November 1984, a 
letter was received from the Home Office accepting that amendments were necessary to 
the Bill to bring B.T. Police into the Act (letter dated 5th December 1984). The response 
also drew attention to the fact that the term 'police officer' was not defined in either the 
Police Act 1964 or the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and thus the powers of the 
1984 Act were conferred on ail police officers including B.T. Police. A further letter 
from Mr.McCrindle on 21st December 1984 to the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, caused 
the following reply :
'The provisions of clause 32 of the Bill (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 - referring 
to a 'police station') will apply in any case where a person is detained by officers of a force 
established under the Police Act 1964 under the provisions of Part IV of the Bill, whether 
the place of detention is known colloquially as a police station or a police office; and the 
same position will hold in the case of detention in the custody of the British Transport 
Police.
It is thus apparent that so far, legal precedent in Scotland (which is highly persuasive in 
England and Wales) together with carefully worded legislation, provides the British 
Transport Police officer with the status of being a 'real' police officer despite the fact that 
the Force remains outside the full scope of the Police Act 1964, the Police (Scotland) Act 
1967 and the Regulations made under them.
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3.1 (ii) WhoTEmplflys British Transport Police?
Legislators appear to have been troubled by this question.
'There are some departmental police forces in which constables are appointed by two 
Justices of the Peace on the nomination of the controlling body. It is clearly right that the 
controlling body and not the justices should be considered the 'employer' and this is the 
further effect of the Amendments. Such a provision is particularly necessary in view of 
the fact that the sub-sections exempting the Crown from the normal enforcement 
procedures were deleted in the Commons in Committee. It is now possible for an award 
of damages to be made against the police and it is right that the controlling body and not 
the Justices should be liable for these damages. I beg to move." (Debate - Race 
Relations Bill, 30 July 1968, House of Lords, Vol. 296, page 246 - per Lord Stonham)
The choice of the word 'control' by Lord Stonham was perhaps arguable. As Lady Simey 
observes, in relation to police, control is an 'explosive' word. (Simey 1988, p.75) 
Lawrence Lustgarten preferred to describe accountability as a 'weasel' word - 'What is 
often at issue is the degree of control various political institutions are to have over the 
police.' (Lustgarten 1986, p. 1)
The problem was overcome in the Race Relations Act 1968, Section 27(4) by these words :
'For the purposes of this Act the office of constable shall be treated as if it were 
employment and a constable shall be treated as if he were employed by the authority by 
whom he is appointed, except that a constable appointed by Justices of the Peace on the 
nomination or application of any authority shall be treated as if he were employed by the 
authority on whose nomination or application he is appointed and accordingly, the 
authority by whom or, as the case may be, on whose nomination or application a constable 
is appointed shall be treated for those purposes as if he or they were an employer or 
employers.'
Legal commentators provide the following guidance :
'The inclusion of the words 'For the purposes of this Act' show that a general change in the 
law is not intended.' (Sweet & Maxwell - Current Law Statutes - 1968 p. 71/27)
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The Race Relations Act 1968 was replaced by the Race Relations Act 1976, Section 16 of
which went a little further by providing th a t:
(1) For the purposes of this Part, the holding of the office of constable shall be treated 
as employment -
(a) by the chief officer of police as respects any act done by him in relation to a 
constable or that office;
(b) by the police authority as respects any act done by them in relation to a constable 
or that office.
(2) There shall be paid out of the police fund -
(a) any compensation, costs or expenses awarded against a chief officer of police in 
any proceedings brought against him under this Act and any costs of expenses 
incurred by him in any such proceedings as far as not recovered by him in the 
proceedings; and
(b) any sum required by a chief officer of police for the settlement of any claim 
made against him under this Act if the settlement is approved by the police 
authority.
(3) Any proceedings under this Act which, by virtue of sub-section (1) would lie against 
a chief officer of police shall be brought against the chief officer of police for the 
time being, or in the case of a vacancy in that office, against the person for the time 
being performing the functions of that office; and references in sub-section (2) to the 
chief officer of police shall be construed accordingly ....'
The Section went on to define the terms used. Those relevant are :
In this section -
'chief officer of police'
(a) in relation to a person appointed or an appointment falling to be made, under a 
specified Act, has the same meaning as in the Police Act.
(b) in relation to any other persons or appointment, means the officer who has the 
direction and control of the body of constables or cadets in question.
'the Police Act' means, for England and Wales, the Police Act 1964 or, for Scotland, the
Police (Scotland) Act 1967.
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'police authority1
(a) in relation to a person appointed, or an appointment falling to be made, under a 
specified Act, has the same meaning as in the Police Act.
(b) in relation to any other person or appointment, means the authority by whom the 
person in question is or on appointment would be paid.
'police fund' in relation to a chief officer of police within paragraph (a) of the above 
definition of that term has the same meaning as in the Police Act and in any other case 
means money provided by the police authority................ '
Legal commentators offered the following explanations :
'The reason for two definitions of both 'chief officer of police' and 'police authority' is to 
cover transport police etc., as well as ordinary police' (Sweet & Maxwell Annotated 
Statutes 1976, p.74/17)
This explanation was borne out by Parliamentary Debate.
Mr. Allison : "I beg to move Amendment No. 81, in page 10, line 28, at end insert -
(c) by the British Railways Board as respects any act done by officers of the Railway 
Police.
This is also an exploratory amendment. I propose the words 'British Railways Board' as a 
addition to the subsection in order to ascertain whether the clause included the various 
semi-statutory or private police forces of which there are a number - not only the British 
Rail Police, but the London Transport Police, the British Airports Authority Police, the 
Atomic Energy Authority Police and one or two others. It is a matter of perhaps passing 
interest because in another context we are considering the Bill setting up the Police 
Complaints Board. There has been some debate about whether other police forces are 
susceptible to legislation passed about the police in general and I should like to know the 
position of these extraneous police forces."
Mr. John : "I am happy to re-assure the Hon. Gentleman that the clause covers the point.
Clause 16(5) contains two definitions of both 'chief officer of police' and 'police authority'. 
The first definition in each of the categories relates to what I might describe as the 
ordinary police and the second, in paragraph (b) in each case, relates to those outside 
police forces which have authority to be in existence. That includes the transport police 
and the other categories which the Hon. Gentleman mentions."
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Mr. Allison : "That leaves me quite happy. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the 
amendment."
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. (House of Commons Standing Committee A, Race 
Relations Bill, 18th May 1976, p. 316/317)
Exactly similar provisions were included in the Sex Discrimination Act 1965 and more 
recently, the Data Protection Act 1984, Section 38(3) provides :
(a) the constables under the direction and control of a chief officer of police shall be 
treated as his servants; and
(b) the members of any body of constables maintained otherwise than by a police 
authority shall be treated as the servants -
(i) of the authority or person by whom that body is maintained; and
(ii) in the case of any members of such a body who are under the direction and 
control of a chief officer, of that officer.
Perhaps the most recent piece of legislation to be examined and applied to British 
Transport Police, is the Official Secrets Act 1989, Section 12. In a guidance document to 
Chief Officers of Police, the Home Office were in no doubt that British Transport Police 
officers are amenable to the provisions relating to disclosures of information. (Home 
Office Circular 34/90, para 28)
Uncertainty as to the status of B.T. Police has to some extent been removed by carefully 
worded legal phrases. It is clear that the Chief Constable of the B.T. Police is, for legal 
purposes, the 'employer', whilst the British Railways Board remains (in Lord Stonham's 
words) 'the controlling body'. In Chapter 4 ,1 will examine the question of accountability 
and control in some depth.
31 (iii) Can B.T, Police Officers act as such anywhere?
All police officers, irrespective of the Force to which they belong are required by 
Parliament to work within their jurisdiction. Whereas Parliament has usually determined 
the jurisdiction of police, in geographical terms, it is not surprising to find that the courts, 
have placed considerable restrictions upon police activities by limiting their legal powers.
The Police Act 1964, Section 19(1) and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 Section 17(4), 
provides, respectively, that Constables of Home Department Police Forces shall have all 
the duties, powers and privileges of a constable throughout England and Wales or 
Scotland.
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Transport Police, jurisdiction is contained in piecemeal Acts of Parliament and Orders, 
starting with the British Transport Commission Act 1949, section 53 of which gave them 
jurisdiction in on and in the vicinity of the whole of the railways, harbours, docks, ships, 
(hovercraft), inland waterways, stations, wharves, garages, hotels, works, depots and other
premises or property now or hereafter belonging to, leased to, or worked b y  originally
the Commission and now the Boards and their undertakings. This was increased by the 
British Rail and London Transport Acts in 1978 and the British Rail Order (Scotland)
1980 which amended Section 53, to allow the jurisdiction to be extended to elsewhere in 
the United Kingdom in relation to matters connected with or affecting the Boards or 
their undertakings. The need for this amendment arose as a result of numerous incidents 
occurring 'off the premises'. In one such incident, a policewoman was assaulted whilst 
attempting to serve a summons on a proposed defendant at a private dwelling house.
Local police were called to assist but declined to charge the offender specifically with 
assault on police on the grounds that they considered that she was outside her jurisdiction. 
The case was not reported and their decision went unchallenged, (albeit a suitable charge 
of assault was preferred). No further details of this incident are thus available but it 
serves to show that British Transport Police officers carry out the same duties involving 
the same risks as any police officer in the execution of duty.
As a result of enquiries in 1987 by the Police Review magazine, it was discovered that 
only 28 of the 43 Home Department Police Forces in England and Wales kept statistics of 
officers assaulted on duty. By 1988, all but six forces were able to provide statistics and 
by August 1989, all forces were maintaining records including those in Scotland. In a 
published survey, the ratios of'officers per assault' in 1989 varied from 3.25 in Cumbria 
through to 66.50 in the City of London in England and Wales, and in Scotland from 2.76 
in Strathclyde to 34.44 in the Northern Force. The figures for B.T. Police, with a force of 
1829 officers showed a higher ratio than all 43 forces in England and Wales with 580 
assaults. Desmond O'Brien, the Chief Constable was quoted as saying that 'aggressive 
behaviour, particularly hooliganism has become almost fashionable (Police Review 4th 
August 1989, p. 1544, 1545). By 1992, however, the 'league tables' had changed. In 
England and Wales, Cheshire had risen to the top of the risk list, whilst B.T. Police were 
34th in the league and the London Metropolitan Police were 28th. Strathclyde remained 
the highest risk police area for assaults in Scotland. (Police Review 25th June 1993, p.5)
The duties of police, of whatever Force, Home Department or Specialist, may generally be 
stated as to protect life and property, preserve public tranquillity, prevent the commission 
of offences and detect and bring offenders to justice. These duties are found broadly in 
the reports of the Royal Commissions on Police and specifically in the Police (Scotland) 
Act 1967. It logically follows that in order to fulfil such duties, police must have power 
to do so, but, by the same token, the Citizens' rights must also be observed. In 
consequence, both Parliament by way of legislation and the courts by way of judicial 
decisions, have limited power of police and other 'officials' throughout the history. For 
example :
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Trespass to land; the act of entering or being upon the land or premises of another without 
lawful authority has been vigorously protected by law for centuries. Indeed, the ancient 
action of trespass in relation to the person and goods formed the very basis for the 
development of the criminal law of England and Wales over the past thousand or so years. 
(See Maitland - 1971 - generally)
It was said in Semaynes' Case in 1603 The house of everyone is to him as his castle and 
fortress, as well as his defence against injury and violence as for his repose ... if thieves 
come to a man's house to rob him, or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the 
thieves in defence of himself and his house, it is not felony and he shall lose nothing ... (O. 
Hood Phillips, 1973,p.409)
Lord Camden, Lord Chief Justice, in Entick -v- Carrington 1765 said : "every invasion of
private property, be it ever so minute, is trespass  No man can set foot upon my
ground without my licence ... If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of 
justification that some positive law has empowered or excused him.*
(Ibid, p.409)
These precedents have been consistently followed (albeit tempered) over the years and 
courts have often declared in certain circumstances, police to be trespassers.
It is perhaps ironic that the most important constitutional case concerning police trespass 
this century should involve a forerunner of the British Transport Police Constable. In The 
Great Central Railway Company -v- Bates (1921 3KB, 578) a constable of the Great 
Central Railway Police, whilst on duty, on patrol during the night hours discovered that 
one of the sliding doors of a warehouse, (of which Bates was the tenant), was open. In 
order to establish that everything was alright, the constable entered the warehouse and fell 
into an unfenced sawpit inside, injuring himself. His Police Authority continued to pay 
him whilst he was off sick then sued to recover the salary by way of compensation.
It was held, that in the circumstances, the constable was a trespasser. Lord Justice Atkin 
said, 'The question raised is whether this constable had the right to enter upon private 
premises, not a dwelling house ... he did not suspect a felony or that there was a felon on 
the premises, nor had he a warrant to arrest anybody on the premises, nor was he in pursuit 
of any criminal who he thought might be on the premises.
Thus, although the officer was doing what he thought to be his duty, he had no common 
law powers to enter private premises without a warrant. Geographically he was within his 
jurisdiction, legally he was a trespasser.
This decision was followed in Davis -v- Lisle (1936 2 KB. 434) when a Home Department 
police officer believing that a road traffic offence had been committed with a lorry, 
followed the lorry to a garage and without the occupiers permission, entered the garage to 
make enquiries, without a warrant. The occupier requested the officer to leave, the officer
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declined and the occupier attempted to remove him. The court held that even if the 
constable had a right to enter the garage to make enquiries, he became a trespasser when 
the occupier asked him to leave and from that time was not acting in the execution of his 
duty and in consequence, the occupier could not be convicted of assaulting or obstructing 
the constable.
How 'private' is a man's castle in modem times? The case of Robson -v- Hallett (1967 
2QB 939) is authority for the view that there is an implied licence for persons who have 
business with an occupier of a domestic residence to open the garden gate, walk up the 
steps and knock on the front door. If invited in, the licence continues but when the 
occupier requests that his visitors leave, the licence is revoked. The occupier must, 
however, give the visitor a reasonable time to comply with his wishes.
If the 'visitor is a police officer, he will need to have a sound legal excuse, e.g. a warrant to 
search, arrest etc., to decline to leave.
Numerous private premises can be visited by large numbers of the public, either on 
payment or otherwise and public disorder can ensue. Football grounds are a case in point. 
Prior to 1970 for example, some twenty police officers were needed at one football ground 
to maintain public order with a crowd of 30,000 spectators. By the 1980's, more than 
eighty police officers were required to police the same ground, which currently draws an 
average spectator audience of only 12,000. (Harris -v- Sheffield United Football Club 
1987 -2  All E.R. 838)
The Public Order Act 1936 created a number of offences, including (by Section 5) 'Any 
person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a 
breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence'.
The terms, public meeting and public place were strictly defined, the former to include any 
meeting in a public place and any meeting which the public, or any section thereof were 
permitted to attend, whether on payment or otherwise. 'Public place’ meant any highway, 
public park, or garden, any sea beach and any public bridge, road, lane, footway, square, 
court, alley or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not and included any open space to 
which, for the time being the public had, or were permitted to have access, whether on 
payment or otherwise.
By the mid 1960's, this fairly comprehensive definition was found to be wanting.
Railway stations, marquees, certain parts of football grounds and the like were NOT 'open 
spaces'. Glass, canvas, or wood formed a roof over them. The Criminal Justice Act 
1972, Section 33, revolutionised the law of public order by defining public place for the 
purposes of the Public Order Act 1936 to include a highway an any other premises or 
place to which at the material time the public had, or were permitted to have access 
whether on payment or otherwise.
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The Public Order Act 1986, has refined the definition even more - any highway (or in 
Scotland any road within the meaning of the Road (Scotland) Act 1984), any place to 
which at the material time, the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or 
by virtue of express or implied permission.
Since 1972, not only have the concourses of railway station been 'public places' for the 
purpose of the Public Order Act but so have trains carrying passengers ... as the definition 
says ... at the material time. At Common Law, in England and Wales, the offence of 
affray was assumed to be capable of being committed only in a public place, but in 1966, 
the Court of Appeal in Button -v- D.P.P. (1966 A.C.591, 1965 3All E.R. 587) held that it 
could also be committed in a private place - in that case in a hall hired by a local darts 
league.
In 1935, in the case of Thomas -v- Sawkins (1935, 2KB.249) the power of police who 
entered private premises - the Large Hall of the Caerau Library in Glamorgan, where a 
public meeting was taking place - was upheld, because the officers could show that they 
were in reasonable anticipation that a breach of the peace was likely to take place.
In 1971, however, a Police Inspector demanded entry to a licensed club - the Moulin 
Rouge at Clifton, in pursuance of his power under the Licensing Act of 1964. The Court 
of Appeal held that the Inspector had no power of entry under Section 186(1) of the Act, 
since he could not show that he had suspicion that an offence was occurring or was about 
to be committed. (Valentine -v- Jackson 1972) - All E.R. 90.
3.1 (iv) DuBritish Transport Police Have the Same Powers as Other Police?
Privacy in relation to land and premises is thus generally controlled by the law. The 
citizen is protected from unlawful arrests by police by means of carefully worded powers 
contained in legislation. These, in England and Wales, existed at Common Law until 
1967, when the Criminal Law Act encapsulated them into legislation and replaced 
offences which had, for centuries, been referred to as felonies and misdemeanours, with a 
new category - arrestable offences.
These were strictly defined to include Murder, Treason and any offence for which a 
person, over 21 years, not previously convicted, might receive five years imprisonment or 
more. Attempts to commit such offences were also deemed to be arrestable.
The Criminal Law Act powers of arrest without warrant, enabled constables who had 
reasonable cause for suspecting that an arrestable offence had been committed, to arrest 
anyone whom they had reasonable cause for suspecting to be guilty of the offence. They 
were also empowered to arrest anyone who was about to commit such an offence. Power 
of entry to make the arrest was also given.
Citizens were given slightly less specific powers of arrest without warrant in certain 
circumstances in relation to arrestable offences, though no power of entry. (Criminal Law 
Act 1967, section 1 and 2).
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This state of affairs continued until 1984, when the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
regularised police procedures in England and Wales, redefined arrestable offences, to 
include certain other categories of serious offences and created a system of police 
procedure similar to that which existed in Scotland as a result of the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1980. Powers of arrest for arrestable offences were slightly altered but are 
effectively similar to those in the 1967 Act. (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
section 24)
There still remain a few Acts of Parliament which give powers of arrest without warrant to 
police (and citizens in some circumstances), but it must be stressed that the overall 
situation is that powers of arrest without warrant are discretionary, persons who offend 
against the criminal law are generally proceeded against by Summons and are only 
arrested and detained if absolutely necessary.
Police discretion often results in persons who have committed offences receiving an 
official police caution, thus obviating prosecution altogether.
In Scotland, a police officer has power to arrest a person without a warrant whom he sees 
committing a crime at common law, or who is accused by an apparently credible witness 
of having shortly before committed a crime, or whom he sees running away from the scene 
of the crime pursued by others, or who is in a state threatening danger to members of the 
public, or who is offensive to public decency or whom the constable reasonably suspects 
of having committed a crime where there are some facts or circumstances to substantiate 
this suspicion.
Police powers of arrest and detention in Scotland were considerably regularised, in both 
the interests of the police (and of offenders) by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, 
which sets out a full and formal procedure to be followed by police who have reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a person is committing or has committed an offence.
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As already observed in Smith -v- Dudgeon (ante), 'The transport constable has conferred 
on him all the powers of a constable*. The limitations are those laid down in relation to 
his jurisdiction, i.e. he may act as a constable anywhere in the United Kingdom in relation 
to matters affecting the (Transport) Boards or their undertakings.
So are British Transport Police really police officers in the full sense of the words If Her 
Majesty's Judges writers of authoritative legal texts, distinguished members of society 
who serve on committees and report to Her Majesty's Government, those who draft 
legislation and elected representatives of Her Majesty's Government, as well as Peers of 
the Realm appointed by the Sovereign are in no doubt as to the question, it is difficult to 
understand why doubts can be raised. Even the eminent Sir Desmond Fennell, who 
conducted the enquiry into the King's Cross Fire, believed that the British Transport Police 
were a public authority funded by ratepayers' or taxpayers' money. (Fennell 1988, p.l 84) 
Perhaps the question is most succinctly answered by this statement: 'Criminals do not 
appear to notice any difference - they assault with the same ferocity, complain with the 
same verbosity and serve their prison sentence with the same animosity, whether they are 
detected and arrested by Merseyside, Metropolitan or British Transport Police.' (Thomas 
1989 (a) B.T.P. Journal Vol. 2 No. 22 p.27)
The evidence must surely speak for itself in relation to the question applied in a legal 
sense. What, however, if the question is applied in a professional sense, or in Lustgarten's 
words, to - 'the nature of the public services they provide in twentieth century Britain'. 
(Lustgarten 1986, p.25),This can be answered by another simple question ... 'What does a 
British Transport Police officer actually do?
3.2 THE PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.2(T)What Poes A Police Officer Actually Do?
The B.T. Police officer is a 'specialist' insofar as the task is to police the railway. The 
duties, however, are much the same as those performed by Home Department police 
officers. Considerable research has been undertaken on the activities of police generally 
and Holdaway found in 1983, that police officers prefer to believe that their function is 
crime control as opposed to providing a social service. Sherman suggested in 1973, 
however, that most police time is spent in maintaining order and providing social services. 
(Fielding 1993, p.4)
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A study by Southgate in 1986 found police activity as follows :
Burglary investigation
%
9
Vehicle stops 8
Police initiated conversations 8
Domestic enquiries 7
Providing information, e.g. time etc. 5
Foot stops 4
Missing person reports 3
Public initiated conversations 3
Domestic disputes 3
Damage to private property 3
Enquiries at business premises 2
Traffic 2
Complaints of rowdy youths 2
Public enquiries 2
Assaults/fights 2
Figure 3(a) Source Fielding 1993
In their study of Community Constables in five police forces, Brown and lies discovered 
that only an average of 13.7 of their time specifically related to community involvement, 
22.6 was spent in preventive policing, 10.1 on crime work, 0.5 in public order work, 31.8 
on general duties and they were withdrawn from their beats for 21.0% of the time.
(Brown & lies 1985 p. 17) Burrows and Lewis in a study of uniformed policing found in 
to 'ground cover' officers in two London divisions (Barnet and Chelsea - 
Metropolitan Police) a conservatively estimated 35% of their total duty time was 
uncommitted and were not being directed to use their time to achieve specific objectives. 
(Burrows & Lewis 1988, p.37)
In an extremely comprehensive project, Horton and Smith conducted in two police sub­
divisions in Hampshire, two thirds of the officers' time in one of the sub-divisions was 
spent outside the police station, sixteen percent of their time dealing with new or old calls 
from the public and only a 'tiny proportion of officers' time overall' was spent on police 
conferences, trying to contact witnesses, interviewing, dealing with warrants and 
summonses, on errands on meetings and visits. Only four or five percent of their time 
was spent on police initiated tasks such as stops, searches, PNC (Police National 
Computer) checks. (Horton & Smith 1988, p.94)
In relation to British Transport Police, the consultants who undertook the Force 
Management Review devised in conjunction with the Force Research and Planning 
Department (to create as far as possible a 'police officer proof system) a questionnaire in 
the form of a time sheet.
This activity analysis had two objectives, one to discover what activities were being 
performed, the other to ascertain the proportion of overtime being worked. The timesheet 
was accompanied by an explanatory paper and was distributed to a sample of officers on 
each Division.
The results in relation to activities which consumed more than 5% of officers' time were as 
follows:
Paperwork 
Foot patrol 
Enquiries 
Mobile patrol 
Office administration 
Other 
Incidents
Figure 3(b) - Source Ernst & Whinney
As a comparison they introduced similar surveys including the Merseyside Crime Survey 
carried out by the University of Edinburgh and which included an analysis of police time. 
The major activities consuming over 5% of police time were :
Office Administration 18%
Patrolling 16%
Other 12%
Station office duties 10%
Standby/refreshment 9%
Special duties 8%
Paperwork 6%
Figure 3(c) - Source : Ernst & Whinney
18%
17%
12%
10%
7%
7%
6%
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The Policy Studies Institute Survey included an analysis of time worked by the London 
Metropolitan Police. The major activities consuming over 5% of police time were :
Paperwork 19%
Mobile patrol 18%
Station office duties 10%
Foot patrol 10%
Training 6%
Standby/refreshment 5%
Figure 3(d) - Source : Ernst & Whinney
The previous year, Ernst and Whinney had carried out an analysis of time spent by British 
Transport Police officers working on the London Underground system and the major 
activities consuming over 5% of police time in that survey were :
Foot patrol 11%
Mobile patrol 18%
Football 21%
Office administration 16%
Figure 3(e) - Source : Emst & Whinney 1988 Appendix 15
The results of the activity analysis led to the following statements :
'British Transport Police employs (as at 20 June 1987) 181 civilians in support of a total 
force strength of 1,860 officers. This level of civilianisation of approximately ten percent 
contrasts with an average in all Home Department forces of about 24% or 21% for county
forces.
The role of civilians with B.T.P. is currently of a general administrative and clerical nature 
and does not, in general, as in Home Department forces, include activities more 
traditionally associated with police functions, for example, information and control, scenes 
of crime and computer support.
An analysis of the activities of officers within B.T.P. shows that a significant proportion of 
their time is spent on paperwork and administrative activities. Much of this work does 
not require specific police training or skills. In addition, there are a number of other more 
technical activities undertaken by police officers, again which could be as effectively 
carried out by persons without police training.'
(Emst & Whinney 1988 Report p. 73)
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Their recommendations included the civilianisation of some 3 6 -4 2  posts then currently 
occupied by police officers at Force Headquarters and on sub-divisions that the following 
activities should be carried out by civilians :
control room operations; 
prosecution administration; 
scenes of crime;
various administration functions which do not need to be undertaken by a police officer; 
possibly collating criminal intelligence information.
By June 1993, except for Scenes of Crime Officers, these recommendations had been 
implemented.
They further noted th a t: 'There is considerable scope for reducing the amount of time 
spent by officers in filing, clerical and other administrative tasks ... The activity analysis 
carried out as part of this review indicates that uniformed officers spend 18% of their time 
on paperwork and 7% on office administration. C.I.D. officers necessarily spend a greater 
proportion of their time on paper work (35%) in support of enquiries (30%). During the 
course of our discussions with the divisions, a number of areas were identified where 
civilians could give additional assistance to uniformed and C.I.D. officers, particularly in 
typing and general administrative tasks. Examples of areas where support could be given 
are :
crime and arrest report administration;
N.I.B. descriptive forms; 
enquiries;
preparation of case files and process reports for Court; 
statements obtained for other divisions; 
recording and analysis of crime statistics.'
(Emst & Whinney 1988 Report p.75)
These recommendations have also been followed. Their examination as to the use of 
security guards and the appointment of Special Constables is dealt with at Chapter 8.
The work of British Transport Police is thus similar to that of all police officers.
Numerous offences are committed and detected within the jurisdiction of the Force, some 
specifically peculiar to railways. Obstructing the tracks or trains, throwing missiles at 
trains, trespassing on the railway (a highly dangerous pursuit over which children do not 
have a monopoly), travel fraud, specific offences (by particular methods) of theft of 
mailbags, luggage, stores and equipment, from street vehicles, goods in transit and of 
deception involving catering, booking offices and serious fraud in relation to the railway} 
demand specialist knowledge not only of legislation but also of railway mles and 
procedures. In addition to specialist knowledge, there is a need for general police 
knowledge and skills to deal with accidents, illness, mentally disordered persons, destitute 
persons, general criminal offences - assaults, robbery, burglary, firearms offences, terrorist 
activities, sexual offences including rape, indecent assault, importuning, even kidnapping,
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criminal damage, forgery, bribery, going equipped to steal, auto crime, together with 
drunkenness, prostitution, vagrancy and numerous 'nuisance' offences. British Transport 
Police officers deal with a wide range of inappropriate and deviant behaviour. Given that 
the jurisdiction, albeit restricted to the railway, extends from Lands End to John O’Groats 
and the Force strength is but 2,000 officers, it must be apparent that the thin blue line is 
extremely stretched at times. Within the force, there are also specialist functions 
performed by officers, including the Central Ticket Fraud Section, Criminal Intelligence 
Bureau and Headquarters C.I.D.
Police dogs have played a very important part in routine policing, not only in searches 
prior to Royal or other V.I.P. journeys but also in general police duties. They have also 
been found useful in assisting Home Department Forces. In 1987, for example, in 
addition to assisting in 508 arrests, including some for Arson, Robbery and Criminal 
Damage, all dogs and handlers from the Scottish Division were utilised in the aftermath of 
the Lockerbie air disaster, recovering seventeen bodies and a considerable amount of 
property and aircraft debris (Annual Report 1988, p.48). Some twenty years previously 
the value of police dogs on football traffic was recorded - extensively used during the year 
to deal with hooliganism and damage to trains by football fans, whenever dogs were used, 
no damage was caused and very little disorder was apparent. When disorder did occur it 
was quickly dealt with by dogs and handlers. (Annual Report 1968, p.27) Using dogs 
in crowd situations, however, is no longer practised as a general rule. In 1975 'as a direct 
result of the need for certain economics' it was decided to reduce the number of 
operational dogs and close down the Dog Training School at Elstree. (Annual Report 
1975, p.26) By 1984, the value of police dogs was realised and a new Dog Training 
Wing was opened at Tadworth in March of that year. (Annual Report 1984, p.41) The 
following examples of the use of B.T. Police dogs by other forces in 1989 (taken from 
Police Dog School records) illustrates the type of work undertaken.
At about 8p.m. on Friday, 20th January 1989, P.C. Wright received a report of a burglary 
in Preston, adjacent to railway property. The suspects had been seen to decamp from the 
scene. P.C. Wright put his dog 'Duke' to search railway lines and the embankment in a 
large, disused area. The search was conducted (in darkness) over an area of half a mile. 
After quartering this area, the dog disturbed the three suspects hiding in undergrowth. As 
a result, two were arrested. The third suspect escaped but was arrested later with the 
property from the burglary.
Over a period of time commencing February 1989, over 90 burglaries had been committed 
in the Adswood area of Stockport. The common denominator appeared to be that most of 
the attacked premises were adjacent to the railway line. Greater Manchester Police 
organised an operation to catch those responsible enlisting the aid of P.C. Parkinson and 
dog 'Sam'. Equipped with an image intensifier, the officer spent several nights in a field, 
in freezing temperature, on observation.
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At 03.00hrs one morning, three suspects were seen to walk up the drive of a house. One 
gained access but they were disturbed. One was seen to be carrying property. With the 
intensifier, the officer saw the suspects climb a garden fence into a field adjacent to 
railway property. P.C. Parkinson challenged them to stand still but they continued 
running. 'Sam' was released and detained one of the suspects. The others escaped. The 
garden concerned was searched and the property recovered. The man arrested pleaded 
guilty at Court later to theft and attempted burglary.
The chase by 'Sam' was over a distance of 200 yards in complete darkness. The spate of 
burglaries ceased.
On 24th October 1989, a request was received from police at Strathclyde in searching for a 
missing person with suicidal tendencies. P.C. Russell and his dog 'Storm' and P.C. 
Campbell with police dog 'Zac' chose to search a two mile stretch of line adjacent to the 
last sighting of the missing person twenty four hours previously. After some considerable 
time, 'Storm' indicated the presence of a man in some bushes. His condition was verging 
on hypothermia in the severe weather conditions.
The following table illustrates contributions made by the Force Dog Section in combating 
crime within Force jurisdiction over a ten year period. (Statistics taken from the Chief 
Constable's Annual Report)
Year General Dutv Explosive Arrests Made
1981 29 • 229
1982 30 - 334
1983 33 2 341
1984 33 3 436
1985 33 3 647
1986 38 4 513
1987 33 9 611
1988 34 8 508
1989 35 11 • 536
1990 33 13 654
1991 34 14 535
Figure 3(f) - Source : Chief Constable's Annual Report
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3.2(ii) Hooliganism - Public Order Control
Hooligansim is a problem with which Transport Police have been required to deal for 
many years, the most prevalent of which involves football fanatics. Eamon Dunphy, a 
former Millwall player of the 1960's suggested that football hooliganism was bom at 
Millwall some time in the mid-sixties. He recalls a match at Oxford, when the team and 
the fans travelled by train and the group 'the decent supporters plus a small group of young 
toughs numbering no more than two dozen', were met by about twenty policemen who 
escorted them on foot to the Oxford United ground (Sunday Times Magazine 21 Aug.
1988). Dunphy suggests that the small band of aggressive young men should have been 
'intercepted at Oxford Railway Station and sent back to where they'd come from'. Over 
the next few seasons, gangs of football hooligans sprang up all over England - the 
Millwall boys, claims Dunphy, 'had invented a new sport*. He recalls a full scale riot 
breaking out at the Den in March 1978 in an F.A. Cup quarter final against Ipswich and 
the dreadful incident at Luton on March 13th 1985, when the pitch was invaded. Scenes, 
described by a London newspaper reporter James Murray are repeated in the article. 
'Children around me clung to their parents in fear ... seats were tom out of the stand and 
hurled onto the pitch ... they became weapons for invading fans ... police who had fled 
from the rushing fans regrouped, drew batons and charged until the enemy had been 
driven back into the terraces ... and as police began winning that battle, more so called 
Millwall supporters began tearing out seats ... and hurling makeshift plastic spears onto 
the pitch ... as I watched policemen led off the pitch dazed and bleeding and a 
Superintendent lying in the centre circle writhing in agony, I was reminded of the Brixton 
riots ... these were not fans ... not people .. they were animals'. Dun/»ty arrives at the 
conclusion that we have 'institutionalised violence on an unthinkable scale'.
A view as to how football hooliganism rose to become a social problem in the mid 60's is 
that it was probably connected with concern about the prospects for spectator behaviour at 
the 1966 World Cup finals. (Williams, Dunning, Murphy 1984, p.214)
The problem of hooliganism by football supporters first received official special mention 
in relation to B.T. Police jurisdiction in the Chief Constable's Annual Report of 1967. It 
was reported that most trouble occurred after football matches and that teenagers were 
particularly involved. Total damage to trains was difficult to estimate but believed, at that 
time to be in excess of £10,000 per year.
A special report produced by the Uffculme Clinic (Birmingham) under the direction of Dr. 
J.A. Harrington was highlighted, the principal findings being th a t:
(a) rowdyism and damage may be anticipated whenever young people travel together in
groups;
(b) experience showed that highlighting misbehaviour in the press often leads to more 
misconduct;
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(c) a most immediate effective step might be to arrest more offenders; and
(d) the public attitude is passive and with the law in spirit only.
(Annual Report 1987 p. 32/34)
Subsequent Annual Reports carried a brief report on hooliganism and vandalism in 
general, with special reference to football supporters. By 1970, a Home Office initiative 
to reinforce co-operation between police forces was being referred to (Annual Report 
1970, p.29) and statistics were being generated to indicate the number of times that police 
escorts were being provided on football trains. By 1973, some 1,295 trains were being 
escorted by police but damage to windows, light bulbs, light shades, seats and toilets were 
still a problem and the use of paint aerosols to cause damage was seen as increasing. 
(Annual Report 1973, p.44) By 1977, 'a  great improvement in the behaviour of football 
supporters on trains and railway stations due in some measure to extensive deployment of 
police officers on match days', was apparent. (Annual Report 1977, p.22) In 1980, 
however, a 55% increase in persons arrested for public order offences in connection with 
football, indicated that hooliganism was a continuing problem. (Annual Report 1980, 
p.30) In September 1980, a Bye Law in relation to British Rail which enabled certain 
trains to be designated 'alcohol free' or 'dry' came into operation, creating offences in 
relation to the taking of alcohol onto 'dry' trains.
Public order problems were not only related to football supporters. Public events, night 
club crowds, discos etc., also brought disorder to the railway. For many years, the need 
for some form of mobile, instant response unit was stressed.
On Friday, 14th March 1980, a fight broke out at a dance hall in the Neasden area of 
London, involving two distinct groups of youths - 'Rockabillys' and 'Skinheads'. The 
fight resulted in a number of youths being arrested and charged with committing an affray. 
The fight spread to the local hospital where injured persons were being treated and to 
Neasden Railway Station where two trains were extensively damaged and six persons, 
including a train driver were injured. Injuries sustained by innocent bystanders were not 
serious but the incident raised implications of possible future public order situations on 
transport premises and the ability of the British Transport Police to respond with adequate 
resources. As a result, Mobile Support Units were formed - groups of one sergeant and 
five constables equipped with a response vehicle and strategically posted at major rail 
termini throughout the country - London, Cardiff, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, 
Liverpool and Glasgow.
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By July 1993, a decision had been taken to 'phase out' the Units which by then had grown 
in number to sixteen. Research over a six month period had shown that 50% of their time 
was spent on travel, administration and other duties :
Travel by road 17.44%
Travel by rail 2.82%
Administration 14.83%
Briefings 5.25%
Other duties 10.00%
'Other duties' included standby, public relations, escorts, station cover, contingency 
planning and identification parades. 'A  new system to tackle major incidents, public 
order and bomb threats will be introduced' (not explained). A Force spokesman stated 
'Having a pool of officers on duty as insurance is not an efficient use of staff. By 
spreading them across the Area, more officers with specialist skills will be available to one 
and all at police station level.' (Blue Line - July 1993 and September 1993) At the time 
of the creation of the Force, its strength (excluding the Docks Division) was 1,860.
(Annual Report 1981, p. 1) At the time of the demise of the Units it was 2,114. (Annual 
Report - Chief Constable 1992, p.32)
By 1985, when the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol) Act 1985 came into operation, 
football traffic was still prevalent. 3,006 trains were escorted during the year, 1,496 trains 
declared 'dry' and 502 persons were arrested for public order offences on trains and 
stations, whilst 996 people were reported for a total of 1,858 offences committed on trains 
carrying football supporters. Of these, 138 were reported for contravening Bye Law 3 A 
(taking alcohol onto 'dry' trains). (Annual Report 1985, p.34).
The following table illustrates the preventive work undertaken in relation to 'football' 
trains over the last ten years.
TRAINS
YEAR ESCORTED DECLARED DRY
1982 1,951 1,388
1983 2,699 1,353
1984 3,840 1,750
1985 3,006 1,496
1986 2,629 1,394
1987 2,357 1,210
1988 2,241 1,460
1989 2,793 1,289
1990 2,576 2,964
1991 1,977 2,336
1992 1,264 1,835
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Views as to the cause of such violence and damage are diverse. On 10th May 1988, the 
BBC 2 Programme 'Brass Tacks' examined the problem of football hooliganism, in 
particular, events at Luton in 1985. David Taylor pointed out that twenty years ago, the 
ratio of police to fans was 1 per 1,000 but by the time of the programme it was 1 per 75. 
With twenty million fans a year attending football matches, this is clearly an increasing 
problem. The discussion centred around Luton's'membership only' scheme. Peter 
Willis, the Chairman of Manchester City F.C. was concerned that such schemes took away 
freedom of supporters, but Luton F.C's Chairman was concerned about the liberty of 
people suffering hooliganism on trains and other public places. Alan Dyer, the Chief 
Constable of Bedfordshire advised that the general level of order in Luton had been 
greatly improved by the steps which the club had taken.
Millwall fans were, however, prominent in the news again, when on Tuesday, 24th May 
1988 nine fans appeared at Southwark Crown Court charged with causing an affray at 
New Cross Gate Railway Station on November 1st 1986. 'Terrified passengers fled 
across live rails as the fans, armed with ammonia sprays, bottles, knives, wooden staves 
and lumps of masonry bombarded the train containing supporters of Charlton and Arsenal 
when it arrived ... A British Transport Police officer was on the train with a dog and 
attempted to disperse the mob, but two officers at the bottom of some steps near the ticket 
hall were set upon by fans.' (The Times, 25th May 1988) 'Outnumbered police were 
attacked with knives and rocks as a fifty strong gang screamed "Kill the Old Bill" ... 
transport police with truncheons drove some louts from the platform ... Constable Sean 
Burke had his fingers slashed and a brick rammed into his face before he fled to safety ... 
(Daily Express, 25th May 1988) On 27th June 1988, one of the accused was 
subsequently jailed for eight years and three more for seven years. 'Screaming friends 
and relatives had to be dragged from the court by police as one defendant tried to fight his 
way out of the dock' ... (The Independent, 28th June 1988)
On Monday, 15th May 1989, the day on which the Hillsborough Disaster Enquiry opened, 
the Morning Star reported that over the weekend, 'hundreds of soccer fans were arrested 
and dozens injured'. The report indicated that ugly scenes had occurred at Selhurst Park, 
South London, involving Birmingham City and Crystal Palace supporters, Weston Super 
Mare with Bristol City and Sheffield United supporters, Leeds United supporters in a 
Cheshire public house and Chelsea fans at Bournemouth.
Whenever, however, by whom or as a result of what football hooliganism was invented, 
'football hooligans are the folk devils of our age.' (Ingham, 1978, p.7) Treatment by the 
media may well have exacerbated its rise, (Hall 1978 p. 15-36), cultural factors (Clarke 
1978 p. 37-60), or alienation, frustration and boredom (Donovan 1978 p. 103). It has 
been agreed that there is no neat theory of football hooliganism (Armstrong and Harris 
1991 p. 436) and that the theory that hooligans operate in well organised groups needs to 
be based on better evidence (Armstrong and Harris 1991 p. 427). Arguments that panic 
about hooliganism is political - a means of frightening the community into taking right
wing positions, i.e. capitalistic manipulation (Ibid - p. 428/9) or that hooliganism is the 
generation of violence within a particular sub-culture (Ibid p. 431), were examined by a 
study involving a group of Sheffield fans and an analysis of the behaviour of Chelsea fans 
to arrive at this conclusion. This anthropological approach by Armstrong and Harris 
produced counter arguments, based on data, that 'the core football hooligans in England 
seem to come predominately from the rougher sections of the lower working class' 
(Dunning, Murphy and Waddington, 1991 p. 474) Police must continue to deal with 
victims and offenders whatever the reason for the behaviour of some fans who continue to 
exercise their freedom to travel in a democratic society.
The problem extends beyond the U.K. as is evidenced particularly by the Heysel Stadium 
incident. The expertise gained by the B.T. Police, despite limited resources was sought 
when it was thought necessary to provide a police escort for English fans from Holland on 
7th and 8th September 1989 after the Sweden -v- England World Cup Match. Despite the 
withdrawal of B.T. Police from the Sealink ports (See Chapter 8), after serious disorder 
following the match, including the death of one football supporter on the ferry 'Tor 
Britannia', twenty four officers assisted the Essexp
Police to investigate offences involving some 200 fans and on 7th September, following 
reports that large numbers of English fans who had been arrested in Stockholm had been 
released and were returning to England unescorted, posing a threat of disorder, H.M. 
Inspector of Constabulary sought assistance from B.T. Police to provide an escort from the 
Hook of Holland. This was done in conjunction with Essex Police, the cost of the 
operation being funded by the Home Office. (Annual Report 1989, p.23) The Force was 
represented on a Government Working Party for the 1990 World Cup by the Assistant 
Chief Constable (Operations). As a result of the establishment of the National Football 
Intelligence Unit at New Scotland Yard, B.T. Police are no longer solely responsible for 
collating and disseminating information relating to international football affecting the 
U.K. The Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) has relinquished his role of the U.K. 
Trevi Permanent Correspondent to the Head of the N.F.I.U. The expertise gained by the 
B.T. Police, however, continues to be valuable. A special operation run with Kent Police 
in 1990 to monitor fans travelling abroad, resulted in 41 trains being escorted from 
Victoria to Dover and eight Sealink ferries to France on the forward journeys, whilst 
thirteen ferries and eight trains were monitored on return journeys. An intelligence 
network was established through COLPOFER, the European Organisation which 
represents police forces responsible for railways to monitor and police supporters using 
European rail systems. (Annual Report 1990, p.21) Training for five Italian Carabinieri 
officers was provided by the Force as part of the pre World Cup planning arrangements 
and the 1991/92 season started with a joint operation with North Wales police to monitor 
fans travelling to Eire for the Ireland -v- England match (Ibid p.22). A light hearted, but 
sincere tribute was paid to B.T. Police in the N.R.C. Handelsblad newspaper on 15th May 
1985, (two weeks before Heysel), by Maarten Huygen, entitled 'Drink and Dancing on the 
Everton Crossing'. It included the following paragraph.
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'To ensure a smooth passage in the aftermath of the stand fire at Bradford, Assistant Chief 
Constable McGregor (B.T. Police) and Inspector Temporal (I/C Football Liaison, B.T. 
Police) have put together a detailed football traffic scheme, incorporating cars, buses, 
trains, aeroplanes and boats. They have liaised with travel agencies, transport firms and 
the management at Everton to ascertain how the fans are travelling. Their report even 
details the quantity of cars. This allows the authorities to decide upon their commitment, a 
policeman here, a bobby there, a gendarme here, a Club steward there. Football has now 
taken its place on the Agenda of international security conferences, alongside terrorism 
and drug trafficking.'
(The report concerned the European Cup Winners Cup Final between Everton and Rapid 
Vienna at Feyermord Stadium, Rotterdam. No problems were experienced there. On 1 st 
February 1989, B.T. Police were withdrawn from Sealink ports - Annual Report 1988, 
p .ll.)
3.2(iii) RiijraLYiflkii££jMuiD isorder
In June 1988, A.C.P.O. issued a press release on a survey which had been conducted the 
previous year into rural violence. 251 incidents of group disorder, assaults or damage to 
which police had difficulty in getting re-enforcement's to the scene in good time, were 
recorded. Seventy-five of the incidents took place in small towns, twenty-nine in villages 
and thirty-three in seaside towns. There were sixty-five in slightly larger towns but still 
well away from the inner cities. Half of the incidents occurred on Fridays and Saturdays 
and there was seasonal influence with 42% overall happening between May and August. 
Alcohol was considered by police to have been a factor in over 90% of incidents and 70% 
of those arrested had been drinking. Several recommendations were made as a result of 
the survey, including the setting up of a standardised reporting system to provide speedier 
future analysis, review of contingency plans, training for disorder and flexibility and 
speedier responses, a closer look at licensing enforcement and closer liaison with 
community groups.
Further research was undertaken by the Home Office as a result of the A.C.P.O. report. 
Three main locations were selected, Haverhill and Sudbury (East Anglia), Woking and 
Guildford (Surrey), Cowplain (Hampshire) and Gravesham (Kent). Using statistics of 
violence against the person, police message pad data and observational and interview data 
gathered in August 1988, the survey found a heavy pattern of drinking in the young in the 
Woking and Guildford areas (Tuck 1989 p.40), that participants in disorder felt that life 
had very little to offer except a boring job or the dole, (p.42) There was a considerable 
amount of under-age drinking and 16 to 17 year olds were disproportionately likely to 
become involved in disorder (p.46) which occurs usually at or around some entertainment 
centre (civic hall, night club, fast food vendors etc.). Friday and Saturday nights were the 
main drinking nights (p.47). Statistics from police message pads showed that one in 
sixteen incidents involved groups of three or more revellers, 70% of the incidents were 
dealt with by one police unit alone. In 29% of the incidents, the alleged offenders were 
gone on arrival' or 'area searched - no trace', 23% were recorded as 'all quiet - advice 
given' and one in eight incidents resulted in arrest, charge or caution. Of these, 18% were
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violence related. Police difficulty in responding to calls for help at the normal rate was 
acknowledged (p.56). It was suggested that the A.C.P.O. report could not be accurately 
described as 'rural violence' since major cities such as Oxford, Nottingham, Plymouth 
Brighton etc. were involved (p.65).
Following the A.C.P.O. initiative, the Deputy Chief Constable, Ted Coles, commissioned 
a similar survey within the B.T. Police. The criteria included incidents occurring in 
rural' areas (not Metropolitan areas or in close proximity to principal towns), either on or 
off trains between 1st January 1987 and 31st May 1988 which were dealt with :
(a) by B.T. Police alone;
(b) by B.T. Police and Home Department Police combining;
(c) by Home Department Police acting within the jurisdiction of B.T. Police but
without B.T. Police assistance, together with other criteria.
The survey was published in-Force only and the following extracts indicate that the 
results were similar to those of the A.C.P.O. survey ;
Whilst the primary objective was to ascertain key areas for the location of police posts in 
conjunction with the Strategic Management Review of the Force undertaken by 
consultants in 1987, the information received from the survey has widened the potential of 
its findings ...
The B.T. Police is a mirror of the A.C.P.O. survey. Widespread, highly alcohol related, 
unpredictable, spontaneous disorder, mainly during the night hours at weekends by young 
people, is as much a problem on public transport as it is in other public places ...
... Advantage was taken of the work undertaken by A.C.P.O. when producing their 
questionnaire. Unfortunately, the criteria selected by B.T. Police were not always 
followed precisely and the survey consequently suffered accordingly. Any future surveys 
conducted by B.T. Police will need to be more precise about what is a 'principal town'. 
The information supplied from Force records was subject to local interpretation by local 
officers and occasionally lacked detail. The overall conclusions, however, are not 
affected ...
Whilst some might suggest that the survey merely reinforces common knowledge based 
on police experience, it does provide hard evidence to those who are required to finance 
police operations, of the size and harsh reality of the problem...
The total sample of 317 incidents, although widespread, does not offer a truly composite 
national picture. This is due to the fact that the criteria of the survey were not used 
uniformly. The sample does, however, indicate certain clear trends. Overall, more than 
two thirds of the incidents were dealt with either solely by B.T. Police officers or with 
assistance from Home Department Constabularies. One third were dealt with by Home 
Department Constabularies alone.
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This illustrates the high degree of co-operation between the Force and the fifty-one Home 
Department Forces throughout England, Wales and Scotland, as well as with other police 
agencies such as the Royal Military Police.
Records show that this co-operation is mutual, since in many areas British Transport 
Police frequently assist Home Department Police.'
In attempting to categorise the types of incident dealt with, some difficulties were met, as 
well as some idiosyncrasies, which seemed peculiar to the railway. Many incidents upon 
the railway were obviously connected with incidents elsewhere, whilst others were wholly 
within the confines of rail premises. Those incidents which were categorised as being 
'Weekend and Late Night Traffic associated with places of entertainment and licensed 
premises' were highly alcohol related and were most prevalent on Fridays, Saturdays and 
Sundays. Those connected with football traffic were less alcohol related and tend to point 
to the success of legislative controls on alcohol consumption at sporting events and 
arrangements on the railway brought about by British Rail's Bye Law 3A. Two thirds of 
these, however, did involve alcohol. It was disturbing to note the number of teenage gang 
fights in the South and North West, though generally the alcohol factor was much lower 
than in the previous two categories.
Bank Holiday traffic problems were highlyalcohol related but those incidents categorised 
as 'no specific local policing problems' appeared somewhat less alcohol inspired, 
suggesting a degree of spontaneous violence and/or disorder. Finally, a small group of 
incidents labelled 'miscellaneous' were least related to consumption of alcohol.
Overall, the most prevalent day for disorder was Saturday followed by Friday, Sunday 
and Thursday. April and May seem to be the most popular months of the year and 1988 
shows a slight increase in incidents over 1987.
Almost two thirds of the total sample of incidents occurred between the hours of 18.30 and 
01.30hrs and some 88% involved people in the estimated age range of 15-30 years. Two 
thirds of the incidents were notified to police either by transport staff or the general public, 
(less than four percent by means of the '999' emergency telephone call procedure). The 
other third indicated a reactive response by police on scene. Whilst just over ten percent 
of the outbreaks were estimated to involve more than one hundred individuals, about forty 
percent consisted of three to nine persons.
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About half of the incidents were simply Disorderly Behaviour 'per se' - shouting, 
swearing and generally causing a nuisance. Twenty-three percent involved assaults; 
nineteen percent, criminal damage and in eight percent both offences were committed. 
Serious injuries were sustained in some instances and one alcohol related offence resulted 
in the death of one of the participants. Although in half of the assault cases reported, the 
actual offences were committed by opposing factions fighting amongst themselves, about 
a quarter of the offences were committed on members of the travelling public. Sixteen 
percent involved assaults on transport staff and thirteen percent assaults on police.
Railway property suffered most from Criminal Damage. Three quarters involved damage 
to trains and buildings, including arson.
The following are some examples of the more serious incidents recorded which resulted in 
police action :
On Saturday, 23rd May 1987 at 04.55hrs, shortly after leaving Plymouth, the guard of the 
19.30hrs (22nd May) Newcastle to Newquay train, discovered a considerable amount of 
damage to furniture and fittings on the train. Seats had been destroyed, tables uprooted, 
fittings were missing (and subsequently found strewn along the track), a window light and 
lavatory pan had been smashed and sliding doors forced from their runners. Police were 
requested to meet the train at Liskeard where further damage was discovered - toilets 
flooded, wall fittings and veneers damaged and electrical wiring exposed. So badly 
damaged was the train that at Newquay it was deemed to be unfit for public service and 
passengers were carried by taxi to connect with another train, at considerable cost. Police 
enquiries resulted in the arrest of four young men who were subsequently prosecuted.
They claimed to be rail enthusiasts and said that they had caused the damage through 
boredom. Each was conditionally discharged by the Court and ordered to pay £110.72 
compensation to British Rail.
The Manchester to Leeds main railway like runs along one edge of Clayton Vale, a large 
country park. From time to time gang fights between local rural groups of youths armed 
with sticks occur in the park. On Sunday, 3rd May 1987 at 20.25hrs, a train driver 
reported large numbers of youths fighting on the railway embankment. Police attended 
and saw about one hundred young people fighting and hurling ballast from the track at 
each other. The youths, on seeing police, ran off. Greater Manchester Police were 
obliged to deal with further instances in the park itself.
On Saturday, 21st March 1987, a first class coach of the 23.23hrs Euston to 
Wolverhampton train was set on fire prior to the train's arrival at Northampton. The 
coach was gutted, the damage amounting to £44,300. Initial police enquiries centred on a 
group of football supporters and information received by police as a result of publicity 
about the incident led them to a group of youths, two of whom subsequently admitted 
causing the damage by igniting newspapers and placing them under seats. Each said he 
had consumed a large amount of alcohol prior to the journey. In September 1987, each 
received a two year custodial sentence.
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On Bank Holiday Monday, 2nd May 1988 at about 16.30hrs, two teenage girls who had 
enjoyed a day trip to Weston Super Mare, visited the ladies room at the station prior to 
taking a train home to Bristol. There they were confronted by four teenage girls and a 
boy (aged about twelve), who attacked them, punching them in the face and stealing 
jewellery valued at about £150. British Transport Police on duty at the station were 
alerted and the offenders traced to a train which was about to depart. They were arrested 
and subsequently reported for Robbery and Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm. On 
Tuesday, 11th October 1988, they appeared at Weston Super Mare Juvenile Court where 
they were found guilty of the offences.
On Bank Holiday Monday, 4th April 1988, after a football match between Bolton 
Wanderers and Burnley, a large number of Burnley supporters joined the 1700hrs train 
from Manchester Victoria to Blackburn. On arrival at Darwen at about 17.55hrs, twenty 
to thirty youths attatched the train using bricks, iron bars and wooden staves causing 
damage to the value of over £1,000. Initial police action by the few officers on escort 
duties prevented larger scale public disorder. Subsequent police investigations resulted in 
a number of persons being charged.
During the evening of Saturday 13th June 1987, a group of eight youths indulged 
themselves in a drinking spree using trains between Bath and Bristol for transport. They 
visited various night spots and seven of the eight consumed between six and eight pints of 
liquor throughout the evening. At 23.15hrs they boarded a train at Bath Spa Station for 
Bristol and throughout the journey they behaved in a rowdy manner, shouting and 
swearing, causing discomfort to other passengers. One youth ran from coach to coach 
spraying the contents of a fire extinguisher. The train was travelling at about 60mph 
when two of the youths each opened a carriage door. Another picked up a fire 
extinguisher and walking backwards began spraying the contents about him. He fell 
through the open door still clutching the fire extinguisher and a passenger pulled the 
communication cord. The youth's body was recovered from the track shortly afterwards. 
On 22nd February 1988, two of the other youths were each fined £100 having pleaded 
'Guilty' at Bristol Crown Court to Endangering the Safety of Persons Upon the Railway. 
A charge of Manslaughter was not proceeded with after consultation with the Crown 
Prosecution Service at Bristol.
On Saturday 27th February 1988 at about 19.25hrs, the 18.30hrs Nottingham to London 
train conveying several football supporters of West Ham and Aston Villa Football Clubs 
returning from various matches, arrived at Kettering Railway Station. A group of 
supporters left the train and walked along the platform. As they did so, rival supporters 
on the train were leaning out of the windows. A fight developed between one of the 
groups on the platform and one on the train and punches were exchanged. The youth on 
the platform was pulled away by others but as the train started to move off, he ran 
alongside, again throwing punches at the youth on the train. He fell down the gap 
between the train and the platform and in consequence, his right leg was amputated below 
the knee.
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During police enquiries, he appeared at Corby Magistrates' Court to answer charges 
involving disorderly behaviour and possession of offensive weapons in connection with a 
previous incident on a train. No proceedings were instituted in relation to the February 
27th offences after discussion with the Crown Prosecution Service.
3.2(iv) How Safe isJhg Railway?
Safety has many aspects. In terms of the likelihood of a passenger becoming injured or 
being killed as a result of the method of travel, U.K. average casualty rates by mode of 
travel calculated between 1976 and 1986 per billion passenger kilometres are as follows :
Deaths
Total
Casualties
Air 0.3 0.5
Rail 0.3 10.6
Sea 1.8 41.1
Bus/Coach 0.8 240
Car 5.9 382
Motor Cycles 156 10,245
Pedal Cycles 68 6,024
Figure 3(h)
Source : Social Trends 19 - Central Statistical Office. 1989. H.M.S.O. p. 155
It is perhaps because air, rail and sea travel are much safer in this context than travel by 
road, that when a major disaster occurs involving any of these three transport services, it 
causes such concentrated media interest.
On 18th November 1987, thirty-one people died and twenty eight received injuries 
requiring hospital treatment when a serious fire occurred on the Underground at King's 
Cross Railway Station. This was the most serious disaster occurring with B.T. Police 
jurisdiction for many years. (Annual Report - Chief Constable B.T.P. - 1987 p.3)
The subsequent public enquiry resulted in the publication of the Fennel Report. (Fennel 
1988) Throughout the enquiry, media speculation had been high as to the probable cause 
- 'Tube disaster not the result of cash cuts.' (The Times, 18 June 1988), 'Ceiling tile clue 
adds mystery to the inferno.' (The Times, 20 June 1988), 'Tube Chief is criticised over 
arsonist theory.' (Daily Telegraph, 25 June 1988), 'Air currents clue to Tube fireball, 
scientists believe.' (The Independent, 29 July 1988). The speculation continued 
throughout the inquest which opened on Tuesday, October 4th 1988, 'Smoker's match 
blamed for King's Cross Fire' (The Guardian, 11 October 1988). 'A failure of 
management.' (Financial Times, 11 November 1988). 'Underground staff woefully ill 
equipped.' (Financial Times, 11 November 1988)
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On Monday, 12th December 1988, at about 8.12a.m. another major rail accident occurred 
when the 6.14a.m. Poole to Waterloo commuter train service was struck by the 8.03a.m. 
empty train service en route to Haslemere. Thirty-five people died. Again, press 
speculation as to the cause mounted. 'B.R. crash caused by faulty work.' (Daily 
Telegraph, 17 December 1988) 'B.R. signal staff working 60 hour week.' (The Guardian, 
17 December 1988) 'B.R. admits work on signal was defective.' (The Times, 17 
December 1988) 'Blunders of Clapham.' (London Evening Standard, 10 February 1989). 
The Public Enquiry, which lasted fifty seven days, closed on 6th June 1989. The Report 
by Sir Anthony Hidden Q.C. the Chairman of the Enquiry, made almost 100 
recommendations, to improve working practices on British Rail. (The Times, 8 
November 1989)
On 4th March 1989, yet another rail accident occurred at Purley when a Littlehampton to 
Victoria express service hit the rear of a train travelling in the opposite direction from 
London to Horsham. The driver of the former train was charged with Manslaughter 
following a B.T. Police investigation into the crash. (Today 8 September 1989)
In all of the incidents, British Transport Police officers worked, together with Home 
Department Police officers, Fire Brigade, Ambulance Service and many other emergency 
service agencies, paid and voluntary, including railway staff whose expertise is vital, both 
initially at the scene of the incident and later in relation to the investigation. The overall 
result of both the Fennel and Hidden Enquiries was an increase in safety measures by the 
transport industries and an increase in safety training within the British Transport Police.
The Force responds outside its jurisdiction to provide assistance. In respect of the 
Lockerbie Air Disaster for example where, on December 21st 1988, 259 passengers and 
crew lost their lives, B.T. Police dog handlers assisted in recovering bodies and wreckage 
over the vast area of search. (Annual Report 1988 p. 48) and on August 20th 1989 when 
the Marchioness sank in the Thames, officers from London Underground Division 
provided an immediate response. (Annual Report 1989 p.3)
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Despite the events on the railway between 18th November 1987 and 4th March 1989, 
given than in 1988 5,050 people were killed on the roads, about 63,500 seriously injured 
and 253,800 slightly injured (Source - Britain 1990 - An Official Handbook - 1990, p. 
333), by comparison, in 1987, 104 people died in accidents on the railways (including the 
31 deaths in the King's Cross tragedy), the railways thus seem comparatively safe.
In 1989, Bradford University began the creation of a 'Disaster Database' to help prevent 
tragedies, with the belief that tragedies such as the Bradford City Football Club Fire are 
preventable. Research showed that within the last century 400,000 lives had been lost in 
disasters within Europe, of which 31,500 had occurred within the United Kingdom. 
Emotional and other factors cause difficulties in comparing one disaster with another.
The unit at the University produced a 'Bradford Disaster Scale' which measures the 
number of fatalities in order of magnitude :
Fatalities Magnitude
10 1
100 2
1)000 3
10,000 4
100,000 5
1 million 6
Figure 3(i) - Source : The Independent - 13 September 1989
Applying the Bradford Scale to disasters which occurred in 1988/1989. 
emerges :
Disaster Fatalities Magnitude
Clapham Junction 36 1.56
Hillsborough 95 1.98
Piper Alpha 166 2.22
Herald of Free Enterprise 188 2.27
Armenian Earthquake 24,000 4.38
1988 Bangladeshi Floods 2m 6.3
Figure 3(j) - Source : The Independent - 13 September 1989
Dr. Keeler of the unit claims that within Europe there is a high expectation that between 
five and eleven class one disasters will happen each year and a likelihood that they will 
arise from man made sources involving either air, rail, marine transport or through the 
effects of a major fire. In the United Kingdom there has been a 30% increase in disasters 
over the last ten years. (Independent 13 September 1989)
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The recommendations of the Fennel and Hidden Reports resulted in a major safety 
initiative throughout the railway industries. In 1988, British Rail appointed a Director of 
Safety. (Financial Times 9 November 1988) B.T. Police have improved safety strategies 
considerably, concentrating training and testing in aspects of fire, rail track and emergency 
procedures. From January 19901 was actively involved as the Force Training Officer in 
setting up Area Safety Training Units throughout the jurisdiction of the Force to include 
training staff to deal with these aspects and in the interests of preventing injuries through 
trespass, a sound system of Schools Liaison Officers. (Figure 3(k))
The core aim of the Force Statement is 'Making our railways the safest'. In November 
1991, British Rail hosted a conference to explore best practice in promoting Child Safety 
on the railways. Representatives from many disciplines countrywide were invited to take 
part, including members of the Education Service. Whilst there has been a considerable 
effort for many years to provide a service for schools and youth organisations through 
visits by B.T. Police and B.R. staff, the system had lacked co-ordination countrywide. In 
1989, for example, throughout the jurisdiction of the Force, police officers visited many 
schools and similar organisations. The Leeds Child Safety Unit visited 850 schools 
providing advice to 161,227 pupils, whilst the King's Cross sub-divisional unit spoke to 
more that 10,000 school children and 80,000 Cubs, Brownies, Scouts and Girl Guides.
Within the Bristol sub-division, more than 20,000 school children throughout Wales and 
the Bristol and Plymouth areas were counselled as to the dangers of trespassing on the 
railway. A particularly good example of this important function is demonstrated by the 
work of one member of that team, Police Constable Chris Jeffries, stationed at Bristol, 
who throughout 1989 alone spoke to almost 7,000 school children between the ages of 7 
and 16 years on rail safety. He is part of a joint Avon and Somerset/B.T. Police team who 
enter a school for a period of one week during which pupils have the opportunity to learn 
about police work in general. Police Constables Williams (Cardiff) and Fegusson 
(Newport) enthusiastically took part in school talks in company with British Rail train 
drivers. In May 1989, Victoria sub-divisional officers were major 'rail safety advice' 
contributors in a Junior Citizen Competition in the Medway Towns, whilst throughout the 
Waterloo sub-division more than 1,200 young people were given information on rail 
safety by officers visiting schools and youth clubs.
In Scotland, 214 schools and youth clubs were visited resulting in 35,000 children and 
young persons receiving safety information, whilst Midland Division officers of the Force 
joined train drivers in visiting schools to talk with pupils in the Birmingham sub-division. 
A similar process throughout Manchester sub-division resulted in a further spread of rail 
safety measures.
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In Merseyside, British Transport Police officers co-operated with the local Home Office 
Force with input to Police Open Days and during 1989, 8,000 persons attended the 
functions. Additionally, 26 schools were visited by officers in that area. In a pilot 
project at Bootle, British Rail and British Transport Police are working together with a 
school which has adopted its local railway station as a 'social awareness project'. (Annual 
Report 1989 p. 12)
As a direct result of the B.R. Conference, a number of Head teachers agreed to work with 
B.T. Police to create an assessment and training package to ensure that all B.T. Police 
officers who undertook Schools Liaison work were suitably competent and adequately 
trained to talk with children. This initiative was completed in early 1993 and was also 
adopted by British Rail. Officers from London Underground Area of the Force also 
participated in the assessment and training scheme, although they do not visit schools as a 
general rule.
The Force has introduced Major Incident Training through 'table top' exercises. This 
involves the local Area 'Moderator' (the Inspector in charge of the Area Safety Training 
Unit) setting up meetings in co-operation with British Rail, throughout the Area and 
inviting members of all local emergency services (Fire, Ambulance, Police, hospital staff 
etc.) as well as local Transport Managers. A table top 'train set' is prepared, an incident 
staged on it and questions posed as to how best to deal with it. The scheme has been a 
considerable success (see Police Review 18 January 1991 p. 126 for full details) and I 
have visited a number of the exercises throughout the country, always receiving positive 
feedback from the participants. The objective of the exercises is to ensure sound co­
operation and co-ordination between emergency services in the event of a major incident, 
in pursuance of the Force Aim to make 'our railways the safest'.
3.2(v) How Safe is the Railway from Criminals?
Differences in legal systems, police recording practices and statistical classifications in the 
counties of the United Kingdom make detailed analysis of trends in crime for the country 
as a whole, difficult. (Britain 1990 - H.M.S.O. 1990, p. 112) The level of police 
manning and deployment of the Force may also affect recording. (Ibid p. 12) Crimes 
recorded by Home Department Police Forces in England and Wales for the five years 1986 
- 1991 provide a useful starting point for comparisons.
)
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The figures quoted below are in thousands :
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Violence against person 125.5 141.0 158.2 177.0 184.7 190.3
Sexual offences 22.7 25.2 26.5 29.7 29.0 29.4
Burglary 931.6 900.1 817.8 825.9 1,006.8 1219.5
Robbery 30.0 32.6 31.4 33.2 36.2 45.3
Theft and handling stolen
goods 2003.9 2052.0 1931.3 2012.8 2374.4 2761.1
Fraud and forgery 133.4 133.0 133.9 134.5 147.9 174.7
Criminal Damage 583.6 589.0 593.9 630.1 733.4 821.1
Other 16,7 .....15L3 .....22.7 27.6 31.1 34,6
TOTALS 3847.4 3.892.2 3.715.7 3870.7 4543.6 5276.2
Figure 3(1): Source - Criminal Statistics (England & Wales) 1991 H.M.S.O. Table 2.1
The consultants engaged in the Management Review of the Force recognised that 
comparisons drawn between crime statistics with Home Department Forces were affected 
by a number of key factors.
1. The Force Statistics covered England, Wales and Scotland.
2. The Force generally defined a crime as cleared up when an offender is prosecuted 
whilst Home Department consider a crime cleared up when an offender is charged.
3. Differences in clear up statistics involving offences taken into consideration.
4. A number of offences and crimes committed on railway property are recorded in 
Home Department Force Statistics.
(Ernst & Whinney, 1988, Appendix 3.1)
With the exception of note 1 above, the other matters were resolved when, in 1989, the 
B.T. Police adopted Home Office counting rules in respect of crime. In respect of the 
national crime statistics, although B.T. Police do report their offences to the Home Office, 
these are not included unless they have been reported also to a Home Department Force. 
(Report of H.M. Inspector of Constabularies 1991)
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Offences reported to B.T. Police between 1986 and 1991 are as follows
Year Total Notable Offices Total Summary Offences
1986 84,591 131,820
1987 85,439 139,947
1988 85,038 119,749
1989 87,905 105,438
1990 84,744 81,692
1991 86,827 74,151
Figure 3 (m ): Source - Annual Reports B.T. Police 1986 - 1991
Examination of these figures show little fluctuation in notifiable offences since Home 
Office counting rules were applied but a considerable reduction in Summary Offences, 
which may be explained by the change in system.
The consultants, using reported crime figures between 1981 and 1986, made the following 
observations.
'Despite the fact that recorded crimes on transport undertakings appear to be growing at a 
slower rate than in Home Department forces, there are a number of factors that should give 
rise to concern on the part of the Boards. These chiefly comprise :
the extent to which there is under-reporting of crime as a result of the de-manning of 
stations and the lower level of surveillance available and the extent to which crimes 
are reported to and recorded by Home Department forces;
the increase in violence against the person and sexual offences, which have higher 
than average clear up rates but can have a significant effect on public perceptions of 
safety on transport systems;
the overall downward trend in clear up rates within B.T.P. from 34% in 1981 to 23%
- during the same period clear up rates for all Home Department forces reduced from 
37% to 30% while in the Metropolitan Police area.it declined from 19% to 13%.
The high throughput of passengers and the value of the goods and freight carried, provide 
many opportunities for crime in a geographically dispersed and open environment. The 
high ratio of crimes recorded annually per officer 947 for B.T.P. compared to 30 for Home 
Department forces) emphasises the need for B.T.P. officers to be targeted at particular 
locations and types of crime which are likely to affect the long term viability of the 
businesses. The B.T.P. can be assisted in this process by strengthening links with Home 
Department forces to enable the rapid deployment of resources, by taking advantages of 
command and control systems and crime pattern analysis.'
(Emst & Whinney Report 1988, p. 13)
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They came to a number of conclusions, including :
There was a steady increase in the volume of crime recorded on transport undertakings and 
the associated property policed by B.T.P. during the 1970's. Recorded crimes increased 
from 47,500 in 1970 to 85,400 in 1980. The decrease in the number of crimes recorded to
76.000 in 1982 can be attributed to the withdrawal during 1981 of British Rail from the 
collected and delivered sector of the parcels business, a new fares system introduced by 
London Underground and thirty-four days lost through industrial action.
The increase in recorded crime was re-established in 1984 when a new peak of almost
89.000 crimes was reached. Since 1984, recorded crimes have stabilised at just under
85.000 following the withdrawal of policing by B.T.P. from B.T. Hotels and Associated 
British Ports (A.B.P.)
Theft and handling accounts for over half the crimes recorded on transport undertakings. 
Of the remaining categories of crime, only criminal damage (17%) and forgery and fraud 
(11%) account for more than 5% of total crimes recorded in 1986.
The overall level of crime recorded by B.T.P. adjusted to reflect changes in the jurisdiction 
of the Force, has grown by approximately 6% since 1981/82. This compares to an 
increase of over 20% by Home Department Forces.
(Ernst & Whinney Report 1988, p. 12)
Given that in 1991 the total number of notifiable crimes recorded by Home Department 
Police in England and Wales was 5,276,000 compared to 3,847,000 in 1986, whilst the 
B.T. Police received 86,827 reports in 1991 compared to 84,591 in 1986, the trend in the 
overall level of crime remains comparatively similar, the percentage rise throughout the 
railways being considerably less than England and Wales as a whole.
Ninety percent of crime is committed against property, much of this being relatively small 
scale and in consequence, the Government has encouraged the development of crime 
prevention schemes. (Britain 1990, H.M.S.O., p. 113) In 1986, five local projects were 
set up with Government support to see how crime could be reduced through co-ordinated 
action by local Government, private businesses, police and voluntary agencies. (Ibid,
P-113)
In 1987, the Chief Constable in his Annual Report (at page 17) published a Force Policy 
Statement which required 'the deployment of uniformed officers to achieve the maximum 
visibility to deterring the commission of crime, enhancing feelings up public security and 
increasing opportunities for the police to deter and arrest offenders'. Numerous 
objectives were set throughout the Force to put this policy into operation. The Liverpool
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Street sub-division for example set an objective during the autumn of 1988 to reduce the 
level of drunken behaviour at and on trains leaving both Liverpool Street and Fenchurch 
Street Stations on Thursday and Friday nights'. This attracted considerable media interest 
and the perpetrators became typecast as 'lager louts'. As a result of a public survey, 
almost 4,000 commuters visited the B.T. Police Station at Liverpool Street on 20th and 
21st October, 922 of whom provided information by way of a questionnaire and as a 
result, police resources were specifically targeted. (Annual Report 1988, p. 17 /18)
A further policy statement issued in 1987/88 required officers to 'identify those situations 
which induce a fear of crime and to enhance our consultative and practical links with the 
Industry and other agencies with a view to improving public perception of tranquillity 
throughout our jurisdiction.' Where local initiatives (in respect of this Statement) were 
allowed to run without having to be curtailed as the result of other, more pressing demands 
on resources, clear successes were recorded. They included significant local reductions in 
offences of endangering railway safety, obstruction and stonethrowing. Other local 
initiatives aimed at decreasing revenue loss, public order and car park thefts, also met with 
success....' (Annual Report 1988 p. 18) (See also Chapter 4.7)
In consequence, Network SouthEast in conjunction with the force, set up an initiative for a 
three month period between 15th January and 7th April 1990 to :
(a) increase the public's knowledge of the Force;
(b) increase the public's perception of tranquillity;
(c) increase the public's knowledge of the service the Force provides, with a particular 
emphasis on crime prevention;
(d) decrease offences reported to the Force and increase the number of persons reported 
for offences.
By providing high visibility policing, crime prevention displays, police surgeries and 
arranging media coverage as well as publicity resourced by Network SouthEast, the 
initiative proved successful. The success was measured by two surveys carried out by the 
Harris Research Institute, one before the initiative and one after. The second survey 
confirmed that the public's perception of safety had increased and that passengers were 
more likely to travel particularly at night. A reduction of 29% in the crime rate was also 
recorded. The scheme was consequently continued.
(Report by C/Insp. Furness, Liverpool St. dated 20.06.90)
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Crime on the London Underground has been the subject of a number of research studies.
In June 1988, a number of known offenders were interviewed by independent researchers 
(CrimeOn the London Underground - Interviews with Offenders 1988 - SDG Research) 
and the information gained was analysed to provide guidance to both London 
Underground Ltd. and the British Transport Police, to combat problems. It would not be 
in the interests of security to disclose the findings or the strategies evolved to deal with 
them.
In March 1989, a further study was undertaken, (Passenger Security on London 
Underground 1989 - Steel, Davis & Gleave) again by independent researchers for London 
Underground Ltd. The report drew attention to measures already implemented which 
included, c.c.t.v., improved lighting, mirrors for blind comers, improved radio 
communications, passenger alarms, additional staff, improved training, focal points, 
designated waiting areas and gates to close certain passageways. Among the 
conclusions was a high perception of risk of crime associated with Underground travel, a 
definite association between environmental quality and feelings of security, that the 
Underground is not recognised as necessarily a more dangerous place than 'on the streets' 
in the risk areas and that some Underground stations are perceived as 'good' others 'bad' 
from a security point of view, (p.25)
Consultations with London Underground staff, 'Crime and fear of Crime on the London 
Underground' was produced in December 1990 (Crime and Fear of Crime on the London 
Underground 1990 - Crime Concern) and provided the management with numerous 
recommendations on passenger and staff safety, information and communication, physical 
security measures, training, B.T. Police, media coverage and the community. The work in 
relation to this report was examined by a Home Office Sponsored Study in 1991 which 
drew attention to the increase in B.T. Police from 350 to 404 in 1989 following an 
Inspection by H.M. Inspector of Constabularies (Webb/Laycock 1991, p.2) and examined 
the c.c.t.v. installations installed to reduce robberies between Clapham North and Tooting 
Broadway (p.4 & 6), together with the intensive policing applied to Stockwell from 
January 1985. (p.6) The effects of the King's Cross Fire, i.e. the implementation of 
recommendations by Fennel - increase in Underground staff and more intensive 
management, together with the introduction of more revenue protection staff and a new 
ticketing system, which caused more staff to travel on trains, were also highlighted, (p. 8 
& 9) A suggestion that the Guardian Angels (see Chapter 8) had been responsible for a 
reduction in crime was refuted, (p. 11) The study examined a number of pilot stations (to 
establish whether new security measures implemented by London Underground, c.c.t.v. 
cameras, help points, new waiting areas, mirrors and passenger alarm points), to assess the 
perception of passengers. Overall, the study concluded that there was little change in 
perception of fear of crime and no evidence to suggest an increase in the use of the 
Underground as a result of the measures taken, (p.22)
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Perhaps the most comprehensive general report on Fear of Crime was the report of the 
Working Group of the Home Office Standing Conference on Crime Prevention published 
on 11th December 1989. Public Transport received a special mention (at page 52.53) 
acknowledging that B.T. Police officers 'will always be needed to provide a round the 
clock service', but perhaps the most useful addition to the report, to assist those in fear of 
crime to rationalise their worries, is an extract from the Annual Report of the Chief 
Constable of Hampshire in 1986 (Appendix D, p. 67) -
'Does your understanding of crime equate to these facts?'... among these were ...
1. In 1985 there were 2,987 serious crimes in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight amongst 
its population of 1.5 million.
2. 77% of these crimes were detected by police ...
4. 42 cases involved people of 65 years of age - there are 240,000 senior citizens in the 
two counties.
5. 404 females were indecently assaulted in 1985. The female population of the two 
counties is 841,500. None involved ladies of 65 years of age.
6. In almost 9,000 cases of burglary in 1985, there were 14 where violence was used
towards the occupiers ... 54% of those were detected ...
8. The statistical chance of your house being burgled is once in every 74 years.
A most recent public opinion poll by Mori, revealed that 14% of the people polled have 
been victims of vandalism at some point in their lives, 14% had a car stolen, 27% had 
suffered burglary at home and 25% had been victims of some other kind of theft. All 
these figures had doubled since 1987. Only 40% of those polled said that they had never 
been a victim of crime. (Sunday Times - News Review 25 July 1993)
It was perception of crime, rather than reality which created the 'Travelsafe' initiative 
which started at Reading in response to a local problem and grew, attracting interest 
countrywide. In the winter of 1990/91 a serious knifepoint robbery occurred in Reading 
Station Car Park, followed a few weeks later by an indecent assault on a female. Local 
press publicised the incidents and railway management were besieged by travellers (and 
staff) concerned for their safety. The perception of the problem was out of all proportion 
to the facts. As a result, a 'Travelsafe' leaflet was designed for distribution locally. 
Considerable interest was generated and subsequently a booklet 'Travel Safely by Public 
Transport' was produced by the Department of Transport, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, 
London Underground Ltd., the Bus and Coach Council, British Rail and the B.T. Police.
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The booklet provides prospective travellers with safety tips when travelling by train or bus 
and was published in April 1991. It would thus appear from all of the evidence that 
perceptions of crime on the railway (and in society as a whole), are greater than reality.
The railways are safe but can be made safer. Much depends upon the capability of those 
who manage the transport systems to provide crime and accident prevention facilities, 
including an adequate police presence.
3.2(vi) So-^Are the B.T. Police 'Real' Police Officers?
Throughout this Chapter, I have attempted to adduce available evidence to prove 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' that a British Transport Police officer is equal in status as regards the 
law and practice as is any Home Department Police officer. I have used the word 
perception' on a number of occasions. What is the public's perception of a police 
officer? Someone who can provide assistance and advice? Someone who has the power 
to uphold the law? Who does so without fear or favour and is often assaulted in the 
execution of duty? Who investigates crime, brings criminals to justice and provides an 
aura of safety and security whilst patrolling in uniform?
Maintains public order (even beyond our shore on ships)? Provides expertise in major 
incidents? ... there may be other duties and responsibilities which the public expects of its 
police, as well as specific perceptions about the type of person a police officer should be. 
These will be discussed but it would appear on the evidence, so far, that there is no 
difference in law or practice between the competence of a B.T. Police officer to act as such 
and any other police officer. Sir Robert McCrindle, in his final article before retiring as 
Parliamentary Advisor to the B.T. Police Federation, succinctly clarified his perceptions as 
follows :
'Having done the job for 16 years I have the advantage of being able to compare the Force 
now and how it was in the 70's. More accurately, I can assess the standing of the British 
Transport Police in the eyes of the public, the press and politicians now and then ... Not 
only did the public question whether transport policemen were real policemen, the press 
missed few opportunities to belittle the Force, while the ruling politicians were, to say the 
least, dismissive. It took a number of years to persuade the powers-that-be, that subject 
only to the limitation placed on places where the writ of transport police runs, there is 
really no difference. In other words, a constable is a constable. Training to be a British 
Transport Policeman became equal to that which a constable in the civil police must 
undergo and gradually acceptance became evident.'
(Express Lines, 1991, Issue No. Two, p.5)
The reader must weigh up the evidence and decide.
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CHAPTER FOUR
In this Chapter, I will examine the comparative accountability of B.T. Police with that of 
Home Department Forces.
WHO CONTROLS THE B.T, POLICE?
4.1 What is Accountability?
'Accountability has become the flagship of a series of complaints, issues and questions 
about organised police work.' (Jefferson & Grimshaw 1984 p.9) Lord Justice Scarman 
said accountability was 'the key to successful consultation and socially responsive 
policing'. (Oliver 1987, p.37) Some believe that the autonomy of Chief Constables has 
expanded to a point where they are free of a duty to account for strategy or policy - where 
dialogue is a concession. (Fielding 1991 p. 175) It is difficult to discover the exact 
position by which police, generally are accountable and to whom, but a good starting point 
is the Police Act 1964, Section 5(1) of which provides the Chief Constable with 'the 
direction and control' of the police force to which he or she is appointed. The 
corresponding section in the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (Section 4) dealing with the 
appointment of Chief Constables, does not contain this provision. In both Acts, however, 
Chief Constables are liable for wrongful acts committed by constables under their 
direction 'as a master is liable in respect of torts (England and Wales) wrongful acts or 
omissions (Scotland) committed by his servants in the course of their employment.
(Section 48 of the 1964 Act and 39 of the 1967 Act) Both Acts set out the composition of 
Police Authorities and their functions as well as systems for dealing with Police 
Complaints, though these were superseded in England and Wales by the Police Act 1976 
and later by Part 9 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Both Acts also provide 
the appropriate Secretaries of State with certain powers. Whilst the British Transport 
Police Force adheres to the system provided by the Police Acts, the legal requirements to 
do so are ambiguous and in some instances, non-existent.
4.2 What is the purpose of the Police Committee?
The British Transport Police Force Scheme 1963 (S.I. 1964/1456), placed the 
responsibility for supervising the administration of the Force upon the Police Committee, 
all of whom are appointed by the British Railways Board and other participating Boards. 
'At least one member of the Committee is to be appointed from among persons who have 
a wide experience of, or who have shown capacity in the control or administration of 
police.' This was in contrast with Home Department Police Authorities whose Police 
Committees have specific responsibility under the Police Acts for the provision o f'an  
adequate and efficient' police force. This was remedied by the B.T. Police Force Scheme 
1963 (Amendment) Order 1992, paragraph 5(f) of which inserted a new paragraph, placing 
a duty upon the B.T. Police Committee to 'secure the maintenance of an adequate and 
efficient police service by the Force for the areas within the jurisdiction of the Force ....'
Home Department Police Authorities have powers and duties subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of State, to appoint the Chief Constable, determine the number of persons of 
each rank in the Force, provide and maintain buildings, structures and premises, as well as 
vehicles, apparatus, clothing and other equipment, contained within the Police Acts.
These powers and duties were not prescribed to the B.T. Police Committee until 1992, 
when they too were added to the 1963 Scheme by the Amendment Order (paragraph 5(f)).
The Management Consultants noted in 1988 that whilst the Railways Board Solicitors 
Department was of the view that insofar as administration applies to the management of 
resources, then the Police Committee had assumed responsibility for the provision of an 
adequate and efficient police force, the exact position was ambiguous. (Emst & Whinney 
1988, Report, p.28) It was determined in 1986, however, that 'In practice, the British 
Transport Police Committee parallels the duties and responsibilities of the Police 
Authority of a provincial police force. (Crime on the London Underground 1986, p.26
H.M.S.O.) In order to examine the comparability of the B.T. Police Committee with 
Home Department Police Authorities, it is helpful to understand how the latter developed.
4.3. How did Police Authorities originate?
The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 provided for a system of local government outside 
the Metropolis and gave boroughs the power to set up police forces, requiring them to 
appoint Watch Committees to be responsible for such forces.
The Watch Committees were empowered at their discretion to make regulations for the 
management of police, as well as to recruit, discipline and dismiss officers o f all ranks. The 
local Mayor (who was always a Justice of the Peace) was a key member.
Initially, borough police forces were funded entirely from the rates. Central Government 
began making contributions as a result o f the County and Borough Police Act 1856, and 
from 1918 has contributed 50% of the cost of Home Department constabularies. In 1839, 
the County Police Act permitted counties to form police forces and gave different powers 
and compositions for county police committees. Justices o f the Peace were eligible as 
members and the power to promote, punish, suspend and dismiss officers was placed in the 
hands of the Chief Constable. The Act of 1856 provided for the appointment of 
Inspectors of Constabulary to inspect police forces and report to the Government as to 
their efficiency.
When County Councils were created by the Local Government Act 1888, the control of 
County police was tr ansferred by way of a compromise to a Joint Standing Committee of 
county councillors and justices. (Hood Phillips 1973, p.350)
The London Metropolitan Police has, since its inception in 1829, always been considered 
a special case, so far as a Police Committee is concerned. Now, as in times past, the 
Home Secretary is in fact the police authority for the Metropolitan Police District. In 
terms of accountability, he can be asked detailed questions in Parliament about the 
conduct of the Force.
He cannot, according to the Blackburn 1968 case, however, give directions to the 
Commissioner in connection with the institution of criminal proceedings. (R -v- 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex Parte Blackburn (1968) (2QB. 118) The special 
position of a Police Authority was illustrated in 1972 when Reginald Maudling was 
required to resign as Home Secretary after it was disclosed that police were investigating a 
former business colleague. (S.A. De Smith 1973, p. 384)
4.4 How are modern Police Authorities made up?
Currently, the Police Act 1964, is the legislation which lays down the constitution and 
powers of Police Authorities. The Act requires that Police Committees or Authorities 
shall consist of such number of persons as may be determined by the county or borough 
council (or prescribed by the amalgamation scheme) and of that number, two thirds shall 
be council members and one third magistrates.
Section 4 states 'it shall be the duty of the police authority for every police area for which 
a police force is required to be maintained by this Act to secure maintenance of an 
adequate and efficient police force  for the area and to exercise for that purpose, the 
powers conferred on a police authority by this A ct'.
The police fund for each area is under the control of the county council and police 
accounts are subject to audit by the district auditor. Questions may be asked in the local 
council, concerning the police authority' functions.
The Home Secretary has wide powers over police authorities which he may exercise in 
such ways as he feels can benefit police efficiency. He may call for reports from, or 
require the removal of, a Chief Constable, or simply require the Police Authority to ask a 
Chief Officer to resign. He has power over the Central Government grant, which he may 
withhold. He can hear appeals from disciplinary cases, demand local public or private 
enquiries into police matters and, of course, make Police Regulations. He determines the 
number of Inspectors of Constabularies and may appoint the Chief Inspector. He can also 
impose a compulsory scheme for amalgamation of police forces after holding a local 
enquiry. Overall, he has much wider powers than any Central Government department 
possesses over local authorities.
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Police authorities can, if all members of the Committee attend, be rather cumbersome.
The Authority for the City of London Police is, in fact, the Common Council for the City 
of London Corporation, which consists of 28 Aldermen who are Justices of the Peace and 
159 Common Councillors. There are meetings at which all of the inhabitants of a ward 
may also be present.
Other Authorities have less members, however, West Yorkshire has 31, Surrey 24, and the 
West Midlands 38. In Greater Manchester where the Authority has 43 members, except 
for the month of August, they meet once a month, with occasional extraordinary meetings.
On a broad basis, they discuss personnel, i.e. Force strength, civilian staff, etc., 
Performance Review (statistics and returns re. crime, traffic etc., Finance and Police and 
Community Relations, e.g. Community Liaison Meetings, Home Watch, Child Abuse etc.
Additionally, there are sub-committees which also discuss these matters. The full Police 
Authority meeting is held in two parts - Part One - open to the public; Part Two - 
confidential matters, e.g. review of grades, establishment of new posts etc. The Chief or 
Deputy Chief Constable always attends the full meeting, whilst an Assistant Chief 
Constable attends the sub-committee meetings. (Research undertaken by C/I Livesley, 
B.T. Police Manchester, Report 22.04.87 for Management Review)
Brogden concluded that in Police Authorities which he studied, members were 
overwhelmingly elderly and saw their work as entirely apolitical, were run by the Chief 
Constable and the basic function of an Authority was to pension off old officers and the 
like. (Fielding 1991, p. 184/5)
Baroness Simey, the former Chair of the Merseyside Police Authority during the Toxteth 
disturbances in 1981, saw the Police Committee as a 'strangely autonomous and elusive 
body, very much the private preserve of the Alderman who chaired if . (Simey 1988, 
p.28) In relation to the amount of influence the Committee had on operational policing, 
she observed that 'There was a widespread acceptance of the assumption that policing was 
police business and politicians must keep out (p.49) and that when as Deputy Chair, she 
attempted to create an Advisory Committee, she was subtly made to realise that the 
Authority was an advisory body and not an executive committee, (p.31) In order to 
achieve accountability, however, to 'police the police', she felt that 'by monitoring what 
the Chief (she refers all the way through the book to the Chief Constable as 'the Chief) 
did with our money and if need by refusing to provide it, we would be able to ensure that 
the service was what the public wanted', (p.74) She saw the root of the problem as what 
was operational and what was political (p. 80) and to talk of politicising the police was 
'instantly misrepresented as a proposal to submit them to the control of partisan 
dogmatists', (p.83) Whilst she saw a quote from the Force Newspaper 'Merseybeat' in 
November 1981 ('We were caught cold on the streets of Liverpool at the beginning of 
July, we were ill prepared, ill trained and ill equipped to deal with unprecedented violence 
...') as a remarkable admission, i.e. that the incident should have been foreseen (p.85) she 
noted that 'hundreds of officers were injured' (p.40) yet was critical of the Chief
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Constable for preparing for Public Order situations. Richard Wells (Benyon & Solomon's 
1987 p ^
81) in respect of the Notting Hill Carnival disturbance in 1976, reminds us that police 
were obliged to protect themselves with dustbin lids and that as a result, today, require 
flameproof overalls and N.A.T.O. style helmets as protection against petrol bombs and 
missiles, pointing out 'that a chief officer has a statutory responsibility for his officers is 
less often adduced.' The political influence within the Merseyside Police Authority 
which occurred with an influx of newly elected Labour Councillors in May 1981, resulting 
in 16 Labour, 3 Conservative, 1 Liberal and 10 Magistrates constituting a committee of 
30, caused Lady Simey to become aware of a takeover bid by a small group who were 
united by a common political philosophy (one admitted to her his firm conviction that 
'control must be in the hands of the Councillors') she realised that 'the group took on the 
aura of the very sanctity which we so greatly resented in the case of the police'. This, she 
did not resist, because she had no wish to add to the internal disputes which had 
characterised the Labour Party for so long. (Simey 1988 p. 99)
The fact that no such elected Committee exists for the London Metropolitan Police, whose 
Police Authority is the Home Secretary, is also a cause for concern. Inadequacy of 
consultation as a complete substitute for elected institutions is seen most clearly in relation 
to finance. (Lustgarten 1986 p. 97/8)
One suggested solution is to split the Metropolitan Police into several segments, creating 
seven or eight forces of about 3,000 officers, although the creation of separate forces and 
authorities would involve considerable administrative costs ... 'democracy costs money'. 
(Lustgarten 1986 p.99)
A general suggestion to replace existing 'accountable authorities' is to set up public 
commissions of police in each police area, including the Metropolitan Police District.
Such commissions would be part of the Judicial organ of the State, have duty to uphold 
the law, appoint Chief Constables and issue instructions. They would be answerable to 
the Courts for decisions and would be made up of elected representatives. Additionally, 
each local authority would have a police committee of the county council charged with the 
maintenance of an adequate and efficient force. (Jefferson & Grimshaw 1984, p.l 80) 
Whilst this idea includes the suggestion that the police committee would assume 
responsibility for discipline within the force, thereby abolishing the Police Complaints 
Authority, it does seem to suggest the creation of a 'supervisory' body (the Commission of 
Police) to whom the police committee would be accountable - it does not indicate how the 
membership of the latter would be arrived at. It does place the Home Secretary in a 
similar position to his/her present role. An alternative suggestion is to create a Ministry 
of Justice which would, inter alia, take over the current functions of the Home Secretary 
and guide and supervise police authorities. (Lustgarten 1986 p. 179) Whether either of 
these suggestions would find favour with Chief Constables seems open to discussion.
One Chief Constable points out that 'It was never the intention that politicians and 
members of the public should be denied the opportunity of influencing the Chief
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Constable in his policy making and his operational decisions, but equally, it was not 
intended that after 1964 they should control and formulate these matters, as had been the 
case in some instances before the Royal Commission. (Oliver 1987, p.7) Until such 
times as the system is changed, perhaps accountability in the context of police authorities 
is best summarised thus :
'Accountability is about the way in which control is exercised ... a moral principle ... of 
those to whom responsibility is given, an account of their stewardship shall be required ...a 
principle whose purpose is to govern the relationship between those who delegate 
authority and those who exercise it.' (Simey 1988, p. 118)
4.5 How does the British Transport Police Committee compare?
The 1963 Scheme placed four responsibilities on the Committee :
(i) To supervise the administration of the Force by the Chief Constable on such lines as 
may be from time to time agreed among the represented Boards and to give him such 
directions as may, from time to time, be necessary for that purpose.
(ii) To make recommendations to the represented Boards in respect of any matter 
relating to the Force.
(iii) To exercise on behalf and in the name of the Railways Board the powers of the 
British Transport Commission Act 1949, as amended by Section 70 of the Transport 
Act 1962.
(iv) To do, on behalf and in the name of the Railways Board all other things which may 
be necessary for performing their functions under the Scheme.
The Amendment Order 1992 (S.I. 1992/364) added further duties and 
responsibilities :
♦ to secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police service by the Force for 
areas within the jurisdiction of the Force defined in Section 53(1) of the British 
Transport Commission Act 1949;
♦ to determine the number of persons in each rank in the Force which is to constitute the 
establishment of the Force;
♦ to provide and maintain such buildings, structures, premises, vehicles, apparatus, 
clothing and other equipment as may be required for the purposes of the Force.
(Amendment Order 1992, p.4 paragraph [f])
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The amendments are similarly worded to Section 4(1), (2) and (3) of the Police Act 1964 
and as such, place similar duties and responsibilities on the B.T. Police Committee as 
those which rest with Home Department Police Authorities.
The 1963 Scheme also provides that all expenses relating to the Force shall be borne by 
the Railways Board but other Boards shall make such contribution to those expenses as 
may be agreed from time to time and the Railways Board shall be entitled to recover from 
the other Boards, the amounts of their respective contributions.
Since 1974, at least the Public Service Obligation Grant has provided the lion's share of 
the cost, bearing in mind that it has been estimated that about 80% of the work now 
undertaken by the Force is for the 'common good' (perhaps it could be said, in view of 
comments so far, that it is in the national interest). (Blue Line - January 1993)
The size of the Committee and its composition, however, did not appear to be 
commensurate with that of a Police Authority. Working for the 'common good' in a 
climate of community policing, it seemed right that the community should have a voice, 
perhaps through Passenger Consultative Committee members, representing the transient 
community and Transport Staff Associations representing the fixed community.
The Amendment Scheme gave authority by the inclusion of an additional clause, to allow 
'(of the members to be appointed by the British Railways Board) one other shall be 
appointed after consultation with the Central Transport Consultative Committee from 
among persons who have had inside experience of the interests and concerns of users of 
railway services and facilities'. (Amendment Order p.7 para 4(ca)(ii)) This was quickly 
undertaken and in May 1992, the Chairman of the Central Transport Consultative 
Committee was appointed to serve on the B.T. Police Committee. (Blue Line - June
1992) In 1993, Mrs. Diana Lamplugh, founder and director of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust 
was appointed to serve on the Committee as an 'independent' member. (Blue Line - May
1993) This followed recommendations by the Management Consultants that the Scheme 
should be revised to concentrate on (inter alia)
'the composition of the Police Committee to ensure that the interests of the industry 
and its community and the views of the Chief Constable can be taken into account in 
determining the size of the Force'
(Emst & Whinney Report 1988 p.29)
To date, no members of Transport Staff Associations have been co-opted onto the 
Committee. It is now, however, slightly more representative and constitutional. Until 
1992 when the Amendment Scheme was introduced, the Police Committee represented, 
somewhat incestuously, the interest of the British Railways Board and participating 
Boards through its senior managers and the Solicitor who comprised the Committee, the 
only independent member being a former H.M. Inspector of Constabularies.
There is no statutory provision for a Minister of State to have ultimate responsibility for 
the Force and this represents a constitutional gap in the arrangements.
To be constitutional and to be seen as constitutional, requires a Police Committee made up 
of interested parties from both the Boards and the Community, with an ultimate 
accountable Authority - a Minister of State.
The consultants engaged on the Management Review recognised these facts and among 
their recommendations were possible revisions to the British Transport Police Force 
Scheme to clarify:
♦ how the size of the Force should be determined;
♦ arrangements which should be provided to allow the industry and its community to 
identify and communicate its policing requirements to the Force;
♦ the composition of the Police Committee to ensure that the interests of the industry and 
its community and the views of the Chief Constable can be taken into account in 
determining the size of the Force. (Emst & Whinney Report 1988 p.29)
They also recognised the 'progressive change in scope and functions of the British 
Transport Police away from the concept of a railway servant to one of a body of 
constables with wide ranging responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order (Ibid 
p.29) They noted that the role of the Secretary of State for Transport as laid down in the 
Scheme is limited to certain procedural matters and although he does answer to Parliament 
in respect of the British Transport Police, the office has no general law and order 
functions. The framework for policing policy and practice is provided largely by the 
Home Secretary. They concluded that 'Ministerial accountability for the Force should be 
more clearly defined. This requires that the existing separation of responsibilities 
between the Secretary of State for Transport for certain procedural matters and the policy 
framework set by the Home Secretary is considered'. (Ibid p.29/30)
The Amendment Order did allow for the clarification of the points stated above but did not 
make any significant changes to Ministerial responsibility.
Whilst the Force adopts Home Office guidelines and follows directives to all police 
forces, without specific legal directives as to Ministerial accountability, it would appear to 
an outsider that the Force is responsible to the Chief Constable, who is himself responsible 
to the Police Committee who are in their turn serving the apparent interests of the 
Transport Boards. Various schemes, aimed at assisting the community was a whole, 
however, help to dispel this perception. In 1993, a national referral scheme to support the 
Victims of Crime, funded by the British Railways Board and the Home Office, was 
launched. (Annual Report 1993 p. 16) Force Training offers a victim awareness session 
with the assistance of schoolchildren from a school local to the Force Training Centre, 
who volunteer to be 'victims'. This has two objectives - it gives police officers a greater 
awareness of the sensitivity needed in dealing with vulnerable witnesses and also gives
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children the opportunity to experience contact with police in a human, non-confrontational 
setting. (Annual Report 1993, p. 17) The 'Travelsafe' initiative, which started as a local 
issue then mushroomed into a national one, providing advice on personal safety on public 
transport (discussed earlier in Chapter 3) is yet another example of the 'community based' 
policy of the Force, as is the Schools Liaison Scheme, also discussed earlier.
Thus, whilst legislation does not provide as much accountability as it should in 'social' 
terms, the Force and Police Committee work together with the community, for it is in the 
context that police generally and British Transport Police in particular, operate 'with the 
consent of the public', that ultimate accountability is present at all times. The values of 
the Force contained in the Force Statement - 'Giving the best quality policing service 
which is caring, efficient, courteous and approachable in a way that is consultative, 
flexible and cost effective and in particular, treating each call for service as if it came from 
a family member' (Annual Report 1992 - first page) is a re-iteration of Maynes primary 
objects of an efficient police, which concluded with the words 'he (the constable) must 
look upon himself as the servant and guardian of the general public'. (Oliver 1987 p.75) 
Total dissatisfaction by the public and consequent lack of co-operation j  the ultimate 
sanction against a Force which is not accountable. ^
Public satisfaction with police has, according to public opinion poll research, declined 
from 83% of people in 1959 who had 'a  great deal of respect' for the way they did their 
job, to less than 50% in 1993, though efforts to improve their image have allowed police 
to stem the decline in public satisfaction. 81% of the 1,030 people polled in 52 sampling 
points throughout Britain on Friday 23rd July 1993 agree that 'police are handicapped in 
the fight against crime'. It would seem that the legal system is now in question in the 
minds of the community. Four years ago 42% of people polled agreed that they had 
confidence in the legal system, whilst 30% disagreed. By 1993, only 29% agreed with 
the first statement, 54% disagreed. During this period, attitudes to police have remained 
broadly stable. (Sunday Times - News Review - 25th July 1993)
4.6 What control does the Chief Constable have over a police force?
Prior to the Police Act 1964 and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, the status of a Chief 
Officer of Police was somewhat uncertain. From a very early stage it had been accepted 
that a police authority could not interfere in criminal matters in particular cases.
This was clearly demonstrated in 1959 when Captain Popkess, the Chief Constable of 
Nottinghamshire Police had been dismissed by the Police Authority when he had refused 
to disclose the details of investigations instituted in respect of certain local councillors.
He had decided that this was not a matter for the police authority. The Home Secretary, 
after studying the relevant precedents agreed and re-instated him. (Oliver 1987 p. 9)
In 1964, in the case of Ridge -v- Baldwin, (A.C. 40) it was clearly stated that the Chief 
Constable 'held a public office'.
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In 1979, the prerogative of the Chief Constable to make the decision as to the deployment 
of Traffic Wardens, was upheld, when the South Yorkshire Police Authority attempted to 
usurp his office. (Watts Pope & Weiner 1981, p.46)
In law, a Chief Constable enjoys a special status. He has, as do his subordinates, a duty to 
the law and to the community. This was part of the decision when Raymond Blackburn, 
M.P. attempted, through the Courts, by means of a writ of mandumus, to require the 
Commissioner the Metropolitan Police to carry out this public duty, firstly in 1968 in 
relation to the enforcement of Betting Laws in gaming clubs and again in 1973 in relation 
to the enforcement of obscenity laws. (R -v- Metropolitan Police Commissioner Ex P. 
Blackburn (1968) 2QB 118, 1973, 2 WLR. 43)
91
In both of these cases, the issue was concerned with the discretion available to Chief 
Officers. It was held that although a Chief Constable had discretion is certain 
circumstances, it was not absolute. The fact that the Commissioner had a policy for the 
time being not to prosecute gaming clubs for breaches of the Gaming Acts unless special 
circumstances made it necessary in his opinion to do so, was held to be a breach of legal 
duty owed to the general public. Clearly, a Chief Officer of Police can be taken to task 
by a member of his community.
The Police Act of 1964 and the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, which followed the Royal 
Commissions on Police 1960-1962, immediately resolved the question raised by Fisher -v- 
Oldham Corporation (2KB.364) by virtue of Section 48 which made Chief Officers of 
Police for police areas, vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of constables and required 
the Police Authority to pay damages or costs in certain circumstances. A similar 
provision is found in Section 39, Police (Scotland) Act 1967.
Chief Officers were also required to make arrangements for the proper investigation of 
Complaints Against Police, an obligation which was to attract further legislation by the 
Police Act 1976 and recently, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
An Annual Report was to be submitted to the Chief Officers' Police Authority and a copy 
to be forwarded to the Home Secretary. He was given authority to provide mutual aid to 
other police forces, special police services and maintain Special Constables and Cadets 
(the latter with the approval of the Police Authority). Similar provisions were made for 
Scotland in the Police (Scotland) Act 1967.
The Act did not interfere with the accepted constitutional definition of the Office of 
Constable, neither did it remove the independent status in operational decisions from the 
Chief Constable. Independence is clearly a cornerstone of the office based upon the 
principle of keeping police free from any form of coercion or control.
The Act in fact, legally established that 'the police force ... shall be under the direction and 
control of the Chief Constable.' (Police Act 1964, Section 5)
Whilst Police Authorities have challenged this legal dictum since 1964 (see above), Chief 
Constables of Home Department Forces do have the law on their side.
4.7 Does the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police control the Force?
Like all Chief Officers, he is clearly bound by the common law and those decisions by the 
judiciary apply to him totally. He is not, however, a chief officer of police for a police 
area within the scope of the Police Acts of 1964 and 1967 and it is here, as with other Acts 
of Parliament, that his position is compromised. Whereas he acts in the spirit of the 
legislation, he does not act with its specific authority.
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There are other anachronisms at law, for instance, it was necessary to apply to Parliament 
to erase the ridiculous position in that, whilst he was a 'chief officer of police in 'respect 
of Road Traffic Legislation on dock roads, thus giving him power to demand certain facts 
from drivers of vehicles, he was not so in relation to the public roads connected with 
railways and docks. (Force Records)
The Data Protection Act 1984 has firmly placed upon him the full responsibility of any 
Chief Constable - for its purpose, he employs constables and is legally liable. Chief 
Constables of Home Department Forces have automatic membership of Association of 
Chief Police Office Officers (A.C.P.O.) in England and Wales and (A.C.P.O.S.) in 
Scotland.
Despite the fact that in recent years the British Transport Police has gained greater 
national esteem as a professional police force, the Chief Constable is not eligible to be 
considered a member.
This may cause operational difficulties if vital information on police policy, formulated by
A.C.P.O. is late in reaching him.
The ambiguity surrounding the problems of the Force and the position of the Chief 
Constable and his subordinates was highlighted by the introduction of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Bill. Fortunately, however, whilst it was still in the early stages of 
preparation, the Chief Constable appointed an 'in-Force' working party to research its 
application to the Force under the direction of the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations)
As a result, many of the original clauses of the Bill required amendment in order that it 
might be applied to rail, port and dock land and premises. Considerable co-operation was 
received by the working party (of which I was a member) from the Home Office and many 
Home Department Forces.
The original Bill (which fell with the dissolution of Parliament) provided powers to 
constables to stop and search premises, vehicles etc., 'in a public place'. (Police and 
Criminal Evidence Bill - printed 17th November 1982*H.M.S.O., Clause 1) Clause '(6) 
defined 'public place'. Had the working party not drawn attention to this definition, 
certain parts of the railway to which the public have access would not have been covered 
by the Act when it eventually received the Royal Assent.
Ironically, neither the Police Act 1964, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 nor the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, define the term 'constable'. Parliament has chosen not to 
interfere with the common law - a constable, of whatever force remains a public officer 
with a duty to the Sovereign and her subjects and of course, to the law. Those duties are 
equally placed upon the shoulders of the Chief Constable.
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The 1964 Act, however, essentially created the means by which Home Department 
Constabularies in England and Wales would be maintained and administered and by virtue 
of Section 62 and Schedule 8, defined 'police area', 'police district', 'police authority' and 
'police force', purely within the context of Home Department Constabularies.
For many years, British Transport Police belief has been that whereas the term 'constable' 
is non-contentious, the terms 'police' or 'police officers' or 'chief officer of police' have 
within other Acts of Parliament been often referrable only to Home Department 
Constabularies.
Thus, in the Theft Act 1968, Section 26(2), 'an officer of police' not below the rank of 
Superintendent may give a constable written authority to search any premises for stolen 
goods ...' (in certain circumstances) has always been construed to mean a Superintendent 
(or ranks above) of a Home Department Force, yet the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 applies fully to B.T. Police.
The Annual Report which was until 1990 required only to be submitted to the Police 
Committee has since then become a public document and published crime statistics are 
now collected by the same methods and categorised in the same way as national statistics 
but are not published with national crime statistics.
Until 1992, the Chief Constable of the B.T. Police was legally responsible 'for the 
administration of the Force in accordance with directives from time to time given to him 
by the (Police) Committee'. (B.T. Police Force Scheme 1963, S.I. 1964/1456) This 
wording thus suggests that the Chief Constable and the Force were under the control, i.e. 
the direction, of the Police Committee. In accordance with recommendations of the Ernst 
and Whinney Review (Ernst & Whinney 1988 Report p. 27), that 'the Scheme under 
which B.T.P. is established contains anomalies and should be reviewed'; (they noted that 
'no reference is made in the Scheme to the question of control over the Force by the Chief 
Constable' In Home Department Forces, operational control of a Force is vested in the 
Chief Constable'.) (Ibid, p.27, para 3.5), the Scheme Amendment Order 1992 S.I. 1992 
No. 364) provided that 'The Force shall be under the direction and control of the Chief 
Constable'. (p.2 para 3). In July 1993, it was announced in relation to the future 
privatisation of the railways that the B.T. Police Force will continue to enforce law and 
order on the rail network, overall control will remain in the public sector, that a provision 
in the operator's licence will make it compulsory to use B.T. Police for the administration 
of law and order on the railway (including London Underground) and of particular 
relevance here, that the Secretary of State for Transport will appoint members of the 
Police Committee to represent franchisees open access operators, Railtrack and the police. 
(Blue Line - July 1993 - report of written answer to Parliamentary question from Sir 
Anthony Durant by Roger Freeman, Minister for Public Transport.)
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4.8 What other forms of police accountability are there?
The Police Act 1976 established a new method for dealing with Complaints Against the 
Police and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Part IX amended the procedure by 
replacing the Police Complaints Board with the Police Complaints Authority, which in 
addition to having power to hear certain disciplinary charges, may supervise investigations 
into the conduct of police officers of any rank. The British Transport Police is fully 
integrated into the national arrangements for dealing with complaints against police by 
members of the community and the Police Committee, through a Complaints Sub- 
Committee fulfils its statutory requirement to satisfy members that the procedures for 
handling public complaints are correct and efficient. Although 'no aspect of police 
governance has been so bombarded with criticism as the handling of complaints about 
treatment of citizens' (Lustgarten 1986, p. 146) and the Police Complaints Board 'was 
greeted with dismay by both police and civil libertarians when established in 1976 (Reiner 
1985 p. 190), the new system provides a number of safeguards. Minor complaints can be 
dealt with by informal resolution subject to the complainants agreement, police officers 
may be legally represented in certain circumstances and it provides a degree of 
independent scrutiny. It does, however, fall short of a totally independent system such as 
that which operates in Toronto. (See Reiner 1986, p. 192)
Strict Codes of Practice accompanied the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
regulating procedures to be used by police in dealing with offenders. Whilst the Act has 
its critics, (See Fielding 1991, p. 189) the safeguards contained in the Codes are for the 
most part precise and not concealed within case law. Many of the principles laid down in 
such case law are now codified, e.g. Christie -v- Leachinsky (1947) (AC.573)
Where British Transport Police Stations operate facilities for detaining prisoners, the lay 
visitors scheme is in operation. (Blue Line - July 1993) This form of accountability 
seemed to receive praise in Merseyside 'I suspect that a number of us were surprised to 
find that the gutters in the stations did not run with blood ... I myself made the effort to 
visit one with a particularly hairy reputation. I went in the middle of the night on a 
Saturday, only to find a calm which would have been a credit to a nursing home.' (Simey 
1988, p. 68)
By 1988, only six Home Department Police Authorities had not introduced lay visitor 
schemes. (Morgan & Kemp 1988, p.l) Originally recommended by Lord Scarman in 
1981 (Ibid p.3), pilot schemes were introduced by the Home Office in six forces in 1983, 
(Ibid p. 10) and a Home Office Circular which left police authorities to decide whether or 
not to introduce schemes was published in 1986 (Ibid p.l 1/12), set out a number of 
guidelines. Lay visitors can be recruited from among local councillors,
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consultative groups, local community organisations or by public advertisement (Ibid p.20) 
and mostly visit police stations in pairs, (p.22) There are significant differences in 
arrangements in the Metropolitan Police District and County Forces. (Ibid p.28) It is 
still too early to assess the effectiveness of the schemes (Ibid p.37), though they are seen, 
inter alia, to re-enforce legitimacy of existing constitutional arrangements for policing and 
may have contributed further to removing suspicions about police secrecy. No 
malpractice has been discovered by them. (Ibid, p.43) They are also seen to provide 
external impartial scrutiny of police work, protect the interest of detainees and police 
officers, encourage public dialogue, make possible independent lay comment on the 
criminal justice system and offer police opportunities to educate lay visitors about the 
realities of police work. (Ibid p.45) (See also Police Review 31 March 1989 p. 650)
Police officers are themselves citizens and as such are amenable to the general law of the 
land should they act unlawfully. Anyone who is subjected to unlawful physical restraint 
may exercise self help, sue or prosecute for assault false imprisonment and if prosecuted 
without reasonable or probable cause and for improper motives, may sue for damages for 
malicious prosecution. Since before the Magna Carta, the liberty of the subject has been 
protected by the ancient prerogative writ of habeus corpus, applications for which have 
priority over all other Court business and directions of which require that a prisoner be 
brought immediately before a Court to show grounds for his detention. If this cannot be 
shown, he is released immediately.
Similarly, as has already been shown, the law recognises that invasions of private premises 
of police are strictly regulated. (See 3.1 above)
4.9 What control is exercised by the Crown Prosecution Service?
The Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales was created by the Prosecution of 
Offenders Act 1985 and was the result of the recommendation of the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Procedure 1981. (Report, 1981 H.M.S.O.)
It has been suggested that a real change in the role of police in relation to the prosecution 
of offences ' may be less than one might expect'. (Lustagarten 1986 p.5)
A further suggestion is that police decide whether to investigate, how to conduct the 
investigations and save for minor exceptions, where the Director of Public Prosecutions 
must be consulted, whether to charge a suspect and what charges to lay. This criticism is 
accompanied by the statement that 'the scope of their authority and lack of control over its 
exercise it awesome'. (Lustgarten 1986, p.4)
The decision as to whether an alleged offender is to be charged is based on the gravity of 
the allegation and the amount of evidence which accompanies it. The question of whether 
and how to investigate is based again on the gravity of the offence and the available police 
resources. The fact remains that if the Crown Prosecution Service decide that the 
evidence is insufficient, or that the charge/prosecution should not be brought for a specific 
reason, then the case is not proceeded with. In addition, numerous offences require the 
consent of the Director of Public Prosecution.
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Prior to the Prosecution of Offenders Act 1984, police were not only responsible for the 
investigation of suspected offences and for the collection of evidence (which remains - 
Report 1981, p. 17) but also, in most cases, the decision to prosecute which now rests with 
the Crown Prosecution Service. The previous arrangements for the prosecution of 
criminal offences in England and Wales 'defied simple and unqualified description'.
(Ibid p. 126)
The work of British Transport Police was examined by the Royal Commission. (Research 
Study No. 10, 1980 H.M.S.O.) Twenty-five percent of Cardiff s 'non police' 
prosecutions were attributed to B.T. Police because of dock policing (now defunct - see 
Chapter 8) and rugby internationals at Cardiff Arms Park produced an average of 60 
arrests for public order and Criminal Damage offences on the railways. (Ibid p. 17) A 
comparison of reported indictable crime for British Transport Police (strength 1,907) and 
Staffordshire Police (strength 1992) produced for the Wright Report (see Chapter 6) 
produced the following statistics, showing that B.T.P. handled twice as many crimes in 
1977 than the Staffordshire Force :
BJJPQLICE STAFFORDSHIRE POLICE
Total Crimes 72,262 32,081
Crimes Detected 25,833 18,278
Detection Rate 35.7% 57%
Figure 4(a)
Source : Table 7.2 p. 161 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study 
No.10
The Study found that B.T.P. prosecuted its own offences in 'much the same way' as the 
civil police, the decision to prosecute being made at that time by the Divisional 
Commander. (Ibid p. 162) Overall, the Force was found to be the second largest 
prosecution agency in the study, 'acting' very much like a civil police force. (Ibid p. 163)
The Crown Prosecution Service came under heavy criticism from police not long after it 
began operating in 1986, particularly in relation to assaults on police, where charges of 
Causing Actual Bodily Harm (Section 47, Offences Against Person Act 1861) have been 
dropped. (Police - Sept. 1987, p.9) In a speech, the Chairman of the Metropolitan 
Police Federation blamed the attitude of the Crown Prosecution Service in reducing 
charges of causing actual bodily harm or not proceeding with them, bearing in mind that in
1986, 3,400 Metropolitan Police were assaulted. (Police - Nov. 1987 p.22) In a speech, 
to Sussex Magistrates, the Attorney General, suggested that the Crown Prosecution 
Service was quite often blamed for errors caused by failures of the police. (Police - Dec.
1987, p. 10) In 1988, a Special Constable (who also happened to be a solicitor) was 
severely injured on duty and his assailants were charged with causing him grievous bodily
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harm. The Crown Prosecution Service reduced this to actual bodily harm. He was so 
incensed he brought a private prosecution for grievous bodily harm. (Police - July 1988 
p. 32) In 1991, a Metropolitan Police officer, seriously assaulted by a youth who was 
attempting to strangle his own mother, was disturbed that the Crown Prosecution Service 
took no further action because the case 'was not in the public interest'. (Police Review 
June 1992, p. 1132) One in ten cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service by police 
in 1991 was discontinued. One and a half million defendants were prosecuted. An 
overwhelming majority of defendants pleaded guilty, leading to 98,418 Crown Court 
convictions. (Police Review 10 July 1992, p. 1258) It has been argued that the 
independence of the Crown Prosecution Service is of value only to criminals (Police 
Review 8 May, p. 854/5) and that it only wants to deal with 'watertight cases'. (Police - 
Sept. 1987, p. 9)
Views of Chief Constables about the Crown Prosecution Service vary. Thirty-eight 
percent did not believe it should have been established and 19% had mixed feelings about 
it, whilst 43% agreed with it being set up but many of these had reservations about the 
actual working of the system. (Reiner 1991 p. 156). Many saw it as a 'fait accompli', 
one accepting it as 'the will of Parliament' accepting that 'the C.P.S. will be concerned 
only with the chances of winning', though some 'warmed to the C.P.S. more positively'. 
(Reiner 1991, p. 159)
Since the Prosecution of Offences Act came into operation, British Transport Police are 
required to conform with its provisions and pass prosecutions to the Crown Prosecution 
Service to deal. The Scottish Area of the Force has always followed the system of 
reporting matters to the Procurator Fiscal. It may well be argued that control is exercised 
over the Force by these institutions - clearly, if the evidence was insufficient or believed to 
have been improperly obtained or the proposed prosecution thought to be malicious or 
unnecessary, the Force would be brought to task.
4.10 Does the media exercise control over police?
A substantial amount of research has been undertaken on the production of news and 
media portrayals of crime and deviance. (Cohen 1986 p.239) Crime news provides a 
chance for a newspaper to appropriate the moral conscience of its readership. (Chibnall 
1977, p. xi (Introduction)). Research both in Britain and America suggests that the media 
over-report serious crimes or those with a sexual element (which has ideological 
consequences for perceptions of the police role!’ They concentrate on crimes which are 
solved and offenders reported in the media are disproportionately older adults from a 
social class higher than their counterparts in official statistics, i.e. news media information 
is misleading.’1 (Reiner 1985, p. 140) Police have passed through an image transformation 
from an honest, brave, dependable, (plodding) Bobby, to a tough, dashing, formidable, 
brave and honest crime buster, gradually into a hard bitten squad 'man' (Chibnall 1977 
P-71)
98
Police perceptions have, however, been assessed and it has been suggested that they see 
themselves as constantly denigrated and under attack in the news media. (Reiner 1978, p. 
73/74). In November 1986, the B.T. Police adopted a new information policy. Previous 
policy had dictated that all information would be passed to the Press and Public Relations 
Department of the relevant transport industry. In this way, the industry concerned 
controlled the publicity surrounding B.T. Police activity. The purpose of the new 
information policy was to help the Force gain support and assistance from the community 
(the travelling public and staff of the railway industries). The policy allows an officer of 
any rank to release factual information within his or her personal knowledge, with the 
belief that openness based on mutual understanding, confidence and co-operation will 
benefit society as well as the Force. There are, of course, certain exceptions, including 
those required by law/e.g. Data Protection Act), to protect the privacy of victims and 
where disclosure of information might prejudice an investigation.
Since 1986, the Force has received considerable press and T.V. coverage which, in most 
instances has been helpful and in the public interest. Press interest in the initiative against 
'lager louts' (see Chapter 3.5) was evident. One newspaper named them 'Yukkies',
(The Sun Oct. 14 1988) another 'thugs in pinstripes', (Daily Telegraph September 23
1988) 'Pinstripe lager louts' provided a further perception (Morning Star, 22 October
1988), 'Yuppie Yobs' another. (London Evening Standard 23 September 1988), whilst 
The Times provided an account of a Friday night at Liverpool Street Station entitled 'City 
gent is giving way to a City Yob'. (The Times, 26 September 1988) A series of knife 
attacks on the railway in December 1988 created considerable press interest. A Turkish 
student died as a result of being stabbed at Holbom Underground Station, a Glasgow man 
queuing for a ticket at Waterloo Main Line Railway Station was stabbed to death and a 
third man was stabbed on an Underground train between Bank and London Bridge. To 
some degree, these incidents provided a 'moral panic'. (See Chibnall 1977, p.233 ) 
'Government ministers are planning sweeping changes to the way the network is policed'. 
(Daily Mail 13 December 1988) Travelling on the Underground is enough of an ordeal 
already for most passengers without the fear of violent assault.' (London Evening 
Standard 12 December 1988) Within days of these and comparable articles in other 
leading newspapers it was announced that Transport Police covering the Underground 
were to get another fifty officers, bringing their total strength to 400 following a meeting 
between the Transport Secretary and the Home Secretary. The announcement was 
thought likely to bring Opposition charges o f'too  little - too late'. Until April 1990, 
however, Transport police were to ask Scotland Yard for limited assistance. (By then the 
extra Transport police would be recruited and trained.) (London Evening Standard 21 
December 1988) This was in fact done and a number of City of London and Metropolitan 
officers were 'borrowed' (on payment) for a short period. Other newspapers highlighted 
a new police radio system which was to be installed on the underground. (The 
Independent and London Evening Standard 21 December 1988) By November 1989, 
newspapers were reporting 'Violence on Tube shows a huge drop'. (London Evening 
Standard 10
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November 1989) After press reports that 'Women were in fear - survey by British Rail' 
(Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail 2nd February 1989) a 'Charter for the Protection of 
Women' was proposed by Labour members of Parliament. (Daily Telegraph April 20
1989) By 1991, the booklet 'Travel Safely by Public Transport' was available. (See 
Chapter 3.6 above)
Not all press reports are complimentary. John Wheeler, Chairman of the Commons Home 
Affairs Select Committee (and Director of the British Security Industries Association) 
was reported as saying that 'transport police were incapable of doing their job properly on 
their own and that senior management had become complacent and probably inefficient'. 
The same article, which reported on the withdrawal of B.T. Police from Sealink U.K. Ltd., 
had provided an anonymous statement from a senior British Transport Police officer, 'The 
root of the problem is that some of the top brass are pensioners who have already retired 
from other Forces. Headquarters is an elephants' graveyard, there's an antiquated 
management style'. A further allegation that statistics were 'massaged' was also made, as 
were a number of other points concerning the annual report of the Chief Constable which 
was a private document (statistics were allegedly hidden from the public), the constitution 
of the Police Committee and the quality of radios. (Sunday Times 29 January 1989)
Some of these points were also cited in a recent study on 'private policing'. (Johnson 
1992 p. 128) There is naturally some concern within the Force that all 'A.C.P.O.' ranks 
are being filled by officers from Home Department Forces, on the basis that this is 'one 
way traffic'. (See Chapter 7.3) Although currently, four of the six A.C.P.O. ranks 
completed a full term of service with Home Department Constabularies, the remaining two 
were promoted in to Assistant Chief Constable rank whilst serving as Superintendents in 
Home Department Forces. The career 'pedigree' of the present Chief Constable who has 
seen senior police service with the Royal Ulster, Greater Manchester and Kent Police 
Forces, would be hard to match. The Force statistics were calculated in a particular way 
for many years until 1989, when Home Office counting rules were adopted. An 
examination of Notifiable and Summary Offences reported between 1986 and 1991 (See 
Figure 3(m), Chapter 3.5) shows that little fluctuation is apparent in notifiable offences 
since 1989, but a reduction in summary offences is apparent. The remaining points made 
in both the Sunday Times article and the study referred to above, are covered in this study.
In addition to reporting specific crime cases, the press have become involved in 'interest' 
reporting, which are both informative and helpful to the Force, e.g. 'Police plan strategy to 
make Tube safer' (Independent 6 April 1988), 'In the Line of Duty', (London Evening 
Standard 16 May 1988). Whilst these may be seen as exploitation of the media for the 
purpose of propaganda, or the promotion and publicity of views and policing objectives, 
(Chibnall 1977 p.201/3) provided that they are articles which are open and honest, they 
can only do good.
Whilst in cannot be said that the press exercise control over the Force, the open policy of 
co-operation with the media is a form of public accountability provided by the Force. It is 
apparent too, that the media is influential in creating the necessary publicity to cause 
'official' action by Government.
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CHAPTER FIVE
This Chapter examines the available evidence in relation to the funding of the Force. 
WHO, PAYS F-OR THE BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE?
5.1. Is funding 'private1 or public?
For the purpose of pay, pensions, conditions of service, provision of equipment, buildings, 
vehicles etc, there must necessarily be a paymaster. The British Transport Police Force 
Scheme provided inter alia that 'all transport police hereafter appointed shall be employed 
by the Railways Board, and all transport police now appointed shall continue to be 
employed by the Railways Board'. (B.T. Police Force Scheme 1963, S.l. 1964/1456, para 
2(c)).
On 1st January 1965, therefore, all British Transport Police officers were legally declared 
to be employees of the British Railways Board.
This included all officers of the Force who serve on London Underground. Whilst it 
would seem that the answer to the question is simple, research shows that this is not the
case.
The creation of the British Transport Commission in 1947 changed the whole system of 
finance in relation to Transport Authorities of the day. Nationalised Industries 
subsequently became eligible for government grants and were obliged to operate non 
commercially viable services in the public interest. Until the arrival of the British 
Transport Police Force Scheme, it seemed that the cost of maintaining the Force was the 
responsibility of the British Transport Commission. By 1962 however, the Commission 
was running at 104 million pounds deficit. It was dissolved by the Transport Act 1962 and 
the Transport Boards were created in its place. Despite a substantial grant of 61 million 
pounds to the British Railways Board by the government in 1969, the deficit continued to 
accrue, and four years later had in fact escalated to 91 million pounds (Gourvish 1986, 
p.396/397).
The Force Scheme, makes it clear that from 1965 when the scheme came in 'all expenses 
relating to the Force shall be borne by the Railways Board, but the other Boards shall 
make contribution towards those expenses as may be agreed between the Boards from 
time to time and the Railways Board shall be entitled to recover from the other Boards the 
amounts of their respective contributions'. (B.T.P. Force Scheme 1963, S.l. 1964/1456 
para. 5). Within the scheme, 'the other Boards' were defined as the London Transport, 
British Transport Docks and British Waterways Boards. By 1984, both the Waterways 
and the Docks Boards had withdrawn from the scheme on the grounds of cost.
10!
In October 1984, the Chairman of Associated British Ports summed up the position quite 
succintly in a letter to Austin Mitchell M.P. 'The high cost of British Transport Police 
arises of course from the fact that the policemen themselves are required by law to carry 
out duties very similar to those of other police forces in the U.K. These duties are far 
wider than the service which we require for safeguarding our property in the ports. (Letter 
dated 12.10.84 from A.B.P.). Considerable efforts were made by Members of Parliament 
supportive of members of the Force who were to be made redundant from the Docks. In a 
letter from the Department of Transport in December 1984, to Michael Brown M.P. the 
Parliamentary under Secretary of State for Transport David Mitchell said that there was 
little to be gained by a deputation from British Transport Police to discuss the issues 
involving the decision by Associated British Ports to dispense with their services at the 
Ports. He referred Mr Brown to a response he had made to Robert McCrindle 
(Parliamentary adviser to the Force Federation) during an adjournment debate in the 
House of Commons on 14th December 1984. (Letter dated 19.12.84 from D.O.T.) His 
response, had indicated the entrenched attitude of government, which had prevailed since 
the statement of Sir James Graham a century ago. 'I must make it clear from the outset 
that the establishment and deployment of the British Transport Police is a matter not for 
the Government, but for the British Railways Board and for other organisations making 
use of their services.' (Hansard, Vol. 69, No.29, Col. 1382).
Whilst the government stance appears on the surface to be entrenched, in reality, as far as 
financial support is concerned, this is NOT the case.
Section 3 of the Railways Act 1974 regularised government funding to the railways in 
relation to certain ’public services' by way of what has become known as the 'Public 
Service Obligation Grant'. Even prior to this some measure of financial support was given 
by H.M. Government as a result of the deliberations of a Joint Steering Group which 
reported in 1967. (Gay, 1973, p. 15) The Force Federation have been concerned about the 
question for many years. In July 1985 in a response to an enquiry by Robert McCrindle 
(Parliamentary Adviser to the Federation) precipitated by the Federation, a letter from 10, 
Downing Street stated that 'almost all of the costs of the British Transport Police are 
eligible for government grant.' (Letter dated 10.7.85 from 10, Downing Street) Efforts to 
gain knowledge of the actual amount allocated to maintain the Force have however proved 
fruitless. Railway Managers questioned by the writer on this point always suggest that the 
government grant is an overall figure handed to the Railways Board to use at their 
discretion as required. For many years I visited the Grove at Watford, British Rails 
Management Training Centre, to provide trainee ’managers with information on the Force. 
Whilst I did not record comments, the question of funding the Force was often at issue, 
and the general belief (prior to my talk) was that the B.T. Police were totally funded by 
British Rail.
Efficiency, economy, and safety of operation is a statutory responsibility which British 
Rail recognises (BRB Annual Report and Accounts 1988/89 - p.l.), and 'safety of 
operation' is a phrase which must include an element of security - which in turn suggests 
that Parliament expects the transport system of the country to be policed by some 
organisation. Clearly options other than a dedicated police force are available (discussed 
at Chapter 8).
102
Government grants and grants from Passenger Transport Executives, which British Rail 
count as revenue have fluctuated annually since 1987/88:
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
£680.4 million 
£532.0 million 
£507.9 million 
£604.9 million 
£797.6 million.
Figure 5(a)
Source : British Rail (Employee) Report 1991/92.
In its White Paper 'New Opportunities for the Railways' (H.M.S.O. 1992,), the 
Department of Transport draws attention to the significant improvements made by British 
Rail in recent years, the fact that the productivity of its workforce is among the highest of 
any European Railway, and the fact that Intercity services and BR freight operate without 
subsidy. Performance of the railways is however, not good enough, it states, and BR's 
staff and management are limited by the structure of the industry in the public sector. The 
Government has therefore decided to involve the private sector with its' competition, 
innovation and flexibility in management (at pages 1 and 2). In relation to B.T.Police, the 
paper says 'At present the British Transport Police have responsibility for security and the 
enforcement of law and order on the railways. The Government has no plans to end this 
arrangement, but will be consulting interested parties on appropriate future arrangements 
for ensuring security and law and order'. (page 20)
Whilst there are many interpretations which can be placed upon this statement, it does at 
least indicate that the Government is at last showing an interest in the Force, and seems to 
herald a move forward from statements by Government Ministers that the BRB and other 
organisations making use of its services are in the driving seat, (see above). In its' desire 
to privatise the Railways, the White Paper draws attention to the Governments interest in 
Japan and Sweden (p.2.). Holland however, spends half as much as Britain on its railway
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system although its railway is only the size of Network SouthEast, Italy spends ten times 
as much as the U.K., on a railway system only a quarter larger. Britain's Government 
subsidises 18% of British Rails costs, Italy subsidises its railway to 84% and the 
Netherlands to 45% (Daily Express 16 October 1991 commenting on D.O.T. statistics
1989). The Netherlands railway (state owned) authority maintains its' own police the 
Spoorwegrecherche who are ultimately responsible to the Minister of Justice, whilst 
Italian railways are policed by the state financed 'Police Ferroviaire' who have full police 
powers throughout the country and are unlimited in jurisdiction. (Thomas 1989 (b ))
During the course of the Force Management Review, the then Chairman of the British 
Railways Board, Sir Robert Reid CBE, FCIT, aware of uncertainties expressed about the 
future of the Force and the need to stabilise financial support indicated his belief that the 
management review would resolve many of these uncertainties and provide clear 
guidelines for the future. Whilst he acknowledged that he could not give unqualified 
guarantees about future levels of resources available for policing, he was explicit that the 
Board had a statutory obligation to provide police services and that there was no question 
of disbanding the Force whilst the statutory obligation remained. He expressed the view 
that railways would continue to require a professional policing capacity. (Letter dated 12 
October 1987 from B.R.B. to the Chief Constable - widely circulated throughout the 
Force).
The consultants who undertook the Force Review recognised the problems of funding, and 
it was clear that even they were not briefed as to how the Force was funded - 'On the 
assumption that the extent of Government funding to the B.T.P. is in the same ratio of 
public sector obligation grants to B.R.B. total turnover, there is a government subsidy of 
24.7%. This compares to a total grant support of approximately 70% to Home Department 
Forces' (Emst & Whinney - Report - 1988, p.32). This statement does not equate with 
the letter from 10, Downing Street (above), that 'almost all of the costs of British 
Transport Police are eligible for government grant'. They recognised that the British 
Transport Police element of the Public Service Obligation Grant could be specifically 
identified and should not be subject the discretionary movements in the PSO and 
considered a number of options available to the British Railways Board, including that:
* B.R.B. should negotiate further with Government to obtain greater government 
contribution to the cost of the Force.
and
* The Police Committee should consider the financial advantages which could follow 
from bringing the B.T.P. within the Scope of the Police Act 1964 (and presumably the 
Police (Scotland) Act 1967, given the national responsibility of the Force) (Ibid, pages 
33-36)
They also considered that there was a need to:
* Set up a formal process between B.R.B. managers and B.T.P. to define within agreed 
planning guidelines the policing and security arrangements of the railway industry and 
its’ community (Ibid p.2)
and
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* Give Divisional and Sub Divisional Commanders greater control over the resources 
within their command. (Ibid p.6)
A formula for improving consultative arrangements for funding the Force was rapidly 
introduced. The key operational personnel within British Rail were Area Managers whose 
duties included inter alia, the preparation of future budget requirements. They did NOT 
however, hold the purse strings. British Rail's financial operations were conducted by 
business managers, known as Sector Directors, who then approved or disapproved as the 
case may be. The formula which British Transport Police officers were obliged to accept 
was that each Sub Divisional Superintendent at a given time during the financial year 
negotiated with railway Area Managers within his Police Division and asked for a specific 
amount of money to be included in their budget requirements to finance police resources. 
Agreement having been reached, a document was signed, and Area Managers sought 
authority from their Sector .
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Directors, who provided the finance. Where disagreements occurred the Divisional Police 
Chief Superintendent discussed the problem with the appropriate Railway Regional 
General Manager, to resolve it, and if disagreements were still apparent these were 
resolved between the Chief Constable and Committee and the Chairman of the British 
Transport Police Authority. Police Headquarters funding was to be authorised by the 
Police Committee.
The benefits of this system were that railway and police managers could be seen to be 
understanding each others problems, and that police efficiency could be evaluated through 
negotiations. The drawbacks were quite simple - Transport Managers are, like all 
businessmen, interested in making a profit. The less the overheads, the greater the profit, 
so clearly, the less police maintained throughout the transport system, the more the money 
coffers should grow. Police needed to convince commercially minded managers of the 
benefits which accrue from a police presence. Ideologically, a very sound system, which 
did not earn favour at first with Police Superintendents, mainly because it was time 
consuming and took them away from operational policing. Consultative arrangements 
have improved considerably since they were first introduced in 1990 - A statement by the 
Chief Constable that 'it is hoped that we move to a position where police officers think in 
business terms and business managers are encouraged to think 'crime prevention'
(Annual Report 1989, p.6) is well underway. On 24th November 1992, a conference 
organised by Network SouthEast (which I attended) covering numerous crime prevention 
issues including the control of public space, the importance of personal safety on the 
railway, and designing out crime, showed that progress between police and management 
thinking had caused a number of initiatives to come to fruition. A whole range of crime 
prevention systems were discussed including proactive and reactive measures taken by 
B.T. Police in conjunction with commercial managers to combat vehicle crime on the 
railway, in particular the Vehicle Watch Schemes, practical steps to be taken on personal 
safety, victim support schemes, the Travel safe project (see chapter 3.6), and Designing 
out Crime (by providing c.c.t.v., supervision by staff, proper lighting and 'Core Area' 
standards for platforms). This is particularly important - glazed shelters and service areas 
on railway station*, well lit during the hours of darkness, allow 'see through' facilities - 
i.e. there are no dark comers for possible assailants to hide. Examples of railway stations 
recently reconstructed to include these standards are East Croydon, Gerrards Cross, and 
Redhill. There are many more. Finally, the Conference considered Joint Operational 
objectives agreed by B.T. Police and Network SouthEast which were:
1. Protection of infrastructure from vandalism.
2. Protection of persons from violence or indecency.
3. Protection of line of route.
4. Reduction of thefts of goods in transit.
5. Prevention of thefts of and from motor vehicles.
The question of funding of the B.T. Police Force was made a little clearer by the Chief 
Constable, who in his Annual Report stated 'Following agreement with the Department of 
Transport, 80% of the British Rail element will be provided by British Rail Corporate and 
20% will be provided by British Rail businesses. This reflects the work of the Force as
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80% public duty and 20% railway specific.' (Annual Report 1991/92 - p.4). A report in 
the Force newspaper concerning privatisation, added a slightly different dimension. The 
Chief Constable is quoted 'There have been no discussions about privatising British 
Transport Police - Indeed as I said in my last Annual Report an agreement has been 
reached, with the Department of Transport identifying the 'Law and Order' role of the 
B.T. Police with 80% of its cost in the public duty area and the other 20% as being 
Railway dedicated' (Blue Line, November 1991).
It remains unclear however, how much of the 80% is provided by Government, and which 
Government Department has responsibility for providing it. Speculation continues among 
Force members as to whether the Home Office or the Department of Transport hold the 
Force purse strings. Further speculation on the fate of the Force should privatisation of the 
railways occur was also rife. The Chairman of the B.T. Police Federation described the 
Federation as 'helpless spectators' in the privatisation process (Blue Line, March 1992), 
and despite the Force response to the Governments consultation paper on the future of the 
Force after privatisation (see Chapter 8 for fuller discussion), which recommended direct 
funding through the Department of Transport, a written answer to a Parliamentary 
question by the Secretary of State for Transport, whilst confirming the future of the Force, 
gave no indication as to how the Force was to be funded in the future. The answer to the 
question 'who pays for the British Transport Police?', thus remains something of a 
mystery which may become clearer if privatisation of the railways occurs.
5.2. Do British Transport Police owe a specific duty to the Railways Board or the 
Public?
The statement by the Chief Constable that 80% of the cost of the Force is in the area of 
public duty (above) indicates that the lions share of the work of the Force is for the public 
good, or perhaps ’in the national interest'. When the former British Airports Constabulary 
was dissolved in 1974, the terrorist threat to mainland Britain from the I.R.A. was at its 
height, and this was the reason for 'take-over' by Home Department Police (Police Review, 
8 November 1974, p. 1443). Yet in relation to the railways, on 10th September 1973, 
bombs exploded at Kings Cross and Euston Station, injuring eighteen people, on 9th 
October 1975, a bomb caused the loss of a life at Green Park Station. On 13th February 
1976, an enormous bomb, packed with explosive to wreak sufficient havoc and death was 
mercifully defused at Oxford Circus Underground Station, and on 4th March a bomb 
exploded in a train, en route to sidings at Cannon Street main line station, only minutes 
after it had arrived there, packed to the gunwhales with commuters during morning peak 
traffic.
On the same day, British Transport Police at King’s Cross, alerted to suspicious persons, 
probably thwarted another explosion - the suspects ran off. On 15th March a bomb 
exploded on a Tube Train at West Ham, injuring several passengers. The driver was shot 
dead. The following day at Wood Green Underground Station, another injury was 
sustained by an explosive device, and the following day, a bomb discovered at Neasden 
carriage sidings was defused. (Thomas - 1989(a))
107
During the period 1973-1977 the Force dealt with 23 separate incidents involving time 
bombs and incendiary devices. This produced a ratio of one incident for every eighty one 
police officers in the Force at the time. During the same period, Home Department Forces 
dealt with 367 incidents - a ratio of one incident to every 295 police officers. Additionally 
in that period, British Transport Police dealt with a further 8,532 reported incidents 
involving suspect packages (see Chapter 8 for full table).
Despite these incidents on the railway, no moves were taken by Government to dissolve 
the Force, nor to place it under the command or control of Home Department 
Constabularies. Perhaps such a take over might have been difficult and costly, or perhaps 
Her Majesty's Government were satisfied that the British Transport Police were 
sufficiently well organised to cope with the problems? It is of interest also, that the 
Special Constables Act 1838 originally enacted to ensure that railway companies in 
particular employed constables to keep the peace was repealed by the Police Act 1964 
(Schedule 10, Ch.48, p.56). The B.T.Police Scheme came onto operation only six months 
after the Police Act 1964. Could Parliament have believed that B.T. Police were coping 
sufficiently?
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CHAPTER SIX
6. ARE B X  POLICE SUBJECT TO THE SAME CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 
AS HOME DEPT POLICE?
The Conditions of Service of Home Department Police officers are governed by the Police 
Act, 1964, the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and the Regulations made under them. Whilst
B.T. Police are not covered by these Acts, their Conditions of Service have been 
developed over the years to become almost exactly similar. Variations, where wide, are 
discussed throughout this study. The most important, training, pay and promotion are 
discussed here.
6.1. Do B X  P-Qli££-Rgc.eiveJhc-sain? trainmgj>£_Hpme Dept Polfce?
The qualifications necessary to an applicant to join the British Transport Police Force are 
similar in all respects to those required by Home Department Forces, and include the 
necessity to pass the national police entrance examination. On entry, the recruit undergoes 
the same basic training and assessment (Probationary) period as his or her Home 
Department counterpart. This is undertaken at a National Police Training Centre and the 
Force Training Centre which is situated in Surrey. As well as training, pay scales and 
Conditions of Service are identical to Home Department Police Forces but no housing 
accommodation is provided by the Force. The Force has adopted the Accelerated 
Promotion Scheme and the Special Course Scheme, applicable to Home Dept Forces. As 
a result of the Force Management Review, and Home Office guidelines, the recruitment 
procedure was revised in 1990. A new police entrance examination was introduced 
nationally by the Home Office in January 1992. The Force adopts national policies and 
the following statistics of all applicants who attended or were invited to attend all 1991 
assessment were as follows:-
Invited to Withdrew Failed Rejected at Offered an
Assessment Assessment Final * Appointment
Interview
198 38 53 (33%) 21(13%) 86(54%)
102^_________m _________26 (2$%)* 15(16%)* 51 (56%!*
300_________ 48_________ 79 (31 %1 36 0  5%) 137 154%!
♦
1 990 Applicants 
Figure 6(a)
Source - Force Records
Figures for 1991 recruits which are a mix of both 1990 and 1991 applicants were as 
follows:-
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Enquiries received 
Application Forms
6,299 
2,020 ^
no
Ap.pfti n tjpcnts
% of Enquiries 1.5%
% of applicants 4.9%
Male - 75 75.75%
Female - 24 24.25%
Graduates - 12 12.12%
Ethnic Minorities 10.10%
Recruits appointed 1991 99
Figure 6(b)
Source: Force Records
An overview of previous occupations held by recruits appointed between July 1990 and 
June 1992 revealed there was no common occupation. However groups can be identified 
as follows:
% of 251
Administration 49 19.5
Military 39 15.5
Public Service 25 10.0
Management 20 8.0
Engineering 16 6.5
British Rail/L.U. 16 6.5
Sales 21 8.4
Security 12 4.8
Serving Police Officers 6 2.4
Other occupations 40 16.0
Graduates (direct) _6_ 2.4
TOTAL 251 100,0
A further breakdown of the above recruits reveals the following:
A total of 21 were graduates 8%
17 were of ethnic origin 7%
5 3 were femal e 21 %
Figure 6(c)
Source: Force Records.
Wastage rates' (retirement, ill health, resignation) remain low. Details are as listed below, 
showing comparisons with Home Office Forces.
Wastage % of Strength % of Strength
B.T.P. Home Office Forces
1988 4.8% 4.66%
1989 4.5% 4.71%
1990 3.9% 4.53%
1991 2.95% 4.35%
Figure 6(d)
Source: Force Records.
By 19th October 1992 the British Transport Police had 172 women officers. This 
represented 8.35% of the actual strength. (Home Office Forces national average was 
11.39%)
Although below the national average > representation by women in the British Transport 
Police has shown a healthy increase since the beginning of 1990 when there were 105 
women officers, who represented 5.7% of the Force's strength.
Figure 6(e)
Source: Force Records.
By 1993, the Force had 42 officers from ethnic minority origins - 2% of the actual strength
(Home Office Forces National Average 1.03%), and 116 graduates - 5% of the actual
strength (Home Office Forces National Average 5.9%). (Force Records)
Marketing includes:
(a) Advertising via community policing posters on British Rail and London 
Underground.
(b) The force Recruitment Brochure which is circulated throughout the British Isles, in
Force Police Stations, Careers Information Centres, and all Universities and centres 
of higher education.
(c) Careers Briefings with the three Armed Services.
(d) Job Fairs (Military) where contact is made with other Police Forces and outside
industry, a most important area where the Force is able to be up-dated in relation to
Recruitment trends and policies in both the police service and in industry.
The quality of recruits is high. One officer won two awards at the Home Office District 
Training Centre Cwmbran (The Blue Line - Feb 1992), another took two prizes at the 
Scottish Police College Tulliallan (Blue Line - June 1992). Throughout 1992, B.T. Police 
officers took 20% of the student prizes at Cwmbran, even though they constituted only 
14% of the students (Blue Line - Sept. 1992).
The situation has not always been comparable. As a result of the 'Beeching Revolution' 
which commenced on the railways with the appointment of Dr. Richard Beeching to the 
British Railways Board in 1963 considerable changes were made. The Force Training 
School in Surrey operated an in force recruit training programme based on those in 
operation in Home Department Forces. Cost cutting resulted in efforts by the British 
Railways Board to sell the Training Centre site for re-development. Police were offered 
'part-time' training facilities at a British Rail owned training establishment at Windsor, 
whilst the Centre buildings were placed up for sale in 1967. Local pressure resulted in the 
plan being aborted, although peripheral buildings, including a large manor house property 
which served as residential accommodation for students, were in fact sold off. In 
consequence, during that period, recruits to the Force were trained by London 
Metropolitan Police. Force instructors of the day recall that many of those trained in this 
way, believing the grass to be greener in terms of further advancement, better conditions 
of service (including housing or a housing allowance) simply transferred, their initial 
training having been financed by the British Transport Police. As soon as the sale of the 
Training Centre failed, it was re-established, re-opening in 1970, but recruit training 
continued to be undertaken, initially at Hendon, eventually passing to Provincial Police 
Training Centres. The Force Centre was used for continuation specialist and supervisory 
training, and continues to be so used today. With the introduction of the existing recruit 
training programme for all police forces in England and Wales (except the London 
Metropolitan Police, who follow their own system) on 10th July 1989, the need for in 
force continuation training for probationer constables increased considerably. This is 
carried out in theB.T. Police Training Centre, Tadworth. It was not until 1970 when 
management representatives agreed at the British Transport Police Force 
Conference, after detailed studies had been conducted into recruitment and wastage that 
'action' in the form of a Supplementary Allowance should be paid. The Police Regulation 
34 (which defined 'married' and 'single' for the purposes of Housing Allowance in Home 
Department Forces) was adopted as a guide. (Minutes of Meeting of B.T.P. Force 
Conference, 30 January 1970) The allowance was not renamed 'Housing Allowance' until 
1991 after long negotiations in relation to an increase. At the same time, agreement was 
reached between the Federation and Force Management to dispense with an agreement on 
the movement of officers, (Blue Line - October 1991). The consultants had recommended 
this, together with a need to take steps to remove obstacles to the movement of B.T. Police 
and Home Dept. Forces (Emst & Whinny Report 1988 p.87)
By 1993 the Force Training Centre which was extensively refurbished and provided with a 
modem accommodation block in 1980, a new Dog Training Wing in 1984, and a further 
modem accommodation and teaching block in 1993, was in constant use. In 1991/92, 188 
male and 33 female police recruits undertook continuation training there and numerous 
specialist courses (e.g. search awareness and interview techniques) were completed. 
Additionally, B.T. Police officers attended a variety of specialist courses at Home 
Department Police Training Centre in England and Wales, and Tulliallan Castle in 
Scotland, alongside Home Department Police officers. These included CID, Inspectors, 
and Sergeants Development, Driver Training, Scenes of Crime and Crime Prevention. 
Three Chief Inspectors attended the Junior Command and two Superintendents the 
Intermediate Command Course at the Police College Bramshill. (Annual Report 1991/92 
p.29/30)
Space has prevented the Force from offering training to officers of other Forces, though a 
few places were taken by Sergeants and Inspectors of the Royal Parks Constabulary prior 
to 1989, when B.T. Police officers began attending Home Dept. Regional Training Centres 
to undertake those courses. British Airports Authority Police Dogs were trained by the 
Force until 1974 when the B.A.A.P. was disbanded.
In recent years, Police Central Service has agreed to secondments of B.T. Police officers.
In 1987 a sergeant was seconded as a Trainer to a Home Dept. Police Training Centre 
(Annual Report 1988, p.25). By the end of 1989 four trainers were seconded to Home 
Office Training Centres, one officer to the National Drugs Intelligence Unit, one to the 
National Football Intelligence Unit, one to the Central Planning Unit, (Annual Report 
1989 p. 16) and by 1990 a Superintendent had completed a two year secondment to the 
Police College Bramshill as a member of the Directing Staff. (Annual Report 1991/2 
p.29) With the introduction of OSPRE (Objective Structured Performance Related 
Examination) in England and Wales, as part of the National Police Promotion 
Examinations, Tadworth was designated as one of the national assessment centres, and by 
1993 was providing training for HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry Computer 
System). (Annual Report 1992/3, p.20)
In addition to the provision of training on a national basis, the Force has developed an 
Area Safety Training System (see Chapter 3.5 for full account), being heavily committed 
to safety in the community (Annual Report 1992.93, p. 10/11) and is involved in Computer 
Aided Training internally as well as being a founder member, with the Metropolitan, 
Thames Valley and Devon and Cornwall Forces of the Police Training and Technologies 
Group, using interactive video techniques. (Annual Report 1992/3, p.21)
6.2. Are British Transport Police Officers Paid The Same As Home Department 
Police?
Currently, British Transport Police officers enjoy parity of pay with Home Department 
Forces. This has not always been the same however. Whilst the Desborough Report of 
1919 created a standardised wage structure for the police service as a whole as well as a
number of other benefits, a meeting of railway companies representatives at Paddington on 
5th
December 1919 expressed caution as to the application of the Report to Railway Police:-
'It was the general opinion that nothing short of the Desborough Report conditions are
likely to
be accepted as satisfactory by the Railway Police Staff, but even if the Desborough scales 
of wages were ultimately sanctioned, it would not be possible for the railway companies to 
adopt the housing and pension clause of the report' (Minute No. 12, 5/12/19). They did 
however find favour in establishing a Railway Police Federation (Minute 14). The 
enormous variation in pay between 'Police Act 1919' officers and Railway Police are 
illustrated below: -
Railway Police
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5thyear
Constables:- 28/- 29/- 30/- 31/- 32/-
90/-
appointment, —
Sergeants:- 34/- 35/- 36/- 37/- 38/-
Inspectors:- 42/6 45/- 47/6 50/-
maximum
Table 6(f)
Source: Minutes of above meetings.
By January 1st 1920, however, Railway Police rates of pay had been agreed, and were at 
the lower end of the scale in excess of those recommended by the Desborough Committee, 
albeit subject to a 'cost of living' clause. The following rates of pay were applied to 
Constables and Sergeants after meetings on July 28th and 29th, August 3rd and September 
29th 1920 - backdated to January 1st 1920:-
Years of Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
Constable 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 shillings
Sergeant 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 shillings
Police Act 1919 Police
70/- on appointment rising by 
annual increments of 2/- to
after 10 years from
to be further increased after 17 
years - 92/6d and 22 years - 
95/-.
100/- on promotion rising by 
5 equal increments of 2/6 to 
112/6 per week.
£310 minimum - £375
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Table 6(g)
Source: Minutes of above meetings.
Additionally a London Allowance of 3/-per week (for Constables and Sergeants) and 4/- 
per week for Inspectors was granted, as well as 5/- a week clothing allowance for officers 
'not supplied with uniform'. ^
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Unfortunately, these rates of pay were determinable by the cost of living index and it was 
not long before they were reduced. At a meeting between the Negotiating Sub Committee 
of General Managers and Representatives of the Railway Police held at St. Pancras Hotel 
on 5th July 1921, a reduction of 6/- per week in the rate of wages for Constables and 
Sergeants was demanded by management representatives, and at a meeting on December 
29th 1921, a further 4/- per week from 1st January 1922. By 12th April 1922 a new wages 
structure had been put forward by management. The police representatives were unhappy 
and sought 'Desborough' rates, pointing out that these had been applied to the Port of 
London Authority Police (Minute 28 12/4/22). The arguement continued between the two 
sides until an 'independent' arbitrator Harry Courthorpe Munroe a King's Counsel, 
resolved the situation on 9th January 1923. Although he did not approve 'Desborough 
Rates', he did concede that the 'Railway Police Forces ... have established their claim to 
the status of a Police Force as distinct from a a grade in the Railway Service'. (Munroe 
Report 1923, paragraph 14) and stated that they should be recognised and dealt with in an 
entirely different position to other Railway Company Employees.
Since the Munroe Report there have been numerous 'independent arbitrators' appointed to 
assess the pay awards applicable to Transport Police in comparison with Home 
Department Police Forces, Honeyman 1950, Cameron 1952, Lloyd Roberts 1954, Lloyd 
Williams 1956, (Force Records). In most cases, parity of pay has been recommended, 
however it took half a century before Transport Police received any assistance with 
housing and a superannuation fund comparable to that employed by Home Department 
Police Forces. In 1961 an arbitration decision by Sir David Anderson reversed a previous 
award made by Lloyd Williams in May 1956 (who had given parity of pay to Transport 
Police) giving the Force 95% of the rates of corresponding Home Department Forces. 
Parity of pay was restored in 1964 and by 1972 this had become so accepted that the 
British Transport Police Conference minutes record the management representatives as 
referring to 'the new established policy to maintain parity of pay with equivalent ranks in 
the Civil Forces'. (Memorandum dated 7th December 1978 - Force Records)
The question of parity of pay again raised its head however in 1978. On 25th October 
1978 the Force received the following message by way of General Order 46/78 'The 
Police Committee gave full unqualified support to the Edmund Davis pay scales. The 
Government have set up a committee to examine the relevance of Edmund Davis to other 
police forces in the public sector, including the British Transport Police.'
The Report was commissioned by Her Majesty's* Government on 24th November 1978 as 
an enquiry into the pay and conditions of Non Home Department Police Forces, to 
examine the relevance of the recommendations of the Edmund Davis Committee (which 
had examined Home Department Police pay) to pay and conditions of service and 
responsibilities of other police forces in the public sector whose rates of pay had in the 
past directly or indirectly
] 17
followed those of Home Department Forces, and to recommend for each police force what 
the appropriate pay relatively with Home Department Forces should be. It is right to point 
out that the British Transport Police Force Committee of the day had been prepared to 
follow Edmund Davis, but the requirements of the government temporarily at least, 
prevented this. Thirteen non Home Department Police Forces were thoroughly examined 
in such matters as organisation duties and responsibilities, Crime (including Public Order 
and Terrorist Activity), Complaints Against Police, risk of assault and injury, training, . 
personnel, recruitment, wastage and the right to strike.
The Constabularies investigated were the Ministry of Defence, Atomic Energy Authority, 
Port of London Authority, Port of Liverpool, Manchester Dock, Port of Bristol, Belfast 
Harbour, Northern Ireland Airports, Royal Parks (England AND Scotland), and Royal 
Botanic Gardens at Kew and Edinburgh, in addition to the British Transport Police. The 
following extracts from the report sum up the committees examination of Transport 
Police:-
'The British Transport Police is a national force which compares in terms of strength to
an average Home Department Force the duties carried out are similar in most
respects to those carried out by Home Department Forces the increase in crime that
British Transport Police have experienced since 1960, is also on a similar scale to that 
experienced by Home Departments' Forces when the reducing size of the Force is taken
into account  The British Transport Police experience similar problems of public order
.... have a particularly heavy responsibility throughout the UK in handling passenger 
traffic to football matches and other large scale events. Football hooliganism and crowd
control throw a heavy and continuous burden on members of the Force The statistics
of complaints against police and of assaults and injury reflect the degree of exposure of 
members of the Force to the general and often hostile public. Similar problems are 
experienced in recruiting and retaining men and the pressures created by undermanning 
are at least comparable if not greater because of additional difficulties created by 
geographically large areas the Force has to police .... 'We conclude that the day to day 
responsibilities of a British Transport Policeman are broadly comparable to those of 
his colleagues in the Home Department Forces.' (Wright Report - Privy Council - 
1979, p.8/9)
The Committee recommended 100% pay relatively with Home Department Forces (Ibid 
p.22). The British Transport Police, incidentally was the only Force investigated, for 
which this recommendation was made.
The Police Committee endorsed the recommendation, and officers who had, throughout 
the long wait for the decision, continued to maintain the highest traditions of the police 
service for 40% less pay in some instances than their civil counterparts, breathed a sigh of 
relief. The rates of pay were applied on 1st September 1979.
The fact that the Wright Committee further recommended that future pay relatively should 
be automatically maintained, boosted the morale of a Force which had for many years 
been obliged through its Federation to go to arbitration in respect of pay awards. (Ibid
p. 10)
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6.3. What Are Promotion Prospects?
Constables and Sergeants are required to pass the National Police Promotion Examination 
before they can be considered suitable candidates for promotion, after which they must 
apply to appear before a Promotion Board consisting of Senior Officers. They are entitled 
to appear before three such boards, which are held annually. If selected, their names are 
placed on the promotion register, and this entitles them to apply for posts which are 
advertised in Force General Orders. Once an officer has reached the rank of Inspector, he 
or she may apply for Chief Inspectors posts which are advertised, and the Chief Constable 
selects those he regards as suitable for further promotion.
Whilst prospects for promotion to Sergeant and Inspector are quite good, further 
promotion prospects are extremely limited and in more recent years have suffered 
considerably as a result of an influx to senior ranks within the Force of officers from 
Home Department Police Forces. Problems arise in respect of promotion within the Force 
due to the area which is covered and the fact that an officer desirous of promotion might 
be required to move his or her family hundreds of miles to achieve an ambition.
This problem is also found in some County Police Forces, but not to the extent that it 
exists within the British Transport Police. Many officers, particularly those with children 
receiving full time education choose not to apply for posts in the interests of their families. 
Whilst within a County Force Area the system of education is fairly standard throughout a 
county, an officer serving in Manchester in the British Transport Police, whose children 
are studying for G.C.S.E.'s through a particular Educational Examining Board, will find 
difficulty if they suddenly are required to continue their education in the South of England 
or in Scotland. Should the officer receive further promotion during the period of child 
education, the problem re-appears. In more recent years efforts to reduce the problem 
where possible have been made by management, the very national nature of the 
organisation will however cause the problem to continue into the future.
Another contentious factor is the refusal by Home Department Police Forces to accept 
British Transport Police officers with equivalent rank or as promotion candidates. With 
the exception of Lord Horwood a Chief Officer of the North Eastern Railway Police, who 
became Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police in 1920, and remained in that 
position for eight years (Ascoli 1979. p205), only one officer has in recent years been 
accepted by a Home Department Police Force (the City of London Police) in his own rank 
(sergeant). Police Regulations allow for the transfers of Constables from the Ministry of 
Defence Police, the Port of London Authority Police, and members of aerodrome 
Constabularies (in certain circumstances) to transfer into Home Office Forces. (Police 
Regulations 1987 - S.l. 1987/ 851, Regulation 41 and 42). For many years there have 
been transfers of constables between B.T. Police and Home Department Forces. The 
following table illustrates a ten year period:-
Constables 
B.T.P. To Other Other Forces
Forces To B.T.P.
1981 2 22
1982 4 21
1983 5 5
1984 16 1
1985 7 1
1986 8 3
1987 4 6
1988 6 2
1989 N/R 9
1990 5 13
1991 10 3
Table 6(h)
Source: Chief Constables Annual Reports.
Whilst the Force has adopted a reciprocal policy and has not accepted transfers of serving 
Home Department Police Officers of Sergeant rank and above (though both British 
Transport Police and Home Department Forces accept each others Constables), the Police 
Committee, albeit inadvertently has consistently created consternation by accepting in 
senior ranks, retired or retiring Home Department Police officers. This might well have 
prompted an anonymous statement by one senior B.T.P. officer also is reported to have 
said 'The root of the problem is that some of the top brass are pensioners who have 
already retired from other Forces. Headquarters is like an elephants graveyard' (Sunday 
Times 29th January 1989).
It can be understood that to fill the post of Chief, Deputy or Assistant Chief Constable, the 
Committee should attempt to find the best possible candidate but given that officers of the 
Transport Police desirous of gaining senior promotion are only likely to achieve their 
ambitions within the Force, it would seem that the odds against a member reaching a rank 
higher than Chief Superintendent have been greatly reduced in recent years.
This factor was recognised by the Police Committee in 1963 (Police Committee Meeting - 
April 1963 Minute 25). They agreed that the successor to Arthur C. West as Chief 
Constable would be made from within the ranks of the Force and that for the future in 
accordance with a decision taken by the Police Committee in 1957 an outside appointment 
to the post should be restricted to a term of 5 years in order not to damage morale and 
dispel any idea of the job remaining beyond the aspirations of serving officers of the 
Force. Since 1974, when West's successor, William Owen Gay retired, this agreement has 
not been followed, indeed the problem was compounded when in 1991 a Detective Chief 
Superintendent from a Home Office Force was appointed, thus creating a precedent for the 
future at that rank. Again that officer had completed 25 years in a Home Department 
Force. April 1992 saw the retirement of the only remaining B.T. Police Career A.C.P.O. 
ranking officer (Blue Line - May 1992). He was replaced by a Chief Superintendent from
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a Home Office Force. On that occasion however, the officer concerned was a 42 year old 
serving officer with the Norfolk Constabulary (Blue Line - March 1992), and again in 
October 1992 a 45 year old Superintendent with the Metropolitan Police was promoted 
into the Force as Assistant Chief Constable Support Services (Blue Line - November 
1992). By January 1993, all B.T. Police Chief Officers, the Chief Constable, the Deputy 
Chief Constable and the four Assistant Chief Constables were all former Home 
Department Police Officer-*. The Chief Constable had previously served as Deputy Chief 
Constable of Kent, an Assistant Chief Constable with Greater Manchester, a member of 
the teaching staff at Bramshill, and before that a Chief Superintendent with the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary. The Deputy Chief Constable joined the B.T. Police originally as an 
Assistant Chief Constable from the Regional Crime Squad, as did the Assistant Chief 
Constable Operations. The Assistant Chief Constable, Scotland, was formerly Assistant 
Chief Constable (Traffic and Communications) with the Strathclyde Police (Annual 
Report 1992 - p.27). Whilst it must be emphasised that such appointments have been 
beneficial to the Force in terms of experience and knowledge, as well as contacts with 
Home Department Police Forces and institutions, and clearly if each had not been 
appointed to that rank no doubt a similar candidate would have been found, in terms of 
Force morale, the system has no advantages to those within seeking senior promotion, 
particularly since they are unable to obtain promotion outside the B.T. Police. Now that 
serving police officers are transferring in, hopefully the opportunity for B.T. Police 
officers might occur to transfer out. The fact however that the Chief, the Deputy and two 
of the four Assistant Chief Constables have been appointed after first accepting a pension 
from their respective Home Department Force can only be detrimental to the status of the 
Force within the 'real police' debate.
In a wider context, given the policy to implement rapid change, to replace all of the most 
senior managers with officers and civilians from 'outside' should effectively quickly 
change the culture of the Force, removing anecdotal practices and agreements. This would 
seem to be sound management theory in today's climate.
There are many officers (the writer included) who have applied for vacancies in Home 
Department Forces and who have reached the interview stage. The letters which follow 
these interviews all bear a similar message .... 'a  more suitable candidate was appointed', 
(numerous letters available)
It was in 1982 that the then Chief Constable attempted to redress the balance by 
abandoning the British Transport Police Force Promotion Examination System and 
replacing it with the National Police Promotion Examination (Annual Report 1983, p. 19). 
So far, it seems, only one has reaped the benefit and that particular officer had, prior to 
joining the B.T. Police been a member of a Home Department Police Force.
The Force Review highlighted some of these contentious issues by recommending the 
appointment of a career development officer: -
'A career development officer should be appointed : movement between the British 
Transport Police and Home Department forces should be encouraged'.
There is currently no career development function within the personnel and training 
department of British Transport Police. This lack of career development has several 
consequences for the Force including:
* difficulties in filling vacancies through lack of planning: the Force currently adopts 
<1, ’fire fighting' approach;
* promotions of officers, often on the basis of past performance rather than 
development potential;
* lack of identification of the development needs or development potential of 
officers.
All of these factors contribute to low morale within the Force, and a lowering of the 
efficiency of its officers. (Emst & Whinney Report 1988 - p. 86)
They also found that 'Force regulations state that once officers have passed a promotion 
board they must apply for posts away from their home station to remain on the register. 
There is, therefore, a general presumption that officers on promotion will move from their 
home station and, due to the widespread geographical coverage of the Force, this often
means moving hom e ' and concluded that 'Although there are circumstances in
which officers on promotion could be required to move, particularly at the more senior 
ranks, the reassessment of this policy could lead to economies without sacrificing the 
overall effectiveness of officers or the Force.' (Emst & Whinney Report 1988 p.89)
They were also anxious that steps were taken to remove obstacles to the movement of 
officers between B.T. Police and Home Department Forces. 'This is important if B.T.P. 
officers are to aspire to senior posts in the B.T.P. - This aspect of career development has 
been highlighted by the Home Office (HOC 12/1987 - Section 'A')'. (Emst & Whinney - 
Report 1988, p.87)
The present Chief Constable is clearly addressing these issues. The work already 
undertaken by the Career Development Officer, particularly in relation to encouraging 
officers (and civilian personnel) to obtain academic and technical qualifications with 
assistance from the Force is a great step towards providing members of the Force with 
credible c.v.'s. Eleven officers successfully completed Degree courses during 1992/93, a 
further thirty three were studying for first or masters Degrees and an encouraging number 
of civilian personnel were undertaking further education courses leading to professional 
qualifications (Annual Report 1992/93 p.21). Additionally, for the first time, an exchange
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between a B.T. Police Sergeant and a Metropolitan Police Sergeant for a six month period 
was in progress. (Ibid p.22). These efforts may eventually create a climate for 'two way 
traffic' in promotion. Until this occurs however, senior command remains unavailable to 
B.T. Police officers.
As the late Sergeant Roy Real, an ardent Federationist, who led many mess room 
discussions at Victoria, Waterloo and Paddington in the 60's and 70's often said on the 
subject of one way traffic
'Whenever an Assistant Chief Constable is brought in from outside, a British Transport 
Police Constable, Sergeant, Inspector, Chief Inspector, Superintendent and Chief 
Superintendent loses an opportunity for promotion'.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
In this Chapter I attempt to show how relations between B.T.Police and Home Department 
Forces have improved considerably.
HOW DO BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE AND HOME DEPARTMENT POLICE 
INTER-RELATE?
7.1 Have Relations Improved?
'While not wishing to be derogatory, these Forces must stick to their manors' - this 
statement was attributed to an official of the Police Federation for England and Wales in 
an article published in a leading national magazine in 1967. (Illustrated London News 15 
April 1967) The article followed a bid by the Port of London Authority Police to extend 
their jurisdiction through the Port of London Bill. The author of the article posed the 
question, 'How far should a law abiding citizen extend his automatic respect for a 
policeman's uniform?' He had described a number of what he referred to as 'non-regular' 
police forces including the Civil Aviation Authority (forerunners of the British Airports 
Authority Police), the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Constabulary, the Port 
of London Authority Police and the British Transport Police. Another Federation 
spokesman (or perhaps the same one) was quoted as saying 'The similarity in uniform is 
both embarrassing and misleading'. Whilst the deduction reached in the article was that 
'non regular' police officers were entitled to wear the uniform whilst upholding the law of 
the realm and that within their jurisdiction they were as much police officers as regulars, 
the report does indicate the feeling among Home Department police officers at that time. 
An earlier report in a leading national newspaper, after briefly describing a few 'specialist' 
police forces, drew attention to the fact that they were independent of local government 
and of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, but conceded that they were all 
attached to either Government Departments or Local Authorities. (The Times 21 Feb. 
1966)
There can be little doubt that railway police forces were considered, in the early twentieth 
century, to be below the status attributable to Home Department police. The minutes of 
meetings held at Paddington on June 5th and June 20th 1919, clarify the commercial 
position of officers of railway police forces in those days. The meetings were held as part 
of a series to consider the question of 'rates of wages and conditions of service of men 
employed in the Police Departments of the various railways'. Whilst the result of the 
meetings (Minute 1), was a turning point for railway police in that, 'as a result of the 
discussion and evidence given at sittings of the Central Conference they had established 
their claim to the status of a Police Force as distinct from a grade in the railway service' 
(Railway Police Central Conference Minutes 28 Sept. 1922, p.l 1) they did not further 
press an original claim to have recommendations of the Desborough Committee applied to 
Railway Police Forces but put forward an alternative plan on rates of pay, hours of duty 
and conditions of service. (Ibid p. 11) In that respect the railway police of that day may 
have missed an opportunity to achieve parity with Home Department Police Forces in 
those areas.
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It was not until 1980 that the report of the Wright Committee (see Chapter 6), clarified the 
position on pay. The 'commercial' interest and the question of control is illustrated by a 
letter to the Police Review in 1927 (Police Review 7th August 1927, p. 731). The 
correspondent commenced his letter with the question 'Is a Railway Policeman's life a 
happy one?', then went on to describe his duties, the restrictions placed upon his life as a 
result of his job (which were the same as those of all police officers), then asked 'Who are 
the railway company's loyalest servants?' and answered 'The men in blue who sort out the 
undesirables ... etc.' Finally, he clarified the position of railway police of those days by 
stating his hopes, 'I trust the managing directors will consider it their duty to protect their 
Police in case of accident and sickness and treat their loyal servants the same as the staff 
who sit in an office and have a warm fire when winter knocks at the door'.
Despite the 'commercial' connotations, railway police were considered to be part of the 
police service in England and Wales in 1923 by at least one author, Stanley Savill, whose 
book of that title was published by the Police Review Publishing Company and contained 
not only the conditions of service, rates of pay etc. of railway police but also of constables 
on canals and navigable rivers and dock constables. (Savill 1923, p. 32-40) (See also 
Chapter 6) All of these groups were, in 1949, to become British Transport Commission 
Police Officers.
By 1989, the attitude of the Police Federation for England and Wales had changed 
considerably to that of their spokesman in 1967. The removal of British Transport Police 
from the docks managed by Associated British Ports in 1984 had provoked much media 
attention albeit often at a local level. The Grimsby Evening Telegraph for example 
mounted a continuing campaign to keep the Docks Police. The newspaper drew attention 
to the replacement of police by security officers. 'Warning over ports chaos' was an 
article which drew attention to concern about national security, the reduction in policing 
levels in Immingham, Grimsby and Cleethorpes areas and concern that a private security 
company would be initially cheaper but would not have liaison with other services or 
access to resources which B.T. Police had. (Grimsby Evening Telegraph 1 November 
1984)
As police departed from the docks, another article headed 'Security doubt as police go' 
drew attention to the end of 150 years of policing at the port and concern that security 
officers would have extremely limited powers and no police expertise. (Grimsby Evening 
Telegraph 12 April 1985)
Despite this and campaigns elsewhere, the Government remained resolute following the 
tradition established by Sir James Graham in 1846. Five years later, the same scene was 
re-enacted when British Transport Police were removed ffom ports managed by Sealink 
U.K. Ltd. This provoked considerable interest in the Police Federation of England and 
Wales. The following statement was published in their magazine :
'We recognise the British Transport Police as a sister service. It's officers are constables 
under the law and they are accountable in law for their actions.' (Police Feb. 1989 p. 10)
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It would thus seem that since 1967, the representatives of the rank an file of Home 
Department Police Forces have grown to accept British Transport Police officers as equal 
in status. (For a fuller report on the removal from ports and docks see Chapter 8).
On a personal note, I can say that relations between B.T. Police and Home Department 
Forces have improved considerably since I joined the Force in the early sixties. It was not 
unusual for a B.T.Police constable to be kept waiting up to four hours in certain 
Metropolitan Police Stations to charge a prisoner in those days. Additionally, B.T. Police 
officers were always last on the Court list. This was particularly annoying when on night 
duty. Having worked from 2300 to 0700hrs to go back to Court with a charge at 1030hrs 
and then to wait for the case to be heard at noon or after and be required to be back on 
duty at 2300hrs the same night took some strength of character. On a busy station this 
could occur two or three times a week. It is right to say, however, that B.T.Police have 
developed a more professional image - mainly because their levels of funding have 
increased and in consequence more modem equipment, improved buildings, etc. are in 
evidence today. The people in the Force have not changed - there were many highly 
professional police officers in the Force when I joined, who were frustrated by the lack of 
facilities and equipment available to them. The Police Committees, over the years, have 
been extremely co-operative and the level of funding has been improved to allow for this 
professionalism to develop. (See Chapter 5 on funding) Additionally, attitudes of Home 
Department Police have changed. In a recent issue of the Metropolitan Police newspaper, 
a combined initiative between Metropolitan, B.T. Police and the local authority to clean up 
the King's Cross area of London is indicative of the accepted status (The Job - 9 July 
1993 p. 8/9) as is the joint operation between B.T. Police and Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary at the Pilton Pop Festival. (Blue Line, August 1993)
A further problem surfaced in the ports in 1990 when the Aviation and Maritime Security 
Bill was under debate in Parliament. The Bill gave power to the ship's master to arrest a 
person he believes has committed an offence but requires him to hand that person over to a 
constable. The Bill also provided power to 'designated persons' to conduct searches and 
thus caused consternation, again with the Police Federation who were concerned that 
security officers who had replaced B.T. Police at Harwich and who were sworn in as 
Special Constables would receive back door powers oftarrest in the Bill. (Police Jan.
1990 p. 16) British Transport Police still possess jurisdiction on Britain's waterways and 
in ports and docks to exercise the power of constables by way of the British Transport 
Commission Act 1949, Section 53 as amended by later legislation. It would seem, 
however, that the question of cost is receiving concern of greater importance than that of 
police efficiency and effectiveness.
Confusion as to the status of British Transport Police officers, however, is still apparent in 
the minds of some members of Home Department Police forces. This can be illustrated 
by examining two separate incidents of similar type which occurred in different Home 
Department Police Areas in 1986.
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On 26th July 1986 at 1000a.m. the 0933a.m. train from Bridlington to Hull struck a Ford 
Escort van on Lockington Level Crossing. The van was demolished and the train derailed 
with the loss of nine lives - a passenger in the van and eight rail passengers.
It is recorded that there was initial distrust of British Transport Police by a senior officer 
of the Humberside Force but subsequently, an excellent liaison developed, albeit mainly at 
ground level. Distrust too of British Rail's ability to effectively move the derailed trains 
led to the army being contacted (contrary to B.R's advice) to effect the operation with 
their heavy lifting gear. They were unable to accomplish this and eventually British Rail 
expertise was needed. (Force Records)
A similar incident occurred on 19th September 1986 at Colwich Junction in Staffordshire 
when, at 1832p.m. a Southbound Liverpool to Euston train and a Northbound Euston to 
Manchester train collided, with the loss of one life. Sixty-eight passengers were injured. 
An immediate liaison was struck up by Superintendents of both Staffordshire and British 
Transport Police and the investigation was conducted jointly. It is recorded that no 
problems were encountered due to good liaison and teamwork. (Force Records)
7.2 Are B.T. Police Impartial?
It is understandable that Home Department Police officers and members of the public are 
suspicious that investigations conducted by a police force which appears to be paid by 
Transport Authorities might lack impartiality.
When in October 1987 the front carriage of an early morning train from Swansea to 
Shrewsbury plunged into the River Toury, a bridge near Llandeilo, West Wales having 
collapsed, killing four people, an immediate investigation was launched by British 
Transport Police. The verdict of the inquest, widely reported in the press - unlawful 
killing - is evidence of the impartiality and professionalism of the Force. Such headlines 
as 'B.R. may face killing charges over Welsh bridge crash deaths, (The Times 22 July
1988), 'B.R. chiefs accused over bridge disaster, (Daily Mail - 22nd July 1988), 'Flood 
train deaths unlawful' (The Independent 22 July 1988), together with reports that 'The 
D.P.P. has studied papers on the case following an investigation by the British Transport 
Police' (Daily Telegraph 22 July 1988), show that the role of the media in reporting 
incidents is also important to this question.
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The inter-relationship between the British Transport Police Force and Home Department 
Forces seems thus to have improved considerably and perhaps the most positive 
contribution in recent years to evidence this, was an article by Commander Purnell of the 
London Metropolitan Police who had studied the B.T. Police as a project when attending 
the Senior Command Course at Bramshill. He drew attention to the work of the Force 
and explained that the training and experience of its officers is second to none, that the 
Force is an important element of British policing and he added that he 'hoped that this will 
be formally recognised before long'. How 'long' that may be would seem to depend upon 
a change in 'official' attitudes. Commander Purnell (an Assistant H.M. Inspector of 
Constabularies) perhaps summed up the whole situation most succinctly with the title of 
his article 'Banish the bias against British Transport Police\ (Police Review 31 
January 1992 p.200)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8. DOES SOCIETY NEED THE B.T. POLICE?
In this chapter, I will examine some of the alternatives to the B.T. Police.
8.1. Could They Be Replaced By Security Officers?
The Emst and Whinney Review considered that there may be scope to use private security 
organisations throughout British Rail premises and property whereby they could 
'substitute' for functions carried out by police. It was suggested that these civilian 
operators could carry our general patrol duties, maintain public order in 'non threatening' 
situations on main line termini and major railway stations, evict vagrants, provide mobile 
security patrols at goods and ffeightliner depots, but did not consider that they could 
replace police on football duties. The need for a readily available police resource as back 
up in time of difficulty was stressed. Significant financial savings were forecast (Emst & 
Whinney Report, 1988, p.80-82).
One of the worrying factors in replacing police with security officers is the quality of the 
operator. It was estimated that in 1972 within the private security sector 25% of the 
labour force changed four to five times a year. By 1987, given that little improvement in 
pay and conditions had been achieved, it was considered that this estimate had increased 
(South 1988, p.28). Interview research with managers in manned security and alarm lock 
fitting companies showed that few Security Managers were happy with recruitment and 
training within private security, and the fact that there have been cases of security guards 
employed who had convictions for violence and dishonesty gives rise to concern (South 
1988, p.28).
In 1988, a survey of nineteen contract companies advertising in the London Evening 
Standard over a two week period found average wage rates to be £2.73 an hour, and in West 
Yorkshire in 1989 a group of security guards were earning £1.50 per hour and working 60- 
70 hours a week without overtime payments. In London and the South East it was found 
that many security companies had a staff turnover of 400% per annum in 1988 (Johnston 
1992, p.75/76).
South draws attention to the case of Roger Gleaves, self styled 'Bishop of Medway', 
sentenced to four years imprisonment in 1975 after revelations in the T.V. Documentary 
'Johnny Go Home' that young boys residing in hostels run by him were allegedly 
corrupted. Gleaves, using the alias of Barry Evans was the head of a group of security 
guards. (South 1988, p.98) The growing tendency to use 'Bouncers' in Licensed premises 
as a form of security raises problems. In November 1978, a man died after having been 
ejected from a Kings Gross Public House by Bouncers. His brother mounted a campaign 
CURB, drawing attention to a number of instances in which bouncers had been 
responsible for carrying out serious assaults throughout the U.K. (South 1988, p. 100)
There is no statutory regulation of private security in Britain (Johnston 1992, p.86). In 
consequence, standards vary.
129
The appointment of security officers to undertake duties previously carried out by B.T. 
Police, is by no means a new idea. In 1961 seventy-seven security wardens were recruited 
by British Rail and placed under the supervision of B.T. Police. Their role was to 
establish a security system within goods and parcel depots. (Annual Report 1961, p. 19). 
By 1963, however, the corps had been transferred to B.R. Traffic Management (Annual 
Report 1963, p. 12). The corps was eventually phased out. No reasons were given but my 
own recollections were that they received little respect from B.R.. Staff, were obliged to 
join the same union as those whose duties they were scrutinising, and were generally 
considered to be ineffective. Security officers have no powers over and above those of 
ordinary citizens. Following the Emst & Whinney Report, an experiment was conducted 
at Birmingham New Street station, whereby private security guards were employed. In 
view of the instructions they had received from their employers, i.e. they were forbidden 
to lay hands on anyone, let alone arrest - but were to call police in the event of a problem, 
they were seen by the Divisional Commander of B.T. Police at Birmingham to be 
ineffective. This policy by Security Companies seems well established. In an 
advertisement (presumably as a police/security industry relations exercise) in the Police 
Federation Magazine in 1974, Securicor one of Britain's leading security companies 
pointed out that 'Sometimes we come across intruders on premises, that's when we send 
immediately for the police - the proper authority. This is the standard practise for all our 
Guards'. (Police - Feb. 1974, p.l 1). The law, of course, allows citizens to arrest 
suspected offenders in certain circumstances (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
Section 24(4) and (5)). A security officer would be eligible to use these powers, and if 
working on railway premises, as an 'agent' of the railway, would be able to make use of 
powers under railway legislation including the Bye Laws to remove offenders in certain 
circumstances. The 'employer', i.e. the security officers company, however, may well 
instruct that these powers are not to be used.
Continual calls for licensing of security firms have so far been ignored. Some firms have 
introduced 'street patrols'. In Wigan for example, Property Watch began a patrol in 
Goose Green and Winstanley in 1992, at a cost of £3 per month to 500 people who 
requested the service. Police were critical of the scheme because the wardens were 
unsupervised, and thus 'no one will be officially checking them'. A similar scheme by 
another company in Merseyside was criticised by police 'There are no checks available to 
control the employment, training and integrity of security patrol groups' (Police Review,
14 Sept 1992, p. 1628/9). A Police Review survey showed that in twenty police areas in 
Britain more than 500 non police patrols were operating in public places. Many police 
forces do not know how many such patrols are operating, others have detailed figures 
(Police Review 13 Jan 1989, p.65).
The security industry has for many years welcomed the notion of legislating for security 
(Security Gazette, March 1974, p.94), though the Government argues that since the 
security industry enjoys no special privileges under the law it is fully accountable (Police 
Review 26 August 1988, p. 1780). Bruce George, Labour M.P. for Walsall South has been 
trying to introduce a Private Members Bill to establish a degree of control over the 
industry without success (Police Review 4 September 1992, p. 1629). The award of a 
contract to Group 4 to provide prison escorts was received with concern among some, and
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more than 100 Members of Parliament called for the contract to be withdrawn following a 
number of escapes and the death of a prisoner. (Police Review 21 May 1993, p.21).
8.2. ComM-Thcy Be SuB^mjgjated-ByYolucdf.crs?
In 1979, Curtis Sliwa, a former manager of McDonalds in South Bronx created the 
Guardian Angels, a 5,000 strong organisation of volunteers to patrol streets, and the 
underground systems in the USA. The Chief of the Chicago Police described the corps as 
a 'Goon Squad' whilst Sliwa himself did not seem to be of unimpeachable status, as he was 
later imprisoned for twenty days in Detroit. (Sunday Times 02nd October 1988). In 
October 1988, Sliwa visited Birmingham, allegedly at the invitation of a Punjabi 
Organisation there. West Midlands Police were reported to have warned Sliwa and his 
wife Lisa they could be deported if  they stepped out of line. In consequence, they offered 
to patrol the London Underground (Evening Standard 21st October 1988). Concern was 
expressed by the London Regional Passengers Committee. Rufus Barnes was reported as 
saying that there is undoubtedly a perceived need for a presence in which passengers have 
confidence in the Underground, but we have serious doubts that a private group of 
vigilantes, however well intentioned, working independently of L.R.T. could be the 
solution'. (London Evening Standard, 07th December 1988). An Assistant Chief 
Constable of the B.T. Police voiced grave misgivings, describing the Angels as amateurs 
and stated that their presence could be provocative. (Ibid). By December 16th, the 
Guardian Angels were reported to have recruited fifty young Londoners to begin training 
(Independent - 16 December 1988).
They were reported to be undertaking a twelve week training programme in first aid, law 
and how to make a citizens arrest before going on to patrol in March 1989. Ted Coles, 
Deputy Chief Constable of the B.T. Police was reported as saying that ’we are concerned 
that they themselves may become victims of public disorder and we may have to direct 
officers to make sure they do not become targets' (Sunday Times 18th December 1988). 
One newspaper asked the question 'Might not the Guardian Angels find themselves the 
hunted and not the hunters?' (Daily Star 20th December 1988). Tony Banks Chairman of 
the London Group of Labour MP's and MP for Newham North-West was reported as 
saying 'There is no room on public transport in London for vigilante groups' (Morning 
Star 25th January 1989). By early February 1989 the football hooligan group known as 
the ICF (Inter City Firm) were alleged to have issued a threat to the Guardian Angels 
(Wogan -BBC1, 01st February 1989). The wave of publicity was used by the Government 
to urge more of the British public to join the Special Constabulary (Today -12th April
1989). Despite protests however, the first 30 volunteers were available to patrol the 
Underground on 15th May - unfortunately there was a strike and the system was closed. 
Patrols began the following day in what was described as a 'turbulent debut' (Independent
- 17th May 1989). By August 1989 the Guardian Angels had been declared winners of a 
crime prevention award by the Institute for Social Intervention (London Evening Standard
- 17th August 1989), by September they were reported to be cutting back patrols 
(Independent - 12th September 1989). In October Curtis Sliwa was attacked during a T.V. 
filming session requiring 20 stitches to head wounds (Daily Express - October 17th). He 
was visiting the Lansdown Green Community Centre in South Lambeth to address youth 
club members about the work of the vigilantes group when he was attacked by a youth
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leader who denied the charge. Thereafter, publicity began to wane. By the middle of 
1993, small numbers of Guardian Angels are still to be seen on the London Underground 
particularly late at night, but no publicity appears to attach to them. In the USA a number 
of surveys have been undertaken in relation to Guardian Angels. Ostrowe and Deblise 
found in 1983 that civilians were more favourably disposed towards Angels than either of 
the New York Transit Police Department or the New York Police Department. 61% of 
civilians wished there were more Guardian Angels, 67% believed their presence made the 
Underground safer and only 4% were opposed to their actions. In 1985, Pennell et al 
conducted a study through the U.S. National Institute of Justice, discovering inter alia, that 
only 6% of patrols involved helping in a crime incident. In 672 patrols, over a six month 
period, two citizens arrests were made and ten crime related incidents involved calling the 
police. Inconclusive results from a study site in San Diego suggested that Angels may 
have contributed to greater crime reduction in the area they patrolled. Overall, 60% of 
respondents said they felt safer as a result of Guardian Angels patrol. In 1986, Kenny 
discovered in relation to fear of crime on the New York Subway, that it is not as great as 
the media suggests. 21% of respondents were very worried about subway crime at night, 
26% somewhat worried, 27% only a little worried, and the remaining 25%, not worried at 
all. 66% of them believed that Guardian Angels could reduce crime. Of particular interest 
was the fact that 54% reported seldom or never seeing an Angel on patrol, and during the 
three months of the survey an analysis of reported incidents indicated that the subway 
system was in reality 'quite safe' (Johnson 1992 p. 168-173).
Attitudes to vigilantes in the UK seem to vary. Citizen Patrol Groups, together with the 
increase in private security street patrols and municipal patrol groups, (g.g. the Zonal 
Improvement Patrol created by Westminster City Council) are reported to have received 
support from the Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (Johnson 1992 p. 163). 
One such group, after consultations with the police and local residents teamed up with a 
private security firm in the Sneyd Park area of Bristol and the scheme is reported to be 
successful, though a Home Office spokesman is reported to have said that they would 
prefer residents to choose a more structured way of going about things such as joining the 
Special Constabulary (Daily Mail, 18 June, 1993).
Attitudes of the Courts to self help vigilantes however are quite resolute. In 1987, a man 
who fought back against a violent attack on the London Underground, defending himself 
with a swordstick received a sentence of 28 days imprisonment (albeit suspended for nine 
months) and a fine of £200 for carrying an offensive weapon (The People - 13th 
September 1987). The sentence was later quashed and a fine of £300 substituted (Daily 
Telegraph - 11th June 1988). In 1993, two men who bundled a youth into a van and 
having tied his hands, interrogated him in order to discover information which they 
believed he had concerning criminal activities in the Dickleburgh area of Norfolk received 
initial custodial sentences of five years imprisonment (Daily Mail 11 June 1993). The 
youth was unharmed. The general public appear to believe in vigilante action. In a Gallop 
poll, published by the Daily Telegraph on 30th August 1992, seventy six per cent of those 
questioned believed they would sometimes be justified by taking the law into their own 
hands.
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8.3. Why Are There No B.T. Police Special Constables?
In 1987,1 undertook research on behalf of the then Chief Constable in relation to the 
feasibility of creating a Special Constabulary for the B.T. POLICE. The Special 
Constables Act of 1831, 1914 and 1923 provided for the formation of a Special 
Constabulary to supplement the numbers of paid police officers. Although initially, 
formed to deal with 'tumults and riots and felonies' the duties of the Special Constabulary 
have progressively increased. In Scotland, Chief Constables were somewhat restricted in 
the use of Specials by Section 17(b) Police (Scotland) Act 1967 to emergencies, to prevent 
and suppress riots or for the purpose of gaining practical experience of police work. These 
were removed by Section 110 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which 
repealed that Section. The Police Act 1964, Section 16 (England and Wales) and the 
Police Scotland Act 1967, Section 3 empower Chief Constables of Home Department 
Forces to appoint Special Constables for police area over which they exercise control.
Until 1992, there was no reciprocal parliamentary authority for the Chief Constable of the 
B.T. Police to appoint Special Constables.
The role of the modem day Special can best be expressed by the statement found in 
various public information booklets prepared for the Home Office by the Central Office of 
Information 'Special Constables provide the police reserve trained to undertake regular 
officers routine policing duties when required and to free regulars at times of emergency 
for those tasks for which they are trained and which only they can perform (booklet 1983). 
Demands for Special Constables to be appointed to patrol London Underground have been 
put forward consistently, since 1983, when the Bow Group published its' paper on the 
subject (Paterson and Axworthy 1983). The Bow Group in fact went further, suggesting 
two models, Model 1 - A New Police Reserve whereby the two tier policing system of 
regular police and the Special Constabulary would be replaced by three groups - regulars, 
specials and an intermediate group - a 'Police Reserve' - unpaid who would work more 
closely with regular police, be expected to put in more hours per month than the Specials 
and effectively to 'sample life in the police before joining the regulars'. This view has 
gained favour with Clare Leon who saw specials as a very cheap commodity.' (Leon - 
1989 - Policing - Winter issue - The Special Constabulary p.28). Model 2 - A Bigger 
Better Special Constabulary was also recommended, (to quote the paper) 'Our Model 2 
thesis, in a nutshell is that the role and strength of the Special Constabulary in its present 
form should be greatly increased'. Within Model 2 came the recommendations (at 
paragraph F) to appoint Special Constables to the B.T. Police.
In an article in the Times (The Times 6th January 1984), John Wheeler and Tony Paterson 
re-iterated the demand for Special Constables to be appointed to the B.T. Police, claiming 
that in 1981, 17,420 people enquired about joining the Force but only 329 were recruited. 
'O f those remaining, many of whom were Londoners, surely a few hundred would be 
suitable and willing to become Specials?' The article drew attention to an 8,000 strong 
auxiliary police force in New York, 3,600 of whom patrolled the Subway. A Department 
of Transport Study in 1986 urged that the issue of Specials be considered by the B.T. 
Police Committee as well as the A.C.P.O. Working Group on interface with non Home 
Department Forces (Crime on the London Underground H.M.S.O. 1986, p.30). It was as a
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result of this recommendation that the Chief Constable discussed the possibility of sharing 
Special Constables with the Metropolitan Police (Chapter 2.1 ), but decided that this was 
impractical.
The Emst & Whinney Review examined the question of Special Constables for the B.T. 
Police and concluded 'Although it may not be possible to recruit or deploy Special 
Constables in the Metropolitan Police area, (on the grounds that the Police Committee did 
not approve the proposal to establish a Special Constabulary within the Metropolitan 
Police area at their Meeting on November 1987 - para 6.57, p.85), we believe there is 
scope for using them elsewhere, (para 6.5 - p.6.)
Legislation now provides power for the Chief Constable of the B.T. Police to appoint 
Special Constables (B.T. Police Force Scheme (Amendment Order) S.l. 1992/364). This 
was being actively considered by a committee under the Chairmanship of the Deputy 
Chief Constable at the time of my retirement in March 1993. The question of training of 
Special Constable to an appropriate standard is of importance. Given that the current 
Probationer Training System for regular Constables in England and Wales is an intensive 
thirty one weeks before that officer is permitted (subject to reports) to undertake 
'independent patrol', if a newly recruited Special undertakes four hours training per week 
(irrespective of any other duties), it will take that officer 310 weeks (FOUR years) to reach 
a similar standard. This presumes that a system of training on that scale could be 
developed. If, as may be more practicable, the Special trains four hours per month, clearly 
it will take four times as long (SIXTEEN years) to reach the same standard. A full 
'Training Course' manual for Special Constables has been produced by the Home Office 
Central Planning Unit, Harrogate. Different Police Forces provide variations in training 
times and systems for Specials. Some operate weekend sessions, others offer evening 
ones. The package is based on Probationer Training, but is less intense. Basic powers and 
duties are taught usually before a Special is posted to a police station.
8.4. Who Polices The Docks And Ports Now The B.T. Police Have Left?
The withdrawal of B.T. Police from premises owned by Associated British Ports (formerly 
the British Transport Docks Board) on 30th June 1985 (Annual Report 1984 p.l and 2) 
resulted in the loss of 207 police posts (Annual Report 1985 p.2.). 43 officers took early 
retirement and/or voluntary severance, 145 were relocated and 10 accepted redundancy. 
The withdrawal affected the careers of 244 police officers and 10 clerical officers (Ibid 
p.3). Two years later, a similar exercise began in relation to Sealink Ports (formerly 
owned by British Rail) (Annual Report 1987 p. 12) and by 1st February 1989, British 
Transport Police ceased to police either Docks or Ports. (Annual Report 1988, p.l 1). Of 
the 81 officers remaining within Sealink Ports, fourteen left on redundancy, fifteen 
remained at Dover to police rail locations and the remaining fifty two were relocated 
throughout the Force. Of the remaining civilian staff, two took redundancy, one remained 
at Dover (Force records). Many of the Dock Authorities took on private security firms to 
replace police. In Grimsby for example, the Grimsby Evening Telegraph publicised the 
impending withdrawal with front page headlines 'Bombshell as Docks Police Axed' 
(Grimsby Evening Telegraph 5th October 1984). The Grimsby MP, Austin Mitchell was 
quoted as saying that 'the decision would lead to a less adequate policing system', whilst a
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spokesman for A.B.P. was reported as saying 'The charges do not imply any criticism of 
the service we have received from the British Transport Police, but are merely intended to 
contain costs'. The Chief Port Health Officer for Immingham Docks drew attention to the 
role played by B.T. Police in relation to rabies prevention. Over the period of the 
withdrawal, many fears were expressed in the newspaper e.g. increases in theft, vandalism, 
drug smuggling and rabies (15 November 1984) and again drug smuggling and rabies 
(25th March 1985). At a meeting of the local councils general purpose committee a letter 
from Associated British Ports in response to a letter from the clerk of Immingham Town 
Council was reported to indicate that ABP was essentially concerned with security of 
property and not the control of such matters as drugs and rabies. (Grimsby Evening 
Telegraph 1st November 1984).
Considerable furore erupted in Police circles when B.T. Police having been withdrawn 
from Sealink Ports were replaced in Parkeston Quay by private security officers who, after 
two weeks training were sworn in as Special Constables in the Essex area. In an article 
entitled ' Sealink's Quaystone Cops' the magazine of the Police Federation warned 'when 
a professional police forces gives way to security guards with full police powers, it's time 
to sound the alarm' (Police February 1989, p.3). In his address to the Federation 
Conference, Alan Eastwood expressed deep concern over the policing of major ports 'we 
find it astounding that there is no uniformed police presence at such a major port of entry 
to this country as Southampton' (Police May 1989, p. 12). Journalists tested the security 
arrangements at Parkeston Quay in February 1989 and concluded that 'ports at which 
private security guards are replacing police officers as a cost cutting measure are 
dangerously open to terrorist attack and abuse by smugglers (Observer 5 March 1989).
The British Waterways Board property, which has not been regularly policed since they 
withdrew from the B.T. Police Scheme in 1964 is also reported to have problems. In 1989 
the Inland Waterways Association a registered charity which represents the interests of all 
users of Britain's Waterways drew attention to the lack of policing and an estimated £2 
million annual bill for vandalism (Daily Telegraph 21st March 1989).
As the Inspector in charge of a small contingent of officers at Dover Western Docks in
1979,1 emphasised the role of B.T. Police at Docks to my officers as being 'in the interests 
of national security'. The removal of professional policing from waterways, ports and 
docks might well have had a deteriorating effect on this. In his Annual Report for 1987, 
the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Richard Barrett drew attention to the fact that 
national and international activities of organised criminals remain a constant threat to 
society and the police operations, against them, particularly in relation to drugs and 
terrorism continue to be demanding in terms of experienced manpower and resources'. 
(Police-July 1988 p.14).
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The lack of police at ports and docks can only contribute to the national threat. Some 
work undertaken in the national interest at ports and docks by B.T. Police in the last years 
before they were withdrawn is shown in respect of indictable (only) offences reported. 
Clearly the drugs misuse offences reported at BR sources cannot necessarily be attributed 
to originating at Docks or Ports, but the Rabies Prevention and Smuggling offences can.
Indictable Offences Reported To B.T. Police : N.B. Those 'Docks / Ports' Type 
Offences Reported At B.R. Sources, Come From Docks And Ports.
REFUSED
ALIENS
RABIES
PREVENTION SMUGGLING
MISUSE OF 
DRUGS
YEAR (GENERAL) BR ABP SEALINK BR ABP SEALINK BR ABP SEALINK
80 5154 1 0 69 189 126 24
81 3530 6 7 Recorded 46 356 Recorded 132 22 Recorded
82 2421 2 9 Only 63 477 Only 137 19 Only
83 2013 8 3 From 55 269 From 206 27 From
84 2492 2 0 1985 27 88 1985 221 9 1985
85 2 0 2 1 1 3 18 235 0 10
86 1 - 3 2 - 11 150 - 11
Table 8(a)
Source : B.T. Police Annual Reports.
8.5. Why Not Hand Over Policing Of The Railways To Home Dept. Police Forces?
This logical solution would provide a simple answer to the problems were the Home Dept. 
Forces capable in relation to strength and expertise to do so, and if H.M. Government were 
prepared to agree to the proposition. It seems logical also that if this were the answer then 
the B.T. Police and their forebears would not have existed for more than one and a half 
centuries. An ideal time for such a merger would have been in 1974 when the former 
British Airports Authority Constabulary a force constituted under similar circumstances to 
the British Transport Police, with a remit to police Airports, was taken over by local 
police. The move was reported to have been necessary in relation to Heathrow, because 
'in response to terrorism the Metropolitan Police with greater resources to deploy had been 
increasingly supporting the small but efficient British Airports Police there'(Police 
Review 8 November 1974, p. 1443). In 1973 throughout the railway, dock and port 
system, British Transport Police received 1,314 anonymous bomb threat calls dealt with 
715 suspect packages, 38 suspect vehicles and 78 suspect letters. Three suspect bombs 
were detonated and three bombs defused. (Annual Report B.T. Police 1974). Since that 
year, terrorist activities have been continuing throughout the jurisdiction of the Force, as 
the following table illustrates:-
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BOMB THREATS : Table 8(b) - Source B.T. Police Annual Reports.
DEVICES ANON SUSPECT SUSPECT SUSPECT
DET. DEF. CALLS PACKAGES VEHICLES LETTERS
1973 3 3 1314 715 38 78
1974 3 1 1321 452 20 9
1975 1 1 1176 287 20 -
1976 5 2 1376 802 10 9
1977 2 502 305 4 3
1978 329 218 6 4
1979 315 224 4 5
1980 287 198 5 3
1981 398 283 1 6
1982 322 37 4
1983 1 278 77 23
1984 8 327 68 6 1
1985 22 393 147 1 1
1986 9 358 388 30 3
1987 22 217 83 4
1988 4 282 133 4 3
1989 1 389 184 9 9
1990 5 446 { 270 }
1991 8 1683 { 1961 }
1992 14 1836 { 2738 }
NOTE: From 'The Future Status of the B.T. Police' Dept, of Transport, November 1992 
(Consultation Document, p.8) 'Terrorism within B.T.P. Jurisdiction is worthy of special 
mention. High ranking specialists in this field have described the B.T.P. as having given 
a robust answer to the terrorist threat'. Since February 1991 the Force has played a vital 
and developing role in the categorisation of bomb threats nationwide.
Gatwick Airport was soon to be policed by the Sussex Constabulary, and arrangements 
were quickly put in hand once the Policing of Airports Act 1974 received the Royal 
Assent on 31st July 1974. A Divisional Commander and Deputy Divisional Commander 
were appointed in December 1974 in readiness to take over the policing of Gatwick from 
the British Airports Police in the spring of 1975 (Police Review 27 December 1974, 
p. 1680). No efforts were made to 'take over' B.T. Police Jurisdiction. British Transport 
Police do rely heavily on Home Department Police Forces to assist in dealing with 
offences throughout their jurisdiction albeit B.T. Police provide reciprocal arrangements 
as the following table illustrates:-
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Assistance To And By Other Forces:
YEAR
ARRESTS FOPR 
OTHER FORCES 
BY B.T.P.
JUVENILE 
ABSCONDEES 
DETAINED BY 
B.T.P.
ARRESTS BY OTHER 
FORCES FOR B.T.P.
1980 1586 16141 408
1981 1886 1374 1544
1982 1771 985 363
1983 1586 1196 534
1984 1779 1099 520
1985 1644 1172 270
1986 1220 1235 596
1987 1293 178 2009
1988 1245 146 2849
1989 1035 270 11
1990 1360 425 3066
1991 1769 402 3633
1992 1591 329 3763
Table 8(c ) : Source B.T. Police Annual Reports
NOTE:
Annual Report 1988 - p.48 'The Force assisted local police at Lockerbie by providing 
police dogs and handlers to search for property and human remains'.
Annual Report 1989 - p.5 'After the sinking of The 'Marchioness' on the Thames in 
August the Force rendered vital early response'
Annual Report 1989, p.25 'After serious disorder, including the death of one supporter 
on the ferry ’Tor Britannia' twenty four (B.T.P.) officers assisted the Essex Police to 
investigate offences involving 200 fans'
It will be seen from the table that in more recent years, Home Department Police Forces 
have become increasingly active within B.T. Police Jurisdiction. Given, however the 
increasing rate of crime, and scarcity of police resources, even if Home Department Forces 
did take over responsibility for B.T. Police Jurisdiction, it is most unlikely that this would 
provide a cheap option - indeed, since taking over the policing of Airports, the numbers of 
Home Dept. Police have increased considerably since British Airport Police days. Whilst 
Home Dept, police were able to take over the policing of certain airports with ease, it 
would be difficult to provide a similar service to the railways on a local geographic based 
agreement. Airports are compact and integral, whilst the railway requires specialist 
knowledge in legal and safety aspects, and its' network extends throughout every Home 
Department Police Area.
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In New York, in 1990, the suggestion of a merger between the New York Police 
Department (the equivalent of a Home Dept. Constabulary here) and the New York Transit 
Police (who police the subways and the buses) was viewed with interest by the media.
'The basic problem is that the Transit Authority Management, busy running trains and 
buses is not as qualified to direct police operations as the law enforcement professionals 
who run the N.Y.P.D., the second factor in favour of a merger is that the work of the city 
and transit police forces often overlaps'. (New York Daily News 3 June 1990). The 
article draws attention to the fact that the two organisations have different radio systems (a 
problem overcome in the U.K. - by negotiation. B.T. Police officers in most areas of the 
country carry a radio or have a vehicle radio linked to local police).
Government attitudes towards the policing of the railways, and originally docks, ports and 
waterways connected with the former railway companies, do however not appear to have 
changed since Sir James grahams statement to the Commons in 1846, that railways must 
bear the cost of policing. This is borne out in most recent times with the issue of a 
consultation document on the future of the B.T. Police after railway privatisation. After an 
extremely positive description of the functions, accountability, structure, personnel, status 
and current funding, the document provides a number of options to consider, the most 
logical of which is option 1 (at page 9) - B.T. Police retained - direct funding by 
Department of Transport/Home Office. In stating (at page 5) that the Government had no 
plans to end the arrangement by which British Transport Police are responsible for 
security and the enforcement of law and order on the railways, the document recognised 
the value of retaining the Force. In its' preliminary conclusions (at page 10) however, it is 
clearly stated that 'It is considered that direct funding of B.T.P. by the Government should 
be rejected'. (para 31). It is difficult to understand how a consultative document can reject 
out of hand the most logical solution to a problem without first 'consulting' those who 
operate the policing system - i.e. the B.T. Police. Responses to the document by the Chief 
Constable, the B.T. Police Federation and the Superintendents Association all indicate that 
Option 1 is the most favoured and most acceptable.
8.6. Why Then Does Society Need The B.T. Police?
In 1958, Britain had 8^2  miles of motorway, by 1965 this had grown to 350 miles, and by 
1971, 800 miles had been completed (Bartlett 1977, p. 167 and 248). The Cornish Report 
of 1960, by a senior detective, commented on the increasing number of high value 
burglaries and robberies carried out by travelling criminals aided by improvements in 
transport and by April 1965 nine regional crime squads had been set up, initially for a two 
year experiment. By 1985 however the RCS was firmly established and the Broome 
Report of that year recommended the addition of a specialist drugs wing. (Police Review, 
23 April 1993, p. 16). If society needs a specialist force to deal with specific types of 
crime nationally, brought about by the evolution of motorways, then surely society also 
needs a specialist force to deal with specific types of crime brought about by the evolution 
of railways more than a century and a quarter before motorways emerged?
The railway is a peculiar, and indeed can be a dangerous environment in which to work. 
B.T. Police, in addition to receiving the standard police training systems also need to be 
trained and refreshed in railway safety - safety on the track, fire safety, and safety at major
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incidents on the railway. Knowledge of train movements, geographical concepts, 
legislation and crime peculiar to the railways is also vital if an efficient and effective 
policing system is to prevail. Among the serious offences peculiar to railways which are 
committed are obstructions on the track, endangering the safety of persons on the railway, 
arson, luggage thefts, thefts of mail and robbery (and assault with intent to rob). The 
following table illustrates the volume of these offences>
SERIOUS OFFENCES : TABLE 8(d) : Source B.T. Police Annual Reports
ENDANGER OBSTRUCTION ARSON LUGGAGE MAIL ROBBERY/ASSAULT
SAFETY THEFT THEFTS WITH INTENT TO ROB
1982 1071 3128 357 1463 1222 725
1983 1344 3337 386 1900 1119 658
1984 1253 3731 430 2162 1245 939
1985 1525 2744 377 2499 1134 1057
1986 1283 2683 360 2639 1055 1175
1987 614 2296 318 2716 837 1281
1988 765 2564 287 2995 602 1654
1989 1056 4070 517 2935 566 1380
1990 848 3926 692 2815 337 1257
1991 738 2955 457 2878 224 1401
1992 642 2585 392 3099 123 1486
The effectiveness of any police force anywhere is determined by four basic factors, 
Manpower, Communications, Mobility and the Law'. (Sir Robert Mark, Alderson and 
Stead 1973 p. 14). With the co-operation of the Police Committee, the B.T. Police has 
invested to a considerable degree in each of these factors. The development of assessment 
and quality training for its officers (Chapter 6.2) for example, and Communications, (A 
Platform for Change - Police Review 15 May 1992 p. 898/9) by way of a multi million 
pound computer project which will provide a single point entry for all data, a seamless 
data base serving all force systems, common standards and design for all applications and 
an enhanced telephone system (Annual Report 1992, p.23). The Force continues to follow 
the policy of introducing quality diesel vehicles into it's modem fleet and even provides 
lightweight mountain bikes in some Areas (Ibid p.24). Whilst police have little control 
over the law, B.T. Police continue to apply not only the general law of the land, but also 
that specific to railways to good effect.
It is reasonable to assume that any credible form of security should be applied to ensure a 
safe and secure environment. Sir Phillip Knights, former Chief Constable of the West 
Midlands Police noted that the police committee of the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities in 1976 ... 'felt that it would be desirable for all types of policing to come 
under one large umbrella, and interest was expressed in establishing a multi-tier police 
force comprising for example, police officers as we generally understand the term, existing 
'private1 police forces, private security forces and traffic wardens, together with, perhaps, 
persons to patrol high rise flats, covered shopping centres and the like...' (South 1988 
p. 159). He suggested that such a move might raise the politically sensitive question of 
'municipal trading' - a possibly better service for the more affluent (Ibid). Whilst this
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suggestion seems somewhat ideological, given the current hotch potch of organisations 
with (and without) police powers, including Customs and Excise, H.M. Immigration 
Service, Court Officials etc, it merits further research.
Very little has been written about private security, specialist police forces and vigilante 
groups in Britain (Johnson 1982, p.220), indeed 'what do we understand by the term 
'policing'?' (Ibid, p.222). South believes that the ’private security sector' 'have a 
significance demanding very serious vigilance', but suggests that a goal might be 
'accountability guaranteed by public right of inspection, for example of training, 
information collection, operational activities etc.', warning that otherwise this could 
'produce Orwells 1984 nightmare'. (South 1988 p. 163).
There does seem a case for consideration of the licensing of private security organisations, 
thereby creating a system (to be paid for by private security operators) whereby security 
staff might be properly vetted, and be subject to a standard set of criteria, removing some 
of the doubts about quality. In relation to the railway, members of society might feel that 
they have the right to the same quality of protection by they travelling by rail, road, (or 
even shanks pony). Only society can decide whether B.T. Police should continue. Any 
legal and credible form of additional assistance from any quarter would be, most certainly, 
acceptable to the Force, provided that it was not used as a lever to replace professional 
police officers.
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CONCLUSION
9.1 Where are the B.T. Police now?
The preparation of this study in a dispassionate and analytical format has been extremely 
difficult. Having lived and worked through pride and prejudice as a serving member of 
the British Transport Police for more than thirty years, during which many of the 
developments discussed have taken place, it is virtually impossible to examine some of 
them with clinical indifference. The task has been complicated by the culmination of two 
issues which may well affect the British Police Service as a whole and the British 
Transport Police Force in particular - the publication of the Sheehy Report (Inquiry into 
Police Responsibilities and Rewards, 1993, H.M.S.O.) and the impending privatisation of 
the Railways. The British Transport Police is 'one of the oldest police forces in the 
world' (B.T.P. Journal, Autumn 1990, p. 18) but 'who knows what the future holds if 
British Rail is privatised? Certainly there can be no guarantees that there will be an 
assured role.' (Sir Robert McCrindle, Express Lines 1991, Issue No. 2 p.5) A more 
practical and objective assessment of the situation was provided by the Chief Constable of 
the B.T. Police, 'The future for the British Transport Police lies in continuing to recruit 
high quality police officers who are trained to be leaders in emergency management and in 
the protection of the community ... flexibility in matching skills to tasks in a cost effective 
manner is essential to our future success as a national Force policing the railway systems 
in this country whatever shape they may take'. (Desmond O'Brien, Chief Constable, 
British Transport Police, Annual Report 1990, p.5). With these statements in mind, I will 
endeavour to summarise the study and recommend future strategies in order to assess the 
value of the continuance of a highly motivated and professional organisation.
9.2 How did the B X  PQlk£.gel.here?
It will be apparent from Chapter One that the origins of the modem Force lie in the years 
during which the police concept was developed. No firm evidence is available to provide 
an exact date for the commencement of policing of railways by dedicated 'railway' police 
officers but, given that the London Metropolitan Police was formed in 1829 and the first 
mention of railway police recorded was in 1830, clearly they were in at the beginning.
The general public disorder which resulted in the subsequent formation of what I will call 
from hereon, the civil police, was clearly mirrored on the railways. Gay, Whitbread and 
Coleman provide information about riots by construction workers at Penrith, Kendal and 
Mickleton in the mid-nineteenth century which appear to have been comparable with those 
which occurred elsewhere than on the railway during those years.Government attitudes, 
however, have stood firm since Sir James Graham's dictum in 1846, followed through by 
Lord Brabazon of Tara in 1988, that the finance of policing railways rests with the 
appropriate Transport Authority. It is extremely difficult to comprehend the reason for 
this persistently dogmatic approach, particularly in the light of the professional 
development of the modem Force. From the outset, railway police modelled themselves 
(and were allowed to do so) on civil police, even down to the style of the uniform they 
wore, although pay structures were somewhat different. It was not until this century that 
amalgamations took place, firstly in 1921, then more dramatically in 1949 when the
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British Transport Commission Police, the forerunner of the modem Force was created - 
the first (and still only) national police force in the U.K. serving the public sector.
Between 1949 and 1964 (when the B.T. Police Scheme came into operation), a great deal 
of reorganisation took place, but it is only in recent years, in particular from April 1992 
that root and branch reorganisation has created a fundamental change of direction in 
management style. Chapter Two raised questions about the adequacy of the 
establishment, based on criteria used by civil police authorities. It was not until the 
commencement of the Amendment Scheme in 1992 that the Police Committee were 
legally required to provide an 'adequate' as well as an efficient Force. Whilst numerous 
security and safety measures additional to police, e.g. c.c.t.v., improved lighting, Help 
Points etc., have been introduced, as well as a system for negotiating police resources, the 
current establishment of the Force is still based on that which existed before these 
measures were taken and in consequence may need further research to clarify its adequacy. 
Limited by information publicly available as to how establishments are calculated, efforts 
to determine suitable formulae relevant to the rationale for a particular level of funding 
remain somewhat superficial. They may, however, form a basis from which to go 
forward.
In Chapter Three, I examined firstly the legal considerations which support the view that 
B.T. Police are 'real' police officers. It will be seen that legal definitions have been 
created in order to include the Force in important legislation, as well as to describe its 
members in parliamentary (and sociological) debates - 'constables', 'officers of the 
Crown', 'transport police as opposed to ordinary police', 'irregular?' (as opposed to 
regular police),'those outside police forces which have authority to be in existence', 'body 
of constables maintained otherwise than by a police authority' and perhaps the most 
colourful of all descriptions, 'hybrid' police. (Johnson 1992 p. 125-128) According to 
the Concise Oxford Dictionary a hybrida is the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar, 
whilst hybrid itself can be the offspring of two animals or plants of different species, 
crossbred mongrel or (hopefully what he means) in Parliament, a Bill combining 
characteristics public and private. (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1951, p.583) Difficult to 
understand was the reference of the Force in the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure as a 'non police agency', (Research Study No. 10 1980, H.M.S.O., p. 163) 
particularly since the study found that the B.T. Police had handled more than twice as 
many known crimes in 1977 than a Home Department force to which it was compared, 
that it prosecuted its own offences in much the same way as the civil police and was 
found to be the second largest prosecution agency in the study ' acting very much like a 
civil police force'. The variety of descriptions attributed to constables of the Force may 
well continue, unless of course, H.M. Government one day decide to 'regularise the 
irregular' and place B.T. Police for legal and practical expediency into the 'police officer 
per se' category - a simple sentence in a future Act of Parliament would suffice.
It will be seen that in the practical considerations, the actual work undertaken by B.T. 
Police is basically the same as that of any police force. The research undertaken by (and 
on behalf of) the Management Consultants in 1988 tends to provide evidence of this, as 
do the statistics and descriptions of incidents. Of particular importance is the survey on 
'rural' violence, albeit having been conducted at high speed and the criteria selected by the
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Force not having always been followed precisely. It does, however, highlight that the 
problems of society as a whole are also present on the railway.
Continuing efforts to improve safety and security on the railway through such initiatives 
as Major Incident Training and Schools Liaison, together with Crime Prevention, fear of 
crime reduction and Travelsafe are indications of modem police management methods 
aimed at community care. The 'outside' view of Sir Robert McCrindle - there is really 
no difference' may be seen by B.T. Police as a refreshing comment.
Chapter Four dealt with what seems to be an emotive issue - accountability. It will be 
apparent that the Police Committee has, in very recent times, accepted into its organisation 
two 'independent' members, representing the community. There is, however, still some 
doubt as to the position of the Committee. In July 1989,1 received a letter from the 
Solicitor of the British Railways Board criticising an article I had written which was 
published in the Spring Edition of the B.T. Police Journal on the present constitutional 
position of the B.T. Police (Thomas 1989(a)). The letter claimed that the Fisher -v- 
Oldham Corporation case was not relevant to the position of B.T. Police officers and that 
they were 'governed by Lambert -v- Great Eastern Railway Company (2KB 776), (This 
was discussed in Chapter 3.1 and it was found by the Judge in that case 'It is the railway 
company who pay ... who dismiss and in these circumstances it seems to me that these 
men (the Great Eastern Railway policemen in the case) are bound to obey the orders of the 
railway company and ... in the acts which they did they acted as servants of the 
Company.') After protest that this was not my view, a further letter accepting a 
'difference of opinion' was received. There still appears to remain, however, a 
'difference of opinion' (letters 14th July, 15th September 1989).
The Amendment order to the B.T. Police Scheme (S.I. 1992/364) has made a number of 
changes to the manner in which the Force is to progress, taking into account many of the 
recommendations made by the Management Consultants Emst & Whinney in 1988. In 
particular, it has given the Chief Constable unquestionable operational control over the 
Force. It is unfortunate that as yet, H.M. Government has not provided a clear and 
specific remit either to the Home Secretary or the Secretary of State for Transport to be 
fully responsible for the Force. The acceptance by the Force of the Lay Visitor Scheme, 
liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and a clear and definite open policy to liaise 
with the media, together with a total commitment to the Complaints Against Police 
System are all indicators of a willing participant in the accountability debate.
If accountability is an emotive issue, then funding of the Force can be described as equally 
so. It is also more difficult to assess. In Chapter Five, I have attempted to examine 
available evidence but must admit failure to provide a simple explanation. Perhaps the 
answer lies in the Italian experience - give British Transport Police equivalent jurisdiction 
with civil forces, fund them through the State and make them accountable to an 
appropriate Minister. This is virtually what happened in relation to British Airports in 
1974 and there seems no logical reason why it should not have happened in respect of 
railways and the same time and for the same reasons.
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In a study of this size, it would be impossible to examine in detail and comparatively, the 
conditions of service of B.T. Police and those based on Police Regulations of the Civil 
Forces. Recruit Assessment and Training, together with specialist and advanced training 
have been explained and together with statistics prepared by the Recruiting Department, 
comparisons with civil forces provided to indicate the fact that B.T. Police receive the 
same, if not more training (given the specialist subjects they are required to know), as civil 
police in the same training environment. In this way, the Force can openly subject itself 
to scrutiny by the community. If training, police duty and general policing requirements 
are synonymous with civil police standards, it seems right that pay and allowances should 
also correspond. Whilst this is broadly true today, it has not always been the case, as will 
be seen from Chapter 6.3. In the current public debate on the Sheehy Report, there has 
been much talk by police to the effect that the police service is a 'vocation', e.g. Panorama 
; BBC TV, 16 August 1993 9.30-10.10p.m.) Whilst it is claimed today that police 
officers are well paid, those who served before the Edmund Davies award was made in 
1979 will remember harder times. (See especially Reiner 1978 - The Blue Coated 
Worker). Research on motivation to join the police service today show that job 
satisfaction (albeit in many cases somewhat idealistic perceptions of what police work 
actually entails) is greater in most cases than financial reward. (Fielding 1988 p.37-50) 
The question of promotion prospects in the B.T. Police Force has become increasingly 
controversial within the last few years. It was believed in 1982 that by introducing the 
Force into the National Police Promotion Examinations (as opposed to the original system 
of in-Force examinations, a procedure also used by the London Metropolitan Police until 
recently on the grounds of specialism), officers of the Force would be qualified to transfer 
to other Forces. This has not come about. Whilst 'Police Regulations' have been offered 
as an excuse by some civil forces, this does not seem valid. Efforts are being made, 
however, to prepare B.T. Police more fully in order that cross- fertilisation may take place. 
Meanwhile, the debate on 'one way traffic' continues.
In Chapter Seven, I traced the inter-relation between the Force and civil forces and show 
the marked difference in opinion of the Police Federation of England and Wales over the 
last quarter of a century, as well as the most recent joint co-operative initiatives. It is 
right to point out that degrees of co-operation have been present throughout my service 
and probably before on a local, perhaps even personal basis. It may be that in the fullness 
of time, co-operation will have advanced to such a degree that it will be unnecessary to 
comment upon it.
In the final Chapter, I have examined some of the alternatives to policing the railway with 
a professional dedicated police force. The considerations by the Management 
Consultants, Emst & Whinney, that civilian security organisations might carry out general 
patrol duties on railway stations had some merit but it is difficult to establish what 'non­
threatening situations' are. Colleagues and I have been called, as police officers, to 
serious fights and disorders on many occasions which arose, initially, from the most trivial 
incidents - an unguarded personal comment in a bar, accidental contact between people 
entering or leaving trains, disputes over taxi fares etc. Additionally, I share South’s' 
(South 1988, p. 163) worries about the quality of some personnel employed in the security 
business. Volunteers, unless properly managed and supervised (as are Special 
Constables) can provoke problems by their very presence and their motivation could be
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suspect, leading them from a passing 'security' presence into a more active (and perhaps 
illegal) vigilante scenario.
The question of community respect and confidence also emerges. When B.T. Police were 
removed from docks and ports, local communities were vociferous, through the media, in 
expressing their fears. The main difficulty in persuading civil police to undertake the role 
of B .T. Police on railways might well be priorities. The consultation document on the 
future of the B.T. Police after privatisation recognised the positive attributes of the Force, 
including its 'robust answer to terrorism'. Given that the Force is dedicated to a system 
of specialised policing, it seems likely that were civil police responsible to the same 
degree, local operational commanders might see the policing needs of the High Street as a 
higher priority than those of the railway station, particularly on Friday and Saturday nights 
and in consequence might frequently deploy few (if any) officers to the railways, which in 
consequence could lead to an escalation of crime and disorder throughout the 'former'
B.T. Police jurisdiction and increase fear of travelling by train in the community.
9.3 Wt o g is P-fllk ing in the IIJL Going?
On 20th May 1992, the then Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke announced to the Police 
Federation Conference at Scarborough, his intention to commission an inquiry into the 
Police Service. (Police Review 29 May 1992 p. 1001-1004) The terms of reference of 
the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, commonly referred to as the Sheehy 
Enquiry, were to examine the rank structure, remuneration and conditions of service of the 
police and to recommend what changes would be sensible to ensure rank structure and 
conditions of service, reflect the current role and responsibilities of officers; enough 
flexibility in the distribution of rewards to ensure that responsibilities and performance 
may be properly recognised in changing circumstances; remuneration set and maintained^
d
at a level to ensure recruitment, retention and motivation of officers of the right quality. 
(Fielding and Fowles - Penal Policy files, The Howard Journal - Vol. 32, N o.l, Feb. 93 
p.61) Initially, the announcement provoked mixed feelings : David Shattock, Chief 
Constable of Avon and Somerset welcomed it, provided that it also investigated the causes 
of crime. (Police Review 29 May 1992 p. 992), The Police Federation of England and 
Wales expressed fears o f ' cost cutting' (Ibid, p. 981), the fact that there was to be no 
police representatives on the team caused concern within police ranks (Police Review 31 
July 1992 p. 1411), whilst the Police Federation were reported to be 'Travelling World for 
Sheehy' (Police Review 11 Sept. 1992 p. 1661). Despite assurances that there would be 
no drastic restructuring of the Police Service (Police Review 15 May 1992 p. 885), the 
subsequent publication of the White Paper (Police Reform : A Police Service for the 21st 
Century - The Government's Proposals for the Police Service in England and Wales - 
1993 - H.M.S.O.) in June 1993, two days before the Sheehy Report belied these 
assurances. The White Paper proposes to : (inter alia) remodel Police Authorities, merge 
police forces, change disciplinary procedures, review the position of Chief Constables, 
develop the Special Constabulary, strengthen the Inspectorate, review force organisation 
and give the Home Secretary greater powers, including power to order mergers, set 
national objectives and limit the amount of cash he gives to each police authority. (Police 
Review 2nd July 1993 p. 12/13)
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Hot on the heels of the White Paper came the Sheehy Report (Inquiry into Police 
Responsibilities and Rewards - 1993 - H.M.S.O.). Among recommendations in that 
Report were : to abolish the ranks of Chief Inspector, Chief Superintendent and Deputy 
Chief Constable, introduce performance related appraisal and pay, a new pay structure 
removing overtime payments in many instances and altering conditions surrounding 
payment for rest days worked, ceasing payment of housing allowance to new recruits, a 
change in regional pay allowances, removal of restrictions on where an officer may live 
and related matters, replacement of police regulations by a national Code of Standards, 
abolish a number of allowances, e.g. detective expenses allowance, plain clothes 
allowance, introduce fixed term appointments, extend the age of retirement, amendments 
to pensions, employment of civilians by police authorities as opposed to local authorities 
and numerous other changes in conditions of service. (Police Review 2nd July 1993 p. 2- 
20)
Initial police reaction was explosive. All Sunday newspapers on the 4th July 1993 carried 
the advertisement by the Police Federation 'Do you believe the police should compete 
against crime or each other?' Media reports were mixed - 'The bobby on the beat will be 
under siege' (Observer 4th July 1993), 'Police warn of conflict over new proposals' 
(Independent 1st July 1993), 'The making of a better force' (Independent 1st July 1993), 
'Strong meat for the police' (Daily Telegraph 1st July 1993), 'Constable may be painted 
out of the picture' (Daily Telegraph 26th July 1993), 'Police chiefs confident of 
compromise over Sheehy' (Guardian 28th July 1993), 'Police changes will do nothing to 
cut crime' (Guardian 22nd July 1993). Sir Patrick Sheehy himself wrote an article in the 
Guardian on 26th July 1993, claiming that 'The report represents a unique opportunity to 
improve the police service both for the public it serves and for the dedicated officers who 
work within in. It would be a tragedy if that opportunity was lost because people had 
been misled about the nature of the proposals.' The root and branch re-organisation of the 
B.T. Police described in Chapter 1.1, together with an effort to dispense with the services 
of a number of older Superintendents and managers by way of voluntary severance in 
1993 (of which I took advantage) is an indication that the Force is well on the road to 
following some of the recommendations.
On 9th July, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police commenting on 'people's 
understandable fears and anxieties' said, 'I agree with the analysis of the problems but I 
have yet to be convinced about some of the proposals'. He added that it was time for 
mature reflection and not knee jerk reactions to what, after all, are recommendations'.
(The Job - July 9 1993 p. 1) By July 25th he was reported as saying that he might not be 
able to continue in his post if Ministers implemented the Sheehy Enquiry's 
recommendations on pay and conditions in full. (The Times 26 July 1993) also (Police 
Review 30 July 1993, R 4) On 20th July the Police Federation held an Open Meeting at 
Wembley Arena entitled 'Fighting for Your Future' which was attended by 23,000 officers 
(Police Review 20th August 1993 p. 13) and by the middle of August, four Chief 
Constables, including the Head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, had followed the stand 
taken by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, stating that they would have to review 
their positions if the Sheehy Report is implemented. (Police Review 20th August 1993 
p.4) The debate continues at the time of writing.
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Yet another report, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice with 352 recommendations, 
was published during the week ending 12th July 1993. Many of these concern police 
investigations, police practice, safeguards for suspects, the right of silence and confession 
evidence. The most radical proposal in respect of police, however, is that where a police 
officer is found not guilty of a criminal offence, that officer may have to face disciplinary 
charges on the same set of facts. (Police Review 9 July 1993, p. 16) This would place 
officers in double jeopardy and the recommendation that the standard of proof in 
disciplinary hearings should be less than that required to commit for a criminal offence 
would apply.
In addition to the recommendations of the three reports above, a code of ethics was 
launched for the Police Service on 8th December 1992. (Fielding and Fowles 1993, Penal 
Policy File, The Howard Journal - May p. 158) The eleven principles which are based 
upon human rights, proper use of power and personal accountability should provide a 
sound basis for community satisfaction if adhered to. This sub-chapter was entitled 
' Where is policing in the U.K. going?' Despite the initial comment on the Sheehy Report 
by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, that the report contains 'recommendations' 
(supra) and the enormous response by the police service, the Home Secretary Michael 
Howard is reported to have said that the new legislation which may be required to 
implement both the White Paper and the Sheehy Report would be in force by April 1995. 
Measures for which no legislation is needed will be implemented sooner. (Police Review 
2 July 1993 p. 13) It would be unwise to speculate, however, if the police service is to 
follow in the footsteps of the National Health and Education Services (both changed by 
Kenneth Clarke) speedy endemic change will ensue. 'Change' has been the watchword in 
the B.T. Police Force ever since the publication of the Emst and Whinney 
recommendations which followed the Strategic Management Review of the Force in 1988.
9.4 Who is in control?
Whilst Chief Constables (of civil police forces) are seen as a 'powerful elite group of 
growing importance' (Reiner 1992 p.3) 'in terms of power, economic class and social 
status' (p.5), the Government White Paper proposes to change the constitution of Police 
Authorities by reducing them to a 'manageable size' of sixteen, (eight councillors, three 
magistrates and five other local people appointed by the Home Secretary who will also 
select a chairperson). Additionally, the Home Secretary will set national objectives for 
the Police Service each year and H.M. Inspectorate will be strengthened. Whilst police 
authorities will continue to appoint Chief Constables, subject to the Home Secretary's 
approval, the Home Office is looking at ways of improving objectivity in assessment and 
adherence to the principle of equal opportunities. (Police Review 2nd July 1993 p. 12/13) 
Despite the fact that sixty per cent of Chief Constables believe that there should be a local 
police authority for the London Metropolitan Police (Reiner 1992 p.263) a view shared by 
others, e.g. Fielding 1991 p. 177, and often discussed at length, e.g. Lustgarten 1986 p.94- 
99, the White Paper does not recommend this, (as some expected), on the grounds of the 
national responsibilities of that force. The Home Secretary will retain his position as the 
police authority but will appoint up to sixteen people to 'help him oversee' the force 
(Police Review 2 July 1993 p. 13). 'The powers of the Home Secretary already dwarf
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those of local police authorities'. He has power to make regulations on establishment, 
discipline, pay, pensions, allowances, training, duties, leave, housing, uniforms, 
equipment and inspection. He may withhold grants, compulsorily amalgamate police 
forces, call upon Chief Constables to furnish him with reports on policing of their areas 
and can conduct ad-hoc independent enquiries into the conduct of a force. He approves 
senior police appointments and is the Appeal body for disciplinary proceedings (S.A. de 
Smith 1973, p.384-386). Except for a small minority, Chief Constables universally 
recognise that central control is increasing and the Home Office is seen as having both 
power and authority (Reiner 1992, p.284). With such existing powers of both central 
government and the Home Secretary and no sign of any diminution of enthusiasm for 
central government authority (despite a rhetoric of community empowerment), it seems 
increasingly unlikely that the anomalous position of the B.T. Police could remain unsolved 
for long. As will be seen, however, even the enormous step of privatising the railways 
has, so far, failed to clarify the status of the Force.
9.5 Where is theJTT, P.olire Force going?
The revelation that British Rail was to be privatised, widely reported in the media on 21st 
May 1988 caused deep consternation throughout the B.T. Police. Such headlines as 
'Thatcher advisers plan B.R. sell o ff (The Independent 21 May 1988) 'Maggie signals 
end of the line for British Rail' (The Sun 21 May 1988), 'The Great Train Robbery 1988' 
(Morning Star 21 May 1988) 'Swansong for British Rail' (Today 21 May 1988), 'B.R. 
gives sell off signals' (The Sunday Times 22 May 1988), to mention but a few, led to the 
question within the Force 'What will happen to the B.T.P?' Rumours were rife, so much 
so that in his first Annual Report, the newly appointed Chief Constable provided the 
carefully worded statement with which I started this Chapter. Though some five years 
later, rail privatisation looms nearer, the final answer has still not fully emerged. In June 
1993, Roger Freeman the Transport Secretary announced that control of the Force will 
remain in the 'public sector' - albeit governed by Railtrack, the body of British Rail due to 
be responsible for track allocation to private operators. Whether 'Railtrack' will be under 
government supervision, thus causing it to be in the 'public sector' is unclear.
Furthermore, the 'industry' perception of requirements for policing should be taken into 
account when deciding the levels of policing', (Police Review 2 July 1993 p. 11) who will 
control B.T. Police? Despite an immediate request to Kenneth Clarke to include B.T. 
Police in the Sheehy Enquiry by the B.T. Police Federation on the grounds that if excluded 
it would leave the Force open to being labelled as not part of mainstream policing.
(Police Review 19 June 1992 p.l 120), the Force was excluded. This was in line with 
government attitudes since railway policing began. The Royal Commission on Police of 
1839 and all Royal Commissions since, have excluded the Force. The Government failed 
to intervene in 1983 when Associated British Ports withdrew their support for the Force 
and again in 1984 when Sealink announced it would do likewise. In Parliamentary 
Debate on 14th December 1984, in response to Robert McCrindle M.P. who raised 
concerns about the withdrawals, the Under Secretary of State for Transport re-asserted 
that :
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(a) the establishment and deployment of the British Transport Police is a matter not 
for the Government but the British Railways Board and other organisations making 
use of their services;
(b) the decision of Associated British Ports to dispense with the services of B.T. Police 
was a commercial matter entirely for Associated British Ports;
(c) the investigation of criminal offences committed on the property of Associated 
British Ports would be undertaken by local county police - arrangements which 
exist in 'dozens of ports' not served by the B.T.P. or having their own police force.
(d) a number of stories had been circulating that the withdrawal of B.T. Police would 
result in organised crime, including drug trafficking - these assertions stray away 
from reality.
(Hansard 14 December 1984 - H.M.S.O. Col. 1380-1386)
f a  uniformed police force in was formed by the West India Company of
Merchantmen, approved by the government but originally paid for by the Merchant 
Companies. The first Marine Police Office was opened in 1798 on the site of the present 
Metropolitan Police Thames Division H.Q. at Wapping. The Marine Police Office, taken 
over in 1839 by the Metropolitan Police Thames Division (Metline June 1993 p. 6/7) 
continues today - publicly funded. In 1991, drugs seizures rose by 15% to 69,800, a 
similar rate of increase to the previous year. Most seizures of all drugs were from the 
person (90%) and some in postal consignments. In terms of weight, the majority were 
seized by Customs and Excise. (Fielding and Fowles 1993 - Penal Policy File - The 
Howard Journal Feb. 1993 - p.60). How much of this materials, seized on the streets by 
police, passed into the U.K. through sea ports and docks which were not policed, or 
ineffectively policed? Currently, nine British Ports/Docks are listed as maintaining a 
statutory constabulary (Police and Constabulary Almanac 1993 p. 268/269). Further 
research on the point of entry of drug seizures, together with similar research on the illegal 
importation of explosives, firearms, pornography, animals and birds, as well as illegal 
immigration, might well establish whether or not national security is being compromised 
by commercial considerations.
Another opportunity for the effective use of British Transport Police expertise was 
sanitised by the government (by way of section 14 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987) by 
placing the policing of the Channel Tunnel under the direction of the Chief Constable of 
Kent. What is the Channel Tunnel but an underground railway? Who has the expertise 
in policing such railways? Sound, visual evidence of this was provided by I.T.V's Crime 
Monthly programme on Friday 20th August 1993 at 10.40p.m. with a snapshot of 
specialist B.T. Police squads at work on the London Underground, combating indecency 
and pick pocketing. Will the privatisation of the railways cause the destruction of this 
effectiveness? Will British Transport Police have the appropriate funding and status to 
continue to provide such expertise or will the control of public space on the Underground 
pass to unqualified, untrained security officers with no constabulary powers?
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Although the government declined to include the Force in the Sheehy Enquiry, there 
seems little doubt that B.T. Police will follow those recommendations of the Report which 
become mandatory. The Chief Constable welcomed the proposals on fixed term contracts 
and performance related pay shortly after the Report was published (Police Review 14 
July 1993 p. 14). The root and branch reorganisation of the Force which was finalised on 
the 2nd April 1992 was the culmination of a number of initiatives starting with the Force 
Strategic Management Review conducted by the same consultants (Emst & Young, albeit 
in 1988 these were Emst and Whinney) as those who conducted the original research 
component of the Sheehy Enquiry.
Despite continuing statements by Government officials that the B.T. Police remain the 
responsibility of the appropriate Transport Authority and not the Government, the 
publication of the Consultative Document by the Department of Transport in November 
1992, entitled 'The Future Status of the British Transport Police ' and the White Paper 
'New Opportunities for the Railways (July 1992) the Government officially recognised the 
Force, perhaps for the first time in it's history. An analysis of the Consultation Document 
may provide an answer to the question 'Where is the B.T. Police going?' The paper 
provided four options (at p. 9/10)
Option 1 B.T. Police retained - direct funding by Dept, of Transport (DoT) Home 
Office.
Option 2 B.T.P. retained - responsible to the Track Authority.
Option 3 B.T.P. retained - responsible to the Regulator.
Option 4 B.T.P. retained - responsible to the Secretary of State.
Although it was stated at the beginning of the document that it's purpose was to form a 
basis for more detailed discussions with those directly concerned with the operation and 
management of the British Transport Police and comments on all aspects of it's proposals 
would be welcomed, the paper contained a 'preliminary conclusion' (at p. 10, para 31) that 
'It is considered that direct funding of B.T.P. by the Government should be rejected'. To 
reflect such a recommendation BEFORE 'welcoming comments' seemed to suggest that a 
decision had already been reached. The Chief Constable, the British Transport Police 
Federation and the Superintendents' Association, each provided 'comments' to the effect 
that this option was the most acceptable.
The relative value of each option is difficult to comment upon in the light of the arbitrary 
dismissal of Option 1. Policing railways in a specialist manner is analogous to policing 
airports. Privatisation of the industry is thus irrelevant to operational policing if control 
and funding is exercised by H.M. Government either through the Home Office or the 
Department of Transport. Paragraph 28 puts the whole question of funding and control 
into perspective with these words :
a national police force controlled by private companies and exercising all the powers of 
constables might prove unacceptable to public opinion'
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Taken with reference to Terrorism in paragraph 17, and comparing the situation which 
existed at principal British Airports in 1974, there can be no doubt that the status of the 
British Transport Police must in the eyes of the community, i.e. society as a whole, be 
equal to that of any Home Department Force in the U.K.
Any apparent or real control of the Force by British Rail, London Underground or any 
private organisation created by privatisation measures will thus complicate the status of 
the Force in the future. The 'take-over' by civil police of policing major airports in 1974 
(see Chapter 8) demonstrated that the status and competence of the British Airports 
Authority Constabulary was in doubt.
The principal reason given for the take-over at Heathrow was that Metropolitan Police had 
greater resources to deploy in the response to terrorism. This reason may be echoed in 
paragraph 21 of the consultation paper in relation to London Underground. Terrorist 
activity in the 1970's was considerable on the railway and has recommenced in the 1990's.
Whilst paragraph 20 draws attention to the valuable assistance rendered by the Force to 
'County' police forces, assistance to Metropolitan Forces is not mentioned and paragraphs 
21-23 indicate that a take-over of London Underground and British Rail stations on 
Network SouthEast by Metropolitan Police is being considered. Paragraph 22, however, 
again sharpens perspective in relation to the specialist knowledge required to police the 
railway. B.T. Police have such expertise already.
Much depends upon Government's perception of the value to the nation of the remaining 
rail network as to the method of policing. Given environmental factors, future reserves of 
oil, gas, coal etc. and the conservation of energy, the network will provide a sound, future 
source of transport and communication. Sir Robert Reid, Chairman of British Rail has 
pointed out that, 'in  the 1990's congestion and pollution caused by rapid expansion of 
road and air transport is reinforcing the case for an acceleration in the pace of railway 
development'. (Future Rail - The next decade - B.R.B. 1991)
References in paragraph 16 to Associated British Ports and Sealink's withdrawal from the 
B.T. Police Scheme because 'security men were cheaper', is a major concern. Whether 
security men provide value for money in quality of service is questionable. Increasing 
illegal importation of drugs and other goods as well as illegal immigration, might be 
reduced by a professional police presence acting as a deterrent. The withdrawal of police 
from some ports and docks might well have contributed to it's increase. In such areas, 
vital to national security, it is important that control is not lost.
Paragraph 35 presupposes that a 'Regulator' is to be appointed but gives no information 
on the qualifications of such a person. Bearing in mind the demands of policing the rail 
system, it does not seem desirable to allow operators who wish to make ' alternative' 
policing arrangements to do so. If, however, (as at airports) they wish to enhance their 
security facilities by the use of private security companies, the should be encouraged. 
Replacing professional police officers with unskilled civilian labour to provide a
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seemingly secure situation is out of step with the character of civilianisation in the civil 
police forces.
9.6 Conclusion - Where should B.T. Police be going?
The core functions of any police force have been enshrined in custom and law since the 
inception of the 'new police' in the early nineteenth century and have not really changed 
much - The Protection of Life and Property, The Preservation of the Peace, The Prevention 
of Crime and the Detection and apprehension of offenders. Modem writers, (notably 
Lustgarten) argue convincingly that police officers can no longer be seen as self directed 
decision makers answerable only to the law and this dictum is adequately catered for in the 
current Force Statement indicating aims and values to carry the Force into the 21st 
century.
The Force has also demonstrated its flexibility in consultative approaches with the railway 
community and society as a whole, implementing many innovative schemes aimed at, for 
example, crime reduction, fear of crime reduction, victim support and (as indicated in 
paragraph 17 of the consultation paper), 'a  robust answer to the terrorist threat'.
Whilst the operational control of the Force must of necessity rest with the Chief 
Constable, it is suggested that the control and allocation of costs should rest with the 
Police Committee and/or the appropriate Minister. It has been said the present Committee 
' in practice' parallels the duties and responsibilities of a Police Authority of a provincial 
police force'. (Crime on the London Underground - DoT 1986 - H.M.S.O.) The current 
composition, however, remains heavily weighted by British Rail and London 
Underground managers who, of necessity will be biased in directing costs to the running 
of a railway, not a police force. The requirement to maintain an adequate (as well as an 
efficient) police force, recently added by the new Scheme, creates a new dimension as 
does the addition of independent members. The composition needs to be widened further 
however, if public credibility is to be achieved. Additionally, the member with specialist 
police knowledge needs to be changed frequently in order to provide current police 
practice and management information. These comments presuppose that a Police 
Committee is necessary in the future. The London Metropolitan Police, a force more than 
ten times the size of the B.T.P. is managed by the Home Secretary. 'Control' of a police 
force is an emotive word and care will need to be taken to ensure that the Force is not 
totally compromised by commercial considerations. The 'great difficulty in 
implementing a financial regime' referred to in paragraph 19 might be eased by a study of 
how the costs of police at major British Airports has been financed for two decades. The 
80%/20% public/industry commitments of the Force (paragraph 13) is an important 
feature of future funding.
If the case for a unified B.T. Police (paragraphs 15-20) is sincerely stated, the 80% public 
duty (paragraph 2) taken seriously and the need to preserve the nation's railways in safety 
and security for future generations is honestly believed, there is only one way forward. 
H.M. Government has the opportunity to re-address the constant historical ignorance of 
the importance of providing a sound, professional, effective and efficient policing service 
for the railways, equal in status to Home Department Forces, by making B.T. Police the
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U.K's fifty-third police force with the implementation of Option 1. Anything less will be 
a retrograde step.
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APPENDICES
Appendix ONE
BRITISH TRANSPORT POLICE
Reproduced by kind 
permission of B.T. Police
THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE FOR THE RAILWAYS 
ENFORCING THE LAW TO PRESERVE THE QUEEN’S PEACE 
AND REDUCING THE FEAR OF CRIME
OUR AIMS
Making our  railways the safest
Enhancing the quality of life for customers and staff 
while safeguarding the whole communi ty
OUR VALUES
Giving a best  quali ty policing service which is 
caring,  efficient,  cour teous  and approachable,  
in a way that  is 
consul tat ive,  flexible and cost effective
“Treating each call for service as if it came from a member of o u r  family" 
“ Supporting  the victims of crime"
HELP US - HELP YOU
Appendix TWO
THE POLICE SERVICE 
STATEMENT OF COMMON PURPOSE 
AND VALUES
Source : ACPO Strategic Policy Document 
Setting the Standards for Policing :
Meeting Community Expectation.
The purpose of the Police Service is to uphold the 
law fairly and firmly: to prevent crime; to pursue 
and bring to justice those who break the law; to 
keep the Queen's Peace; to protect, help and 
reassure the community: and to be seen to do all 
this with integrity, common sense and sound 
judgement.
We must be compassionate, courteous and 
patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice 
to the rights of others. We need to be professional, 
calm and restrained in the face of violence and 
apply only that force which is necessary to 
accomplish our lawful duty.
We must strive to reduce the fears of the public 
and, as far as we can, to reflect their priorities in the 
action we take. We must respond to well - founded 
criticism with a willingness to change.
ACPO 1990
The ability of the service to adopt the above statement will depend on the willing co -operation 
and assistance of society in general. The maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of 
society itself not solely that of the police.
Organisation -1987 Appendix THREE
Coae D iv is ion Strength
\ Western 153
2 Eastern 154
3 Southern 23 7
4 M idlands 187
5 N onh West 211
6 N orth East 183
7 Scottish . 176
8 London Transport 314
M obile Units 97
Force Headquarters 134
70TAL 1.846
Reproduced by kind 
permission of B.T.Police
P a rkeston Quay
N E W  F O R C E  S T R U C T U R E  F R O M  5 A P R I L  1 9 9 2
Scottish Area
E d i n b u r g h
I n v e r n e s s
P a i s l e y
M o t h e r w e l l
D u n d e e
P e r t h
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s  
G l a s g o w  
A b e r d e e n  
D a l m u i r  
K i l w i n n i n g  
K i r k c a l d y  
F a l k i r k
S c o t t i s h  A r e a  H e a d q u a r t e r s  
9 0  C o w c a d d e n s  R o a d  
G l a s g o w  G 4  O L U  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :
A s s i s t a n t  C h i e f  C o n s t a b l e
A . M .  M a c K e n z i e  D L
0 4 1 - 3 3 2 - 9 4 4 3
0 4 5 - 3 8 0 0
F a x .  0 4 1 - 3 3 5 - 2 1 5 5
S R  North Western Area
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
L i v e r p o o l
C a r l i s l e
C r e w e
B a n g o r
B l a c k b u r n
C h e s t e r
P r e s t o n
M a n c h e s t e r
W i g o n
L a n c a s t e r
B l a c k p o o l
S t o k e
N o r t h  W e s t e r n  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
R a i l  H o u s e ,  S t o r e  S t r e e t  
M a n c h e s t e r  M 6 0  9 A J  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :  
C h i e f  S u p e r i n t e n d e n t  
G . S .  G r i f f i t h s  
0 6 1 - 2 3 6 - 4 5 6 3  
0 5 8 - 5 3 8 4  
F a x :  0 6 1 - 2 3 6 - 6 3 5 5
g j [  South Western Area"
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
B r i s t o l  
S w a n s e a  
G l o u c e s t e r  
E x e t e r  
W e s l b u r y
S o u t h  W e s t e r n  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
1 1 1 - 1 1 7  V i c t o r i a  S t r e e t  
B r i s t o l  8 S 1  6 A X  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :  
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t  
A . D .  T h o m p s o n  
0 2 7 2 - 2 5 2 8 3 5  
0 7 4 - 2 6 7 0  
F a x :  0 2 7 2 - 3 4 8 3 3 6
C a r d i f f
P l y m o u t h
T r u r o
S w i n d o n
N e w p o r t
| North Eastern Area
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
L e e d s  
N e w c a s t l e  
M i d d l e s b r o u g h  
H u l l
S h e f f i e l d  
B r a d f o r d
N o r t h  E a s t e r n  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
L e e d s  C i t y  S t a t i o n  
L e e d s  L S I  4 P R  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :  
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t  
S . C . M .  H o l s t o n  
0 5 3 2 - 4 1  1 5 5 0 0  
0 3 3 - 2 5 5 0  
F a x :  0 5 3 2 - 4 1  1 7 7 2
Appendix FOUR
D a r l i n g t o n
D o n c a s t e r
Y o r k
G r i m s b y
S u n d e r l a n d
3  London South Area
D o v e r / A s h f o r d  
L o n d o n  B r i d g e  
G u i l d f o r d  
C r o y d o n  
C h a r i n g  C r o s s
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
V i c t o r i a  W a t e r l o o  
S o u t h a m p t o n  
B r i g h t o n  
G a t w i c k  
C h a t h a m  
P o r t s m o u t h  
L o n d o n  S o u t h  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
3  E b u r y  B r i d g e  
L o n d o n  S W 1 W 8 R P  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :
C h i e f  S u p e r i n t e n d e n t  
A . F .  S t o p p a n i  
0 7 1 - 8 3 4 - 2 6 3 0  
F a x :  0 7 1 - 9 2 2 - 7 2 3 3
ll j j '  London Underground Area
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
W e m b l e y  P a r k  F i n s b u r y  P a r k  
S t o c k w e l l  A l d g a t e
B a k e r  S t r e e t  /  S e l b i e  H o u s e  
H e a t h r o w  H a m m e r s m i t h
E a s t  H a m
L o n d o n  U n d e r g r o u n d  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
5 5  B r o a d w a y  
L o n d o n  S W 1 H  0 B D  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :
C h i e f  S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
P .  N i c h o l a s
0 7 1 - 9 1 8 - 3 5 5 3
0 8 4 - 3 5 5 3
F a x :  0 7 1 - 9 1 8 - 3 4 1 9
M id land  Area
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
B i r m i n g h a m  D e r b y  
P e t e r b o r o u g h  S h r e w s b u r y  
L e i c e s t e r  L i n c o l n
C o v e n t r y  W o l v e r h a m p t o n
N o t t i n g h a m
M i d l a n d  A r e a  H e a d q u a r t e r s :  
B i r m i n g h a m ,  N e w  S t r e e t  
S t a t i o n
B i r m i n g h a m  B 2  4 Q A  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :  
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t  
A .  C l i f t
0 2 1 - 6 4 3 - 1  1 0 5
0 5 0 - 4 2 3 7
F a x :  0 2 1 - 6 4 4 - 4 6 1 2
London North Area"
L i v e r p o o l  S t r e e t  
I p s w i c h  
M i l t o n  K e y n e s  
N o r w i c h  
S t .  P a n c r a s
P o l i c e  s t a t i o n s :
K i n g s  C r o s s  R e a d i n g  
P a d d i n g t o n  
S o u t h e n d  
C a m b r i d g e  
S t r a t f o r d  
O x f o r d  
E u s t o n
L o n d o n  N o r t h  A r e a  
H e a d q u a r t e r s :
3 r d  F l o o r / W e s t s i d e  O f f i c e s  
K i n g s  C r o s s  R a i l w a y  S t a t i o n  
L o n d o n  N 1  9 A P  
A r e a  C o m m a n d e r :
C h i e f  S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
A . J .  B o f w o o d
0 7 1 - 9 2 2 - 4 9 5 9
0 0 2 - 4 9 5 4
F a x :  0 1 7 - 9 2 2 - 4 9 5 8
Reproduced by kind permission of 
The British Transport Police
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